Billy Ray Ashley v. United StatesBilly Ray Ashley v. United States
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Easterbrook
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Billy Ashley filed with this court an application for leave to commence a collateral attack. That request was dismissed because it appeared to be unnecessary: Ashley had not filed a previous collateral attack, so he did not need our permission. He then turned to the district court, which dismissed as untimely his motion under
Paragraph 6 of
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
The district court treated subparagraph (1) as the applicable limit and rejected Ashley’s argument that his application is timely under subparagraph (3) because filed within a year of Apprendi. No one could doubt that Apprendi “newly” or “initially” recognizes a constitutional right. Apprendi caused this court to overrule numerous eases, a sign that something novel occurred. See United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820 (7th Cir.2000). Nonetheless, the district court held, until the Supreme Court itself declares that a new decision applies retroactively on collateral review, subparagraph (3) does not open a new filing window for prisoners.
In reaching this decision, the district court drew on opinions holding that an appellate court may authorize a second or successive application under
Yet the two provisions differ. (As do
a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
Paragraph 6(3), by contrast, restarts the time on:
the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral reviewf.]
An initial petition may be filed within a year of a decision that is “made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[.]” A second petition, by contrast, depends on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” (emphasis added). Both statutes make it clear that only the Supreme Court may issue the new decision. But who decides whether that new decision applies retroactively? The first formulation (“made retroactive”) leaves that question open. The second formulation (“made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court”) answers it. To treat the first formulation as identical to the second is not faithful to the difference in language. By omitting the restriction contained in ¶ 8(2), ¶ 6(3) implies that courts of appeals and district courts may “make” the retro-activity decision. Tyler concludes that the word “made” in ¶ 8(2) means “held.” — U.S. at -, 121 S.Ct. at 2483. District and appellate courts, no less than the Supreme Court, may issue opinions “holding” that a decision applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The jurisdictional (and precedential) scope of that holding differs, but it is a holding nonetheless.
At least three reasons justify the difference between ¶ 6(3) and ¶ 8(2). First, permitting a district or appellate court to make the retroactivity decision for an initial petition may be essential to put the question before the Supreme Court for final resolution. How else would a retro-activity question get before the Supreme Court so that it could make the decision that would in turn authorize second or successive petitions? Second, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Tyler, — U.S. at -, 121 S.Ct. at 2483, a court of appeals has only 30 days to decide whether a second or successive petition may be filed. Shortness of time implies a mechanical process; all the court need do is look up an answer in the United States Reports. No such time limit attends an initial petition for collateral review, so courts have time to apply the retroactivity criteria in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), to novel decisions of the Supreme Court. Third, the conditions for filing successive petitions are substantively as well as procedurally more restrictive; having had one full opportunity to wage a collateral attack, the prisoner cannot demand another on the same terms. Yet on the district court’s view it is as hard to launch an initial collateral attack as a subsequent one.
There remains the requirement that
some
court make the decision retroactive. The one year to file under ¶ 6(3) begins, not on the date of the Supreme Court’s decision newly recognizing a constitutional right, but on the date that decision is “made retroactive”. Otherwise ¶ 6(3) is a mirage, for retroactivity deci
Right after
Apprendi
appeared, no court anywhere in the country had had a chance to decide whether it was retroactive. Are only prisoners whose convictions became final in the year before
Apprendi
eligible to seek such a declaration, with everyone else queued up until a court in the prisoner’s state has held that the Supreme Court’s decision is retroactive? Nothing in
Having reached this conclusion, we must acknowledge that the district court’s contrary view has some support. Indeed, it has the support of
Montenegro v. United States,
248 F.3d 585, 593-94 (7th Cir.2001), on which the ink is barely dry. We said in
Montenegro
almost exactly what the district judge said here: that ¶ 6(3) and ¶ 8(2) should be read identically. What we did not do is say why. On the very date that
Montenegro
was issued, a panel of the fifth circuit held, to the contrary, that ¶ 6(3) differs from ¶ 8(2) in allowing district and appellate courts to make the retroactivity decision.
United States v. Lopez,
248 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir.2001). So we have a conflict among the circuits, which will disappear if we overrule this portion of
Montenegro.
Overruling such a recent case is an unusual step, but a conflict created on a single day (with each circuit in ignorance of the other’s views) also is unusual. Our decision not only failed to grapple with the reasons given in
Lopez,
on which we have elaborated above, but also was issued before the Supreme Court released
Tyler,
the definitive interpretation of ¶ 8(2). As we have observed, strands of the analysis in
Tyler
counsel against equating ¶ 6(3)
The district court dismissed Ashley s petition as untimely without reaching a conclusion about whether
Apprendi
applies retroactively to collateral attacks. We therefore issue a certificate of appealability, for given
Apprendi
the underlying constitutional claim must be deemed “substantial” for purposes of
Vacated and Remanded.
Notes
This opinion was circulated among the court‘s active judges before release. See Circuit Rule 40(e). None of the judges favored a hearing en banc.