Denial of a Fair Hearing.
Mr. Hahn claims that Mr. Bihlmire corrupted these proceedings by a series of improper communications to the trial judge. The record shows that Mr. Bihlmire sent eight letters and onе telegram to Judge Zastrow. In these communications he characterized Mr. Hahn as a professional litigant and accused him of submitting a fraudulent bid. He also accused Mr. Hahn of neglecting his children and of having swindled naive elderly ladies of over $100,000. He asserted that Mr. Hahn had a twenty-year reputation of nonpayment and a history of cоrrupting attorneys and judges.
These communications also accused the trial judge of being prejudiced, incompetent and cowardly and asserted that the trial judge had made deals with Mr. Hahn. Mr. Bihlmire also threatened to have Judge Zastrow removed from the bench for his conduct in this case.
The trial judge comported himself in a scrupulously proper manner. As these messages were received the trial judge informed Mr. Bihlmire that such communications should not be made. He notified the opposing side. An acсount of each event was spread upon the record by the trial court. In addition, the trial court instructed Mr. Bihlmire to communicate with the court only through his own counsel, but Mr. Bihlmirе did not respect that instruction.
At the oral argument on this appeal, Mr. Bihlmire’s counsel acknowledged that Mr. Bihlmire’s conduct toward the court could not be justified but urged that there was no actual denial of a fair trial, pointing out that the *543 communications were all made a part of the record and that no affidavit of prejudice wаs ever filed by Mr. Hahn.
We accept the trial judge’s declaration that Mr. Bihl-mire’s communications had absolutely no effect upon his judgment, and we conclude that there was no denial of a fair trial. However, we are shocked at Mr. Bihlmire’s demeanor and consider that no judge or opposing party should be subjected to such improper attacks. While we do not believe that the trial court was in fact corrupted by Mr. Bihlmire’s campaign, it does not follow that a judge should be obliged to function in such an atmosphere.
When a litigant persists in the course which Mr. Bihl-mire followed, especially after being informed of its irregularity, there would appear to be an intentional affront to the court which can and should be terminated or at least punished by the use of the power of contempt. “The big stick” exists to enable a court to enforce the fair and orderly administration of justice and to maintain such dignity and discipline as is essential to that end. It is our opinion that Judge Zastrow should examine the course of conduct pursued by Mr. Bihlmire and determine whether a citation for contempt should issue. The initiation of such proceedings is within the discretion of the trial court.
O’Brien v. State
(1952),
The Amendment of the Judgment.
Mr. Hahn contends thаt it was error for the trial court to remove the requirement contained in the original judgment that the down payment at the foreclosure be at least $4,000. We do not agrеe with this contention.
*544
It is entirely proper for a trial court to concern itself via continuing jurisdiction over a mortgage foreclosure action.
Rio-Fall River Union Bank v. Hollnagel
(1940),
In view of the fact that a previous down payment of $4,000 had been forfeited, the court was well within its discretion in eliminating the $4,000 figure from the judgment in regard to future sales. The order in effect put the sheriff back in the position covered by sec. 278.16, Stats., which provides that “the sheriff may accept from the purchaser at such sale as a deposit or down рayment upon the same not less than $100.” Plankinton Packing Co. v. Cincrete Corp., sufra at pages 242, 243. In our opinion, it was proper for the court to modify the judgment in this regard and for the sheriff to require a $10,000 down payment at the second foreclosure sale in order to prevent a repetition of the prior inchoate sale.
Confirmation of the Sale Price.
Mr. Hahn contends that the price paid at the sеcond foreclosure sale, $29,000, was unconscionably low and that the trial court erred in confirming such sale. It is also claimed that the trial court erred in excluding certаin evidence offered by Mr. Hahn concerning the value ■ of the property.
Mr. Hahn attempted to testify regarding various offers to purchase which he had received for the property from W. F. Best & Son, the city of Lake Geneva, and Hotton Realty Company, as well as various other offers to purchase. The offers ranged from $50,000 to $123,000. This testimony was excluded, and this was not error on the part of the trial court. In order to qualify as probative
*545
evidence, there must be a preliminary foundation of “the
bona fides
of the offer, the financial responsibility of the offeror, аnd his qualifications to know the value of the property.”
Fox Wisconsin Theatres, Inc., v. Waukesha
(1948),
Mr. Hahn also sought to have the court consider an appraisal of the property which had been made for. a savings and loan association. An officer of the latter company was permitted to submit into evidence a tentative loan commitment by the association in the sum of $40,000, but the court rejected the proffered evidence that the said loan was based on a property appraisal of $84,000. The appraisers whо had made the determination of the $84,000 figure for the savings and loan association were not in court and thus could not be cross-examined. We believe that it was appropriate for the trial court to have rejected the appraisal when offered by one who had not participated in such appraisal.
The prоperty in question was transferred by Mr. Hahn to Transasia Trading Corporation and at the time of the transfer was valued by the parties to the transfer at $123,000. Mr. Hahn testified that he beliеved the property was worth $125,000. On the other hand, there was testimony offered by the assessor for Lake Geneva, who expressed the opinion that the market value of the property was approximately $36,000. The trial court concluded that “the bid price is not so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of this court, or to raise a presumption of fraud, inadvertence or mistake.” Our review of the evidence convinces us that the trial court’s conclusion must be affirmed. In
John Paul Lumber Co. v. Neumeister
(1900),
*546 “The granting or refusing of an application to set aside such sale and order a resale, as a matter of favor, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; and its determinatiоn will not be disturbed, except for a clear abuse of such discretion.”
In
Gumz v. Chickering
(1963), 19 Wis. (2d) 625, 634,
“. . . a trial court may refuse to confirm a sale if he is satisfied (1) that the price received for the property was inadequate, and (2) that there was a showing of mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence on the part of interested parties or prospective bidders.
“Moreover, under Wisconsin law a trial court has discretion to refusе to confirm such a sale even though there is no mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence, where the sale price is not only inadequate, but is so grossly inadequаte as to shock the conscience of the court.”
Mere inadequacy of price is not ordinarily sufficient of itself to set aside a sale.
Anthony Grignano Co. v. Gooch
(1951),
The appellants also complain that the court erred in not granting an adjournment so that further evidence as to value could be presented. The hearing on confirmation was оriginally scheduled for July 20, 1965, but was adjourned to August 5, 1965. It was' a correct exercise of the trial court’s discretion to deny any other request for adjournment.
Estate of Staniszewski
(1965), 28 Wis. (2d) 403, 406,
The trial court was familiar with this property and its troubled history. The foreclosure judgment had been
*547
entered in 1954, and thus many years transpired before the actual confirmation of the foreclosurе sale. A previous foreclosure sale had produced a price of $35,000, but such sale was never consummated. Mr. Hahn’s hope that another sale would provoke a higher bid was one in which the trial court understandably had little confidence. In
Northwestern Loan & Trust Co. v. Bidinger
(1937),
“Whether a resale of the premises would result in a higher bid is exceedingly problematical.
“If upon a resale no higher bids are made, that fact should be considered by the court when again called upon to confirm a sale. Kremer v. Rule, supra. The mortgagee in the end is entitled to have the mortgaged property sold to satisfy his debt. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (D. C.), 15 Fed. (2d) 434.”
By the Court. — Order affirmed.