69 W. Va. 15 | W. Va. | 1911
This is a suit to cancel a written contract for the purchase of a piano to be paid for upon the installment plan, on the ground that plaintiffs signature to the contract was procured by false and fraudulent representations. The cause was heard March 23, 1908, in the circuit court of Mingo county upon bill, answer and general replication and depositions taken on-behalf of the plaintiff, and a final decree pronounced cancelling and anulling the contract, and giving plaintiff a recovery against the defendant for $50, the amount of money which she had paid on the piano; and decreeing that, upon the repayment of said sum, and the costs of the suit, the plaintiff should return to the defendant or its agent the piano. From this decree defendant has appealed.
There was a demurrer to the bill which was overruled, and this is assigned as error. The bill states a good cause for equitable relief and the court committed no error in overruling the de
But we think the proof fails to establish a ease of fraud. Plaintiff agreed to pay $250 for the piano, and paid $20 down; she paid $30' more in five separate payments. Plaintiff testified that she did not know the value of pianos, and that she trusted to defendant’s agent to sell her a good one; that he represented to her that it was a good one, and that it was worth $250. She does not claim the piano is not of the kind described in the contract; but says she afterwards learned it was a cheap one, and not worth the money which she had agreed to pay; that it was not worth more than $50. The fraud, relied on is the misrepresentation of the defendant’s agent as to the value of the piano. A witness for plaintiff, M. Damn, who was a music teacher, and apparently a tuner and repairer of pianos, testifies that the piano ought not to have cost the dealer more than from $115 to $125 when new, and ought to sell for about $175. But the fact that plaintiff had agreed to pay more for the piano than it was worth, is not alone sufficient to establish such fraud as would entitle her to be relieved against her contract. If courts would undertake to relieve parties from the effects of their contracts, simply because they had been induced to buy a thing for more than it was worth, they would be kept very busy indeed. Courts will not thus assume the guardianship over people who are sui juris. “Mere inadequacy of consideration which is a species of constructive fraud' is not of itself sufficient to justify a court of equity in setting aside a deed or other contract, unless the inadequacy be such as to justify the presumption of fraud or collusion; and to justify such presumption from inadequacy alone it must be so strong and manifest such an inadequacy as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any man of common sense.” Hogg’s Eq. Prin., section 51. This - principle applies whether the thing be personal property or real estate. If inadequacy of price is not sufficient reason to set aside a contract on application of the seller, it follows that the purchaser can not’ avoid it on the ground that the price which he has agreed to
We are clearly of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to prove a case entitling her to equitable relief. We will, therefore, reverse the decree of the lower court, and will render such decree as the lower court should have rendered, which will be to dismiss plaintiff’s bill. Reversed and Bill Dismissed