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Bill Clark, Herbert Futch, Austin Hurst, Louis Sliker and William Barrineau v. Coats & Clark, Inc.
865 F.2d 1237
11th Cir.
1989
Check Treatment

*2 JOHNSON, Before HILL and Circuit *, Judges, and NICHOLS Senior Circuit Judge.

NICHOLS, Judge: Senior Circuit Futch, Clark, Appellants Bill Herbert Hurst, Sliker, Austin Louis and William appeal judgment Barrineau from the of the United States District Court for the Middle (Elliot, J.), granting District of Clark, part appellee Coats & Inc.’s motion Equal Oppor- Employment to dismiss. The (EEOC Commission) tunity Commission appeared argument helpful and made a part, as amicus. We affirm reverse in part, and remand. Background

I. All appellants of the in this lawsuit are employees appellee former Coats & Clark, (Coats Clark), appel- Inc. & and all employee pen- lants were members of an plan sion covered Section of the Employee Security Retirement Income Act (ERISA). Appellants 29 U.S.C. § Futch and Hurst were terminated on De- 30, 1983, years cember after 21 and 26 service, respectively. Appellants Sliker Barrineau, employees of 9 and 25 years, respectively, were terminated in appellant March of Bill Clark was age terminated on October years employment. appel- after 38 Each alleges lant that his termination was effect- purpose interfering ed for the with his attainment of and retirement bene- fits, in violation of section 510 of ERISA. Player, Spriggs Jeanne M.L. & Associ- Appellant alleges also that his ter- ates, Tallahassee, Fla., plaintiffs-appel- mination was carried out in a cruel and lants. harsh manner intended to inflict severe Counsel, Fink, him, Peggy Vella M. Asst. Gen. emotional distress and further Mastroianni, D.C., Atty., Washington, R. that his termination was made in violation 7(b) Age for amicus-curiae —E.E.O.C. of section of the Discrimination in * Nichols, Jr., designation. Philip Honorable Senior U.S. Cir- Circuit, Judge sitting by cuit for the Federal 1988, dismissing of the claims. The all U.S.C. (ADEA). Act Employment appellants except claims of all 626(b). two-year by a Clark were held to be barred Clark, Coats separation from After 47-2-3; statute of limitations. O.C.G.A. § Atlanta inquired Bill Clark appellant 9-3-22; 45-19-36; O.C.G.A. O.C.G.A. § proce- appropriate EEOC the office ADEA 9-3-33. O.C.G.A. § former charge against his dures to file a *3 for failure dismissed as barred was of ADEA. upon a violation employer based required charge EEOC as timely with the ques- an intake sent Clark The Commission 626(d)(1),and Clark’s tort by 29 U.S.C. § returned to completed and to be tionnaire of for intentional infliction emotional claim the Commission. preempted held to sec- distress was be provided questionnaire completed The 1144(a). 514(a) 29 U.S.C. tion of ERISA. and his of Clark address both name and the disposition unfavorable of The trial court’s of the facts employer description and a other than those of ADEA and tort claims alleged age discrimina- the giving rise to appealed. are not Clark signed by was questionnaire The tion. 26, 1986; the Com- and dated March Clark II. Issues completed question- the received mission appeal on are: The issues before us 1986, 21, April On April naire on Charge (1) of of an Notice submission in- mailed a Whether Clark’s the Commission stating Clark questionnaire to & the EEOC constitutes Discrimination Coats take of charge against the charge. filed a timely had of a Clark the alleging age dis- ADEA company under (2) appellants’ ERISA claims Whether with his involun- in connection crimination of by the statute limitations. are barred May Clark On tary retirement. (3) preempts Clark’s Whether ERISA Charge of Discrimination a formal signed infliction of emotional for intentional EEOC, signed the by the and prepared distress. May on by the EEOC charge received was of disputed issues materi being no There thought it acted time- 28,1986. The EEOC questions fact, present all of the al issues is much and preserve Clark’s ly to plenary of law over which this holding. contrary by the embarrassed Co., 743 F.2d Kroger review. Simon against complaint Coats filed a Clark denied, Cir.1984), 471 1544, 1546(11th cert. 9, 1987, in the District September on Clark 85 Georgia. District of for the Middle ADEA claim complaint set forth the of section claim for violation well as a III. Discussion ERISA, inflic- a claim intentional of (1) submission in- Hurst, Whether Futch, of emotional distress. the EEOC con- action, questionnaire take Sliker, joined the and Barrineau charge. timely filing the stitutes of section 510 alleging violations each claims relevant and other a civil action for precursor to As a appeal. this discrimination, requires that ADEA age the alleging charge unlaw file a an individual answering complaint, Coats lieu of In within the EEOC ful discrimination with dismiss all of the a motion to filed & Clark prac alleged unlawful days after except for Clark’s in the case claims 626(d)(1). Ac tice occurred. U.S.C. § motion ruling upon claim. above, the described cording to the facts matters dismiss, the trial court considered informal intake thus converted complaint outside by the Commission completed summary was received one for motion to dismiss into termination, and the days after Clark’s 12(c); J. Charles judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. Charge of Discrimi Notice Commission’s Arndt, Birmingham, City Inc. v. & Clark 172 Coats mailed to nation was Cir.1984). The motion par- termination. days after Clark’s April by way of an dated granted order transpired (a) agree requirements ties these events In addition to the days 1626.6, within 180 of Clark's termination. charge each should contain the following: charge prepared by The formal (1) name, telephone The full address and signed by days Clark 202 after EEOC was person making charge; number of the termination, by the and was received days Commission 209 after the termination. (2) The full name and address argues that the formal Coats & Clark person against made; charge whom the charge signed by days Clark 202 after his (3) A clear and concise statement of the operative termination was document facts, including dates, pertinent consti- required to filed the statute with- tuting alleged unlawful days alleged in 180 discrimination. practices; charge was not filed Because formal known, approximate If number of days, Coats & Clark reasons within 180 employees prospective defendant Clark, ADEA claim is *4 that the barred. employer prospective or members of the amicus, joined by suggests the EEOC as organization. defendant labor describing written statement the disclosing A statement pro- whether alleged identifying and the discrimination ceedings involving alleged the unlawful adequate satisfy filing defendant is employment practice have been com- 626(d)(1). requirement of section These re- menced agency charged before a State quirements were met the informal in- with the enforcement of fair and, therefore, questionnaire take Clark ar- practice and, so, if laws the date of such gues, in compliance his actions were full commencement and the name of the with the statute. agency. interpretation The EEOC’s of statutes (b) Notwithstanding provisions charged enforcing which it is with is enti- (a) section, paragraph charge of this great Mayer tled to deference. Oscar & sufficient when the Commission receives Evans, 750, 761, Co. v. 99 S.Ct. person making charge from the ei- 2066, 2074, (1979); Griggs 60 L.Ed.2d 609 ther a written statement or information 424, 433-34, Corp., v. Duke Power 401 U.S. writing by reduced to the Commission 849, 854-55, (1971); 91 S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d 158 requirements conforms to the Deposit Corp. Federal Insurance v. Sum- 1626.6. § Corp., ner Financial 451 F.2d (5th Cir.1971). The construction of a stat- argues The EEOC that while section charged ute those with its execution 1626.8(a)identifies beyond information should followed compel- unless there are 1626.8(b), in set out section the additional ling wrong. indications that it is Braddy required information is not to be included Telephone v. Telegraph Southern Bell in a document in order for that document Corp., (5th Cir.1972); 458 F.2d charge to constitute a meaning within the Sumner, supra. FDIC v. 626(d)(1); 1626.8(a) of 29 U.S.C. section § merely states that the additional informa interpretation EEOC’s charge. tion “should” in be stated See regu statute issue here is set out in the Co., v. Meridian Insurance promulgated lations it has for enforcement Steffen life (7th Cir.1988) 859 F.2d 534 (completed pertinent regulations of the ADEA. The EEOC intake meets read: quirements 1626.8(b) of 29 C.F.R. and 29 § charge. 1626.6 Form of [29 C.F.R.] § 626(d)(1)); U.S.C. Foster v. National § charge A writing shall be in and shall Bank, (5th Cir.1988) (doc- 857 F.2d 1058 prospective respondent name the meeting requirements ument of 29 C.F. generally allege shall discriminatory 1626.8(b) R. satisfies 29 U.S.C. § act(s). Charges person received or 626(d)(1)). § telephone writing. shall be reduced to charge; agree 1626.8 interpretation Contents We with the EEOC’s [29 C.F.R.] § charge. regulations. language amendment of these plain limitations, citing O.C. two-year statute 1626.8(b)unmistakably establish- of section 47-2-3; 45-19-36; O.C. O.C.G.A. G.A. § without charge is sufficient that a es 9-3-22; or 9-3-33. Furthermore, G.A. O.C.G.A. § information. additional of section interpretation find that a statute of limi does not contain regulations by these 626(d)(1)advanced 510 actions. When Con for section tations objec- congressional harmony with has not established a time limitation gress The basic enacting the statute. tives action, the settled a federal cause section filing requirement of purpose of time adopt a state practice has been Depart- provide the 626(d)(1) “is to [then] if it is not incon as federal law limitation suffi- Labor, with now the ment EEOC] [of policy to do so. with federal law sistent notify pro- may so that cient information Garcia, 261, 266- v. 471 U.S. E.g., Wilson provide the defendants and spective 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d * * * to elimi- opportunity [EEOC] statute of adopting a state When practices alleged unlawful nate limitations, the essential we first determine conciliation.”. methods of through informal federal law nature of the claim under Cong., 2d 95th H.R.Conf.Rep. No. applicable to such period on the then focus Cong. Sess., U.S.Code reprinted in [1978] analogous state law under the a claim most Specifically, & Admin.News 707 F.2d Ogburn, McGhee v. E.g., claim. ‘charge’ re- Congress intended “that Cir.1983); (11th v. Tex- Braden by the will be satisfied quirement 636 F.2d University System, Aas & M identifies the statement which a written 1981); City A Franklin Cir.Unit *5 generally describes potential defendant and Cir.1971). Marks, 439 F.2d of discriminatory.” to be the action believed two-year limita- Having indicated that a Id. trial court cited period applies, the tions in- informal judice, In the case sub statutes, only of have two- two which four objec- of the all questionnaire fulfilled take periods. O.C.G.A. limitations year enacting sec- by Congress desired tives limitations 180-day contains a 45-19-36 § 626(d)(1). was The discrini- employment period for the of the action which writing and described of the state!. by employees ination claims discriminatory. The to be Clark believed employment to discrim- applies This statute promptly did able to and was Commission allege not ination, claims do appellants’ and complainant’s of the & Clark notify Coats by Coats & discriminatory action Indeed, was notification allegations. a 30- contains 47-2-3 Clark. O.C.G.A. § days of & Clark within sent to Coats judicial seeking period for day limitations alleged discrimination. employees’ a denial of review of 45- Both O.C.G.A. §§ tirement benefits. analysis, we can- upon the above Based gov- terms own and 47-2-3 their 19-36 compelling indica- say that there are not employ- only to state pertaining ern claims construction that the EEOC’s tions issue are ees, here at the claims and to wrong. Accordingly, we defer statute is rea- For these employer. against private EEOC by the interpretation advanced stat- sons, by these two covered the claims regulations and before us. in its ap- analogous to sufficiently utes are these adoption of justify to pellants’ claims statute (2) State Whether of periods. limitations statu- limitations for enforcement wages bars recovery rights and tory nature of the to characterize In order claims. appellants’ giving rise to issue, the statute claims at examined. Sliker, rights asserted must Hutch, Furst, and the Appellants Co., 482 U.S. Lukens Steel pay, and Goodman pay, front seek back Barrineau (1987), their connection reinstatement task of confronted with was The the Court of ERISA. section claims under characterizing claim of racial relief, requested denied the court has trial selecting an purposes of for by a discrimination are barred holding that the claims analogous period. state law limitations analogous state period. Appel- limitations upon claims, claim founded predicated The was U.S.C. lants’ upon a statutory provides right, persons that all seek recovery wages § and rein- right shall have the to make and statement of rights. enforce O.C.G.A. 9-3-22 applied contracts free from racial discrimination. § trial employer The seized addresses language actions to enforce statu- tory rights and concerning urged speaks “contracts” and specifically to the recovery wages. apply to the state The statute of limita- focus of this stat- ute much more narrowly tions for interference and specifically with contractual contemplates the rights. employee urged application action now before us than general does the language governing per- statute of limitations O.C.G.A. 9-3-24 governing contract injury actions. period sonal claims. The limitations Therefore, two-year period limitations selected the Goodman Court was that of O.C.G.A. 9-3-22 is analogous the most actions, personal injury for for interfer- state statute of governs limitations and ence with contracts. appellants’ claims. provides This statute argues Coats & Clark that Goodman two-year period limitations for recovery of compels apply personal us injury wages, and a 20-year period limitations for period present case, limitations to the be- equitable of statutory rights enforcement the action cause concerns an adverse em- appellants such as seek in their reinstate- ployment disagree. decision. We ment claims. Accordingly, only the claims explained Goodman Court that the issue wages are barred. before it concerned a having a statute fo- personal founded on contract. application of O.C.G.A. tortion economic, and to characterize their viola- pt. cannot be H.R.Rep. & Admin.News income to careers in a or in this case does vidual 2621. law persons broad that rights under all laws for sonal * rights alone. The cus of the ERISA statute at issue The focus ** is a ERISA is to personal rights. II, as *6 section 1981 “is barring much reprinted scope rights “personal injury claims. The claims are No. regarded language. persons fundamental broader of a 93-807, racial property. provide adequate productive sue, 4639, in injuries” person.” section included the as section, who have [1974] discrimination, thus encompass than on contractual 93rd Hence we 4676. These anything testify, injury 9-3-33 primary purpose part In view of the U.S.Code would be a dis- normal sense of Cong., work Id. 107 S.Ct. at the Court held of a federal spent to the indi- security other than retirement governing reject individual deaux, capacity. 2d Cong. which Sess., equal their per- plan.” 2900. The broad reach of ERISA’s pre- emption provision applies to all state laws connection with si v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Shaw ‘relates to’ an surance Co. v. 724, 103 Pilot preemption provision struction. insofar as late to ERISA Section intentional infliction of emotional distress. er In emotional distress. S.Ct. Whether ERISA Shaw, 101 105 v. Delta Air We turn Id. 463 “supersedes any 481 U.S. S.Ct. 514(a) S.Ct. 2890, preempts they the Court (1987); employee employee 2380, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 U.S. intentional now of ERISA may now or Life Massachusetts, 41, Lines, Inc., Metropolitan 68 L.Ed.2d 402 85 L.Ed.2d 728 at reference Clark’s tort claim for explained Insurance Co. v. De is phrase, benefit 107 96-97, benefit preempts given and all State laws S.Ct. issue of wheth provides Inc., 451 U.S. infliction of (1983); hereafter a broad con plan.” 103 S.Ct. at 463 U.S. it if plan, that “a law to such a 471 U.S. 1549, Life (1985); has in the Ales This In 85, re 95 a appellants suggest that O.C.G.A. they insofar apply employee to benefit governing 9-3-24 upon “simple plans actions if even those laws do not expressly contracts in writing” closely is the most employee concern plans benefit and amount

1243 nucleus of of a common claim arises out plans. of such regulation to indirect only claim, a federal fact to an ERISA operative at 103 S.Ct. Id. to hear the pendent jurisdiction has court ERISA’s reach of ascertaining the In the mere existence claim. But state held that statute, has this court preemption automatically does pendent jurisdiction arising out of the claims common law claim as “related” the state qualify pension under a of benefits administration fac claim virtue common of ERISA’s limits are within plan In v. International setting. Miner tual plan pension Thus, claim that reach. Negotiated Pension Union Typographical pay was to benefits refusal administrator's 1390, 1394(D.Colo.1985), Plan, F.Supp. 601 to intentional to amount outrageous as so preempts all held that ERISA preempted distress of emotional infliction court com- claims. This pendent party Parisian, Inc., 807 v. Howard by ERISA. read simply cannot mented “[w]e Cir.1987). Powell also (11th See 1560 F.2d broadly. preemption ERISA’s Co. Telephone Potomac Chesapeake & * * * surely does not extend to [provision] Cir.1985), (4th 780 F.2d Virginia, of cert. that, re- law claim however every state 1170, 106 S.Ct. denied, employee ben- factually involves an motely, (ERISA preempts 90 L.Ed.2d Insur- v. Balboa plan.” efit Giardiello in- intentional law claim common (11th n. 8 Co., F.2d ance distress, insofar as fliction of emotional Cir.1988). seeking relief beneficiary by a is invoked termi- his asserts that plan ad- pension arising out of injuries out in a carried manner nation was ministration). emotional to inflict severe intended was arising law to state claims In addition v. Pa- the Howard upon him. distress benefits, claims of administration out decision, al- plaintiff risian, supra, impact on the administration directly pay under benefits leged that the refusal limits of plan are within pension out plan was carried ERISA covered an v. Martin Mar Jackson ERISA’s reach. inflict was intended manner which Cir.1986) Corp., ietta him. This distress emotional severe alleging of contract (state law breach extent prove may be hard employee’s improper calculation law, passing are but we quired law State preempted). date service this time. aspect at preemption only on the improper processing arising from claims be- preempted The claim Howard preempted are claim for benefits effected issue was conduct at cause the De Co. v. Insurance ERISA. Pilot of bene- the administration Life connection 1549, 95 deaux, 481 U.S. plan. Clark employee benefit fits in *7 Also, (1987). law claims state 39 L.Ed.2d part the any conduct on alleged not fiduciary duties cover the depending from process- to the relates & Clark which Coats Phillips v. preempted. are by ERISA ed or claim. any ERISA covered benefit ing of 1470 Co., 799 the Oil on Amoco no conduct claim embraces The tort denied, 107 Cir.1986), 481 im- U.S. cert. which tends Clark part of Coats & employee’s way affect an any pair S.Ct. or rights. ERISA provision preemption the ERISA While construction, surely the tort description of given complaint’s a broad must be skeletal, far as as Phillips, supra, the but general limits. claim is there are which was tell, ERISA to conduct of the fact can alludes mindful court was concurrent) in time (or only they proximate claims even law preempts state wholly violation, but alleged Id. plans. employee relate benefit vaguely complaint Indeed, laws affect in content. “some remote 1470, 2. n. defend- all five allegation that tenuously to be sets out plans too employee benefit given summarily dismissed employee ants were relating to fairly as characterized form, the present In its rush”. Parisian, the “bum’s Howard v. plans.” benefit ties no statement complaint makes example, 1564. For where F.2d at together the tort claim and the ERISA The occurrence of the conduct, abusive way claim in such a that one to” “relates with the state tort action is con- statutory other in the sense. For this cerned, in such a context of federally reason, we hold that the tort claim not is prohibited discrimination suggests po- preempted. Because the tort claims of oth- tential for interference with the federal plaintiffs er jointly were stated in one scheme of regulation. Clark’s, any count with grievance along Viewed, however, light of the dis- peculiar that line to Clark not express- crete concerns of the ly alleged. federal For satisfactory scheme and disposi- final law, the state part case, this tort potential of the there is need for in- for a pleading specific to terference Clark. It hardly insufficient to counterba- can have been intended allege legitimate lance and substantial inter- plaintiffs, treatment of five at different est the State in protecting its citizens. times, was identical. If the charges in complaint Hill’s were filed Board, with the

Consistent with the the focus requirements any of no- tice unfair pleading, see, practice labor e.g., Conley Gibson, proceeding would 41, 47, be on S.Ct. whether the L.Ed.2d statements or conduct (1957), may, district court part in its on the of Union officials discrimi- discretion, remand, after order that nated or threatened discrimination complaint be amended to specify pe- facts against him employment referrals for culiar to Clark upon which predicates Clark reasons other than pay failure to Union his conclusion that given he was dues. Whether the statements or con- “bum’s rush”. Clark filed his brief on duct of the respondents also caused Hill appeal shocking details conduct severe emotional distress and physical underlying claim, his tort but these asser- injury would play no role in the Board’s tions are properly not we, record and disposition case, and the Board court, like the trial may only on rule could not damages Hill award pain, complaint which properly of record. The suffering, or expenses. medical Con- complaint now before us also does es- versely, the state-court tort action can be any tablish nexus between the allegedly adjudicated without resolution of the tortious conduct and an ERISA covered “merits” of the underlying dispute. labor plan. course, Of if after remand the Recovery tort of emotional dis- complaint amended reveals that the con- tress under requires California proof law complained duct of does relate to the ad- that the defendant intentionally engaged ministration of an plan, covered in outrageous conduct causing plain- again defendants can raise the preemption tiff to sustain mental distress. The state issue on the amended complaint, as our court need consider, much less decision relates complaint before us. solve, whether union discriminated Coats & points out that the tort threatened to against discriminate an em- incorporates by reference all facts ployee in terms of employment opportu- involved in claim, the ERISA thus render- nities. To the contrary, the tort action ing the claims related. That claims are can be resolved without reference to related, or even concurrent, in time does special accommodation of the interests of not render them related in a substantive *8 unions and members in the hiring hall legal sense. A similar preemption issue context. was raised in the case of Farmer v. United Carpenters Brotherhood & Joiners of of balance, On we cannot that conclude America, Local 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. Congress intended to oust state-court (1977), 51 L.Ed.2d 338 where the de- jurisdiction over actions for tortious ac- fendant union asserted plaintiff’s that the tivity such as that alleged in this case. claim for intentional of infliction emotional distress was preempted by the National Carpenters, Farmer v. 430 U.S. at 304- Labor Relations Act. The (citations omitted). at 1065-66 reasoned: dis- judgment court’s portion of trial issue here statutory scheme While inflic- for intentional missing claim in Clark’s discussed the one as same not the is fop We remand distress. rea- emotional tion of Court’s Farmer Farmer, supra, this consistent proceedings now before further to the case soning persuasive is Farmer, case, in as opinion. present In the us. concur- are which conduct statements only, may be related, in time closely rent or Costs addressing a an action of a both the focus costs. own bear its party Each shall a as well as concern federally regulated PART, IN REVERSED IN AFFIRMED of infliction intentional for action state PART, AND REMANDED. impermissably without distress emotional the fed- of reach broad intruding concurring Judge, JOHNSON, Circuit incorporation scheme. regulatory eral specially: into the facts the ERISA of reference not does background submission way plaintiff of Clark’s agree that claim I tort Therefore, hold employment discrimination this result. disturb of written form, skeletal charge in their under pleadings, that the constituted as “related” agree were that 626(d). claims which I set out also 29 U.S.C.A. § 514(a) of in section pro- is used law, that term 9-3-22 O.G.C.A. § under keep- to be appears This result for ERISA. limitations statute of proper vides the Federal objects of general ing with under sec- employee’s of an violation Procedure, “reject of Civil Rules I ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 510 of tion of skill game pleading is approach that majority’s in the specially to concur write may be deci- misstep by counsel one state law Clark’s plaintiff that conclusion principle accept the outcome to the sive of emotional infliction intentional claim to facilitate is pleading of purpose that 514(a) by section preempted is not distress Conley merits.” on the decision proper 1144(a). ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § of S.Ct. Gibson, 355 U.S. v. complaint as- plaintiff’s emphasize I that 2 L.Ed.2d for intentional claim law only a state serts tort Clark’s between only connection on the based distress emotional of infliction arose conduct is that the and ERISA claim Any facts employment. of his termination that overlapped setting which factual in a his of anticipated reduction relating why claim. That ERISA of Clark’s included benefits pension or retirement his over jurisdiction pendent took complaint his III of in Count plaintiff a common existence The mere claim. tort claim. his relevant are not giving rise of facts nucleus operative preempted Otherwise, would the claim here, is insufficient jurisdiction, pendent ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. 514(a) of by section “related” claim the tort to render Inc., Parisian, 1144(a). Howard meaning of section claim within Cir.1987) (holding that no tort claim has 514(a). Because for inten- state law claims preempts any matter on the administration effect aris- distress emotional infliction tional plan, the employee benefit regarding an from benefits ing of the termination out preempted. the under- plan). With benefit employee law claim standing plaintiff’s that Conclusion way to not relate does the trial portion reverse We plan, I concur. ADEA dismissing Clark’s judgment court’s trial portion affirm We claim. the claims dismissing judgment court’s por- reverse We recovery wages. dismiss- judgment court’s the trial *9 employ- reinstatement claims for ing reverse rights. We ment

Case Details

Case Name: Bill Clark, Herbert Futch, Austin Hurst, Louis Sliker and William Barrineau v. Coats & Clark, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Feb 16, 1989
Citation: 865 F.2d 1237
Docket Number: 88-8339
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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