Petitioner, Big Bear Municipal Water District (Big Bear District) seeks a writ of mandate to compel the superior court (1) to dismiss an eminent domain action instituted by San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District (Valley District) on the ground that summons was not returned within three years as required by section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1 and (2) to vacate an order barring Mr. Tobin, attorney for Big Bear District, from further participation in the Valley District eminent domain action. 2
*922 The following is a chronology of the events leading to the present petition insofar as it seeks to compel dismissal of the Valley District action:
On April 6, 1962, Valley District filed an eminent domain action to condemn certain properties owned by the Bear Valley Mutual Water Company (Water Company). In the court below all parties assumed that the properties sought to be condemned included Big Bear Lake, but at the hearing on the present petition it appeared that the legal description did not include the lake. Summons was issued but return thereon was never made. On December 6, 1963, and again on March 24, 1965, Valley District and Water Company, through their respective attorneys, filed written stipulations for dismissal of the action as to portions of the properties sought to be condemned.
On June 30, 1966, Big Bear District, which had filed a subsequent eminent domain action seeking to condemn Big Bear Lake, was permitted to intervene in the Valley District action for the limited purpose of making a motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of section 581a.
On July 7, 1966, Water Company filed a general demurrer to Valley District’s complaint.
On July 14, 1966, Valley District and Water Company entered into and filed a written stipulation waiving the provisions of section 581a and agreeing that the time for the issuance, service and return of summons be extended to December 31.1966.
On August 12, 1966, its demurrer having been theretofore overruled, Water Company filed its answer to the complaint in eminent domain.
Meanwhile Big Bear District filed an amended notice of motion to dismiss Valley District’s action by requesting the court to invoke its inherent discretionary power to dismiss for failure to prosecute with due diligence.
The motion to dismiss was heard and submitted on August 12.1966, and was subsequently denied.
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to obtain review of an order denying a motion to dismiss.
(Perry
v.
Magneson,
Section 581a provides in relevant part that all actions “. . . must be dismissed by the court, ... on its own motion, or on the motion of any party interested therein, . . . unless the summons shall be served and return thereon made within three years after the commencement of said action, except where the parties have filed a stipulation in writing that the time may be extended. But all such actions may be prosecuted, if general appearance has been made by the defendant or defendants, within said three years in the same manner as if summons had been issued and served; . . .”
It has been held that the provisions of section 581a are mandatory and “jurisdictional” and that in cases coming within its provisions, the court has no authority except to order dismissal.
(Black Bros. Co.
v.
Superior Court,
In the case under review, however, the written stipulation extending time rendered the mandatory dismissal provisions of section 581a inoperative. The fact that the stipulation was filed after the expiration of the statutory period did not render it ineffective. (See
Miles
&
Sons, Inc.
v.
Superior Court,
Nor did the fact that the stipulation was not filed until
*924
after petitioner made its motion to dismiss render it inoperative. The court’s control over an action under section 581a is not lost until an order of dismissal is made and entered. (See
Rio Vista Min. Co.
v.
Superior Court, supra,
In view of the foregoing it is unnecessary to consider whether the stipulations for partial dismissal constituted a general appearance within the meaning of section 581a.
Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exercise its inherent power to order a dismissal for an alleged lack of due diligence in the prosecution of the action. The contention is without substance.
Petitioner, after seeking and being permitted to intervene for the limited purpose of making a motion under section 581a, filed an amended motion, without leave of court, seeking
*925
to invoke the court’s inherent power. Real parties in interest objected to the court’s consideration of the additional ground and the objection was noted by the court. It is thus doubtful whether the issue was properly before the trial court. Assuming that the question of the court’s inherent power to dismiss was properly before it, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to exercise it. Petitioner urged that Valley District’s action was not filed in good faith, that there was collusion between the condemner and the condemnee, and that Valley District never intended to prosecute the action to conclusion. However, real parties in interest filed declarations of its officers and attorneys denying any collusion and justified the delay on the pendency of litigation involving the annexation of Big Bear Lake to Valley District and the validity of the formation of petitioner Big Bear District. On the evidence before it, the trial court was clearly justified in refusing to invoke its inherent power to dismiss. An appellate court may reverse such an order only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.
(Rice
v.
Arden Farms Co.,
There remains for consideration the validity of the order barring Mr. Tobin, attorney for Big Bear District, from “further participation in the case [Valley District’s condemnation action].” The validity of the order may be reviewed upon an application for writ of mandate.
(Earl Scheib, Inc.
v.
Superior Court,
The facts giving rise to the order barring Mr. Tobin may be summarized as follows:
When Mr. Tobin, on behalf of Big Bear District, filed the motion to dismiss, Valley District filed a declaration by its general manager, Mr. Jack Beaver, supported by a declaration by Mr. John W. Littleton, a former director of the district, opposing Mr. Tobin’s participation in the ease and requesting the court to bar him from further participation therein. Mr. Beaver stated Mr. Tobin was employed as special counsel for Valley District in February 1961 and continued in that capacity until his services were terminated in September 1965, that he (Mr. Tobin) was one of the attorneys for Valley District in the condemnation action, that he signed and filed on behalf of Valley District a written stipulation with Water District *926 for a partial dismissal of the action, and that Valley District had never consented to Mr. Tobin’s participation in the action adverse to its interests. Mr. Littleton stated that he was a member of the board of directors of Valley District when the condemnation action was filed, that Mr. Tobin was then one of the attorneys for Valley District, that prior to the filing of the condemnation action Mr. Tobin participated in a discussion with certain of the directors respecting the advisability of filing the action and the position to be taken by the district.
The record reveals that Valley District’s complaint in eminent domain is subscribed “Alexander B. Tobin and Bobert J. Webb,” by Bobert J. Webb. The record also reveals that on January 25, 1965, Bobert J. Webb, with the consent of the district, withdrew as “one of the attorneys for plaintiff,” leaving Mr. Tobin as the only attorney of record. The record also substantiates the fact that the written stipulation for a partial dismissal of the action which was filed on March 24, 1965, was signed by Mr. Tobin on behalf of Valley District.
Following a hearing on August 12, 1966, the court, then being of the view that it was without jurisdiction to act in the matter, denied Valley District’s petition to bar Mr. Tobin. Thereafter Valley District moved for a reconsideration of the court’s ruling, and, following a further hearing, the court vacated its prior order and made its order barring Mr. Tobin from further participation in the case.
Buie 5 of the Buies of Professional Conduct provides: “A member of The State Bar shall not accept employment adverse to a client or former client, without the consent of the client or former client, relating to a matter in reference to which he has obtained confidential information by reason of or in the course of his employment by such client or former client. ’ ’ Under the rule an attorney is forbidden to do either of two things after terminating a relationship with a former client: “ ‘ He may not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he formerly represented him nor may he at any time use against his former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship. ’ ”
(Galbraith
v.
State Bar,
One of the ways in which the issue of a violation of the rule may be raised is by a motion by the former client in the case before the court to enjoin the adverse representation.
(Meehan
v.
Hopps,
Although in the ease under review Mr. Tobin filed a declaration denying that he represented Valley District in connection with the condemnation action, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. His name appears as attorney of record; he was special counsel for Valley District during the period in question; a member of the board of directors of Valley District stated that Mr. Tobin discussed with some of the board members the advisability of filing the condemnation action; and the record confirms the fact that Mr. Tobin signed a written stipulation for partial dismissal of the action as attorney for Valley District. In intervening in Valley District’s action on behalf of his new client and making the motion to dismiss, Mr. Tobin was clearly seeking to forward the interest of his new client adversely to the interests of his former client in a matter in which he formerly represented *928 the latter. There was substantial evidence to support the-trial court’s order.
In passing, it is noted that Mr. Tobin’s new client, Big Bear District, could not have been prejudiced in the presenta-, tion of its motion to dismiss by reason of the court’s order. The order barring further participation was not made until after the motion to dismiss had been argued, briefed and submitted for decision.
Mr. Tobin’s contention that the court was not empowered to reconsider its previous ruling denying the petition to bar him is without merit. It is settled that a court has jurisdiction to reconsider its ruling on a motion after having once denied it.
(Harth
v.
Ten Eyck,
Mr. Tobin’s contention that he was not given sufficient or proper notice of the motion to reconsider is likewise without substance. The notice of motion for reconsideration and the supporting declarations and points and authorities contain proof of service by mail of each of the documents. The record discloses that the motion was originally noticed for October 28, 1966. On that date it was continued to December 9, 1966, and notice of the new hearing date was served upon Mr. Tobin. On December 9 the matter was continued to and heard on December 20, 1966. On that date Mr. Tobin filed a declaration stating that the only document he had received was a single page notice of a hearing and that he did not receive by mail a copy of the points and authorities and declaration in support of the motion. But, as noted by the trial judge, the record showed that the notices of motion and each of the supporting documents contained proof of service by mail. It was for the trial court to resolve the factual issue as to whether proper service had been effected. Moreover, the' notice of motion to reconsider recited that it was based upon *929 the points and authorities attached and "all the pleadings, records and documents in this action;” no new facts nor grounds were submitted. There is no showing of any prejudice to Mr. Tobin by reason of the alleged failure to receive by mail copies of the documents supporting the motion for reconsideration.
The alternative writ is discharged and the petition is denied.
McCabe, P. J., and Kerrigan, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 14, 1969, and petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 17,1969.