39 W. Va. 108 | W. Va. | 1894
This was a bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court of Roane county in the month of October, 1891, by E. L. Bill, against J. G. Schilling, William Woodyard, and M. W. Kidd.
The facts, which appear in the record, and which gave
The suit in equity brought by said E. L. Bill in October, 1891, as above stated, sought, among other things, to set aside the sales and deeds made thereunder with respect to the twelve acres of land (which description was intended to include the entire fourteen and a half acres) as fraudulent
The plaintiff" in his bill relies upon the following alleged facts and circumstances to entitle him to the relief prayed for, to wit: That, on the 8th of January, 1869, Iienry D. Chapman conveyed to him and the defendant William Woodyard said fourteen acres of land; that a vendor’s lien was reserved for five hundred dollars, the residue of tire purchase-money; that at that time Henry J. Fisher claimed to have alien against said tract of land equal to or in excess of the unpaid purchase-money, for which said Chapman retained a lien in his. deed to himself and said Woodyard ; that.said Fisher instituted a suit to enforce his lien against said property, and before a decree was obtained, about February, 1871, he, plaintiff, removed from the county of lloane, and thereafter, until within the last one or two years, had no personal knowledge of or in relation to the proceedings had in said chancery cause brought by said Fisher, and had no adequate or reliable information respecting the several matters complained of until the 1st day of November, 1890 ; that, upon examination of the records of the Circuit Court of Boane county, he found that George J. Walker in September, 1873, acting as special commissioner under the authority of two certain decrees in said chancery cause of Fisher against Schilling, administrator, and others —one on the 13th day of November, 1872, and the other in March, 1873 — sold the real estate aforesaid in two parcels
The plaintiff also charges that there was a fraudulent combination on the part of the defendant J. G. Schilling and others to procure the sale of the entirety of the twelve acres of laud aforesaid, which had the effect, or the apparent effect, of wiping out and extinguishing the plaintiff’s one half interest in said valuable real estate; that said Schilling, as administrator of said Chapman, failed to pay, and did not pay, the small sum of three or four hundred dollars, as it was his duty to do in the premises, and thus save from sale the said parcel of twelve acres of land, with the fine homestead residence and other valuable improvements thereon; that, since the close of the year 1889, he had been informed that the said Schilling merely used the defendant M. W. Kidd as an instrument in said purchase,
The defendant, Schilling, demurred to plaintiff’s bill and by his answer put in issue every material allegation it contained and alleged, that the plaintiff never had any interest in said tract of land, as it was conveyed to him and said Woodjmrd without any valuable consideration and with intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of said H. D. Chapman, and that said Bill accepted said deed in furtherance of said object. He also alleges that said Bill filed his answer to the bill filed by said Fisher in the Circuit Court of Roane county, and that he was informed both by letter and in person of the proceedings had in said cause about the time they were entered, and says that if he was the owner of one half of said, fourteen acres of land, as claimed in his bill, it is incredible that he should have had no personal knowledge about what became of the property since February, 1871, a period of eighteen or nineteen
Respondent further says that the plaintiff and defendants Kidd, Woodyard, and himself all married daughters of said
Several depositions were taken in the cause, and on the 3d day of December, 1892, a decree was rendered in the same denying the relief prayed for, and dismissing the plaintiff’s bill, with costs, and from this decree the plaintiff obtained this appeal.
The first error assigned and relied upon is as to the action of the court in its final decree in refusing the relief prayed for, and in dismissing the plaintiff’s bill. In considering the questions raised by this assignment of error we notice, first, that the plaintiff appears to place great reliance on the alleged fact that, during the pendency of the chancery suits of Fisher v. Chapman et al. and Marks v. Chapman et al., he was absent from the county of Roane, and apart of the time from this state and from the United States, and that advantage was taken of his absence to obtain decrees from the court adverse to his interests and in fraud of his rights. When, however, we consider the fact that he was not only made a party defendant in both of said suits, but also that he appeared and filed his answer in each of said causes, which answers were signed and sworn to by him, the fact, that he paid no further attention to the
The decree directing the sale of the fourteen acres of land in satisfaction of the vendor’s lien retained by Fisher was entered on the 13th day of November, 1872, and the plaintiff brought this suit to October rules, 1891, after a period of nearly nineteen years bad elapsed, praying that the sales made therein and the several deeds made thereunder, with respect to said twelve acres of land, might be set aside as fraudulent and void as to the rights of the plaintiff therein ; that he might have a decree for the undivided half of the twelve acre-tract conveyed to him and defendant Wood-yard by Ilenry D. Chapman on the 8th day of January, 1869, or that he might have a decree against the defendant Schilling for the portion of said twelve acres occupied by him under the partition thereof between said Schilling and the defendant Woodyard, or, if he was not entitled to that, that he might have a decree for the amount due him as aforesaid of the surplus proceeds of the sale of said twelve-acre property, with interest; that the lien for one thousand four hundred and fifty two dollars with interest thereon, reserved in the deed to the purchaser thereof, might be declared and held a valid and binding vendor’s lien thereon, and that the same might be enforced by decreeing a sale of the land, and that the full amount to which lie was entitled be decreed him.
In this connection it is proper to notice the fact, that more than ten years bad elapsed since the execution of the deed from George J. Walker, special commissioner, to M. W. Kidd, the purchaser of said fourteen acres of land at the judicial sale, and more than eighteen years after the confirmation of said sale; and, after waiting this great
In the case of Braden v. Reitzenberger, 18 W. Va. 286 (third point of syllabus) this Court held : “A party without showing more, will not be permitted to contradict the solemn records of a court on the ground that the statements therein are false, that they show that proof was heard, when in fact no proof was heard, and chai'gethat there was consequently fraud in both the party and the court in so eutering the judgment.” The court in its opinion, on page 291, says: “Suitors must learn, and it is strange they have not loug ago learned, that when, by their own default, a judgment is rendered against them, it requires much more than to show that the judgment was not sustained by law or fact to impeach it in a court of equity. If they will be careless and not attend to their interests in court, and not watch the entries made of record, they must suffer the consequences of their folly. It is far better that they should suffer than that the rights of everybody else should be placed in jeopardy.”
Again, when we inquire how the plaintiff acquired the interest, which he claims and is seeking to assert, in his parcel of land (which in fact contained fourteen apd a half acres, part of which, two and a half acres, is spoken of as the “Argabrite tract”) the proof clearly indicates, that said Henry I). Chapman was pecuniarily embarrassed and unable to meet his liabilities, and upon a conference with the plaintiff’and Woodyard, his sons-in-law, it was thought best that this tract of land should be conveyed by said Chapman to the plaintiff and the defendant Wood-yard, subject to the vendor’s lien retained by said Fisher; that no, consideration was paid by the said Bill or Wood-yard therefor, and that the object of said conveyance was
If, however, it be conceded that the plaintiff pai’ticipated in no fraud in the procurement of his alleged title to the land in controversy, does his voluntary absence from the county and state afford an excuse for his long delay in the assertion of his claim ? He appeared promptly and filed his answer under oath, thus bringing himself unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the court; and if by his voluntai’y act in absenting himself from the county and state he was ignorant of what was transpiring in the case? it was attributable to his own neglect; and if, as he states, the alleged fraud was discovered by him by an examination of the record, this same fraud might have been discovered by an examination of the same record eighteen years before the institution of his suit; and if he could be allowed to wait eighteen years before he makes such examination, who can say how long he may not wait before he looks after his interests in a suit, to which he is a party defendant, and then ask that the decrees be set aside excusing his delay on the ground of his ignorance of what the record contained?
In the case of Trader v. Jarvis, 28 W. Va. 100, this Court held (second point of syllabus) that “delay in the assertion of a right, unless satisfactorily explained, even where it does not constitute a positive statutory bar, operates in equity as an evidence of assent, acquiescence, or waiver; and especially is such the case in suits to set aside transactions on account'of fraud or infancy. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced by a court of equity.”
Inthe opinion p. 108, SnydeR, J., says: “A court of equity, which is never active in relief against stale demands will always refuse relief where the party has slept upon his
The authorities on this subject are collated in the case of Whittaker v. Improvement Co., 34 W. Va. 229, 230 (12 S. E. Rep. 507) citing the case of Curlett v. Newman, 30 W. Va. 182 (3 S. E. Rep. 578) in which this Court refused to set aside a deed for misrepresentation and fraud nearly five years after its date, and the court called it a great delay in commencing suit and refused relief. See, also, Pusey v. Gardner, 21 W. Va. 470; Hale v. Cole, 31 W. Va. 585 (8 S. E. Rep. 516); Doggett v. Helm, 17 Gratt. 96; Walker v. Ruffner, 32 W. Va. 297 (9 S. E. Rep. 215); Harwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 78. But if no demurrer had been interposed, and neither laches nor the statute of limitations had been relied on in the answer, yet, if the decree complained of had been entered by the Circuit Court by reason of the evidence adduced in the cause with reference to the compromise entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant Schilling, we would not feel warranted in reversing the action of the Circuit Coui’t.
Let us look for a moment at the circumstances surrounding this alleged compromise. Schilling’s wife was dead; he had inherited from her three thousand dollars in notes, representing the purchase-money of some land she had sold; Schilling had married again; some unpleasantness had grown up between the plaintiff’s wife and the second wife of Schilling, and, in consequence, Mrs. Bill had left the house of Schilling, and gone to visit her sister Mrs. Wood-yard. Schilling had concluded to divide the three thous- and dollars, inherited by him from his deceased wife, between Mrs. Woodyard, Mrs. Bill, and himself, and had informed them of the fact, and had handed four of the five hundred dollar notes to these ladies, in order that they might agree upon a division of them as they fell due at different periods. While they were in possession of the notes the plaintiff went to Schilling’s office and, during the interview, in arranging some of their personal matters, some hot words'passed, and the plaintiff-threatened to sue said
It is, however, assigned as error, that the court refused to allow the plaintiff to amend his bill. The motion for leave to amend was made after the cause had been submitted and the court had announced its opinion, and then without tendering the amended bill or indicating in what respect the amendment was desired. In Western M. & M. Co. v. Virginia Cannel Coal Co., 10 W. Va. 251, this Court held, that under section 12 of chapter 125 of the Code the plaintiff may amend his bill at any time after the appearance of the defendant, if substantial justice will be promoted thereby ; but the judge of the court below is clothed with discretion to say “where substantial justice will be promoted thereby,” and, unless the record shows that the court erred in exercising that discretion, the decree denying the right to amend will not be reversed.
In the case under consideration the amended bill does not appear to have been tendered, neither does it appear in what respect the amendment was desired. We therefore are of opinion that the court committed no error in the circumstances in refusing the leave asked for to amend. Our conclusion therefore is that there is no error in the decree complained of, and the same is affirmed with costs and damages.