Lead Opinion
Thе information charges that the appellant forged the name of Louis C. Morgan, deceased, to an instrumеnt purporting to be a promissory note; that the forgery was committed after his death, and was committed for thе purpose of defrauding the estate of Louis C. Morgan.
'• The objection urged against this information is, that it «does nоt aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The reason advanced in suppоrt of this proposition is, that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This сontention can not prevail. The estate of a decedent is a person in legal contemplаtion. “The word person,” says Mr. Abbott, “inits legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural рersons.” 2 Abbott Law Dictionary, 271; Douglass v. Pacific, etc., Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters’, etc., Bank v. Andrews, 8 Porter (Ala.) 404. It is said in another work that •“Persons are of two kinds, natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2)' a collection of property to which the law attributes the capаcity of having rights and duties- The latter
Our *own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for thеy declare that it is sufficient in pleading a. claim against a decedent’s estate to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn v. Collins,
The appellant filed a plea in abatement, but we deem it only necessary to say of this plea, that an incomplete sentence, leaves it in such a condition as to make it fatally defective.. It is a familiar rule that omissions or defects in a plea in. abatement can not be supplied or cured by intendment.
The record shows that the trial court sustained a demurrer to the plеa, and that, thereupon, a jury was called and sworn and evidence heard, but it does not show an arraignment or a plea. No objection was made below in any form to the failure of the court to arraign the defendant or to require him to plead to the indictment. The question is made for the first time by the assignment of errors in this court. If thе question had been properly saved, it would be our duty to reverse the judgment, for in criminal cases there must be a plea, as a trial without a plea is certainly erroneous. Tindall v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
On Petition foe a Rehearing.
In the argument on the petition for a rehearing it is insisted that we did not decide one of the points made by сounsel as to the sufficiency of the information. The argument upon this point in the original brief was exceedingly meagre, as counsel evidently relied upon other points for the reversal of the judgment. As stated in the original brief the objection now under discussion was, that “ the prosecuting attorney nowhei’e charges the forgery of the' note, by making the same or causing it to be done,” and this objection is discussed at much length in the brief on the petitiоn. We think it without merit. The introductory clause of the information reads thus: “ Hiram McCormick, the prosecuting attorney of the Forty-ninth Judicial Circuit, prosecuting the pleas of the State of Indiana, gives the court to know and be informеd that heretofore, to wit,” etc. The conclusion of the information reads thus : '“'So the said prosecuting attоrney says
We do not deem it necessary to again discuss the questions considered by us in our former opinion.
Petition overruled.
Niblack, J., dissents from this opinion.
Filed June 17, 1886.