98 Wash. 310 | Wash. | 1917
Appellant, who is a .taxpayer of 'Benton county, commenced this action below, seeking to enjoin re
“It appearing to the board that the lease on the courthouse will expire on the 31st day of December, 1916, it is ordered that commissioners Clements and McNeil be authorized to go to Spokane and see what terms can be obtained upon a renewal of the present lease of the courthouse. If no lease can be obtained, to investigate and find out what other quarters can be secured.”
Pursuant to the resolution, commissioners Clements and McNeil, on November 20th or 21st, went to Pasco and consulted with E. A. Davis, an attorney of that city, who, at their request, accompanied the commissioners to Spokane for a conference with Messrs. Zent and Powell upon the legal phase of the scheme then in contemplation. The result of the Spokane conference was a determination to issue county bonds and, out of the proceeds, erect a courthouse. Up to this time no action had been taken by the board of county commissioners relative to the construction of a courthouse, nor had any discussion taken place at any of their meetings suggesting the issuance of county bonds in any form for that purpose; no plans had been adopted looking to the erection of a courthouse; in fact, so far as the board of commissioners was concerned, the idea of erecting a courthouse was yet unborn.
On Sunday, December 3d, Mr. Zent, of counsel employed by Clements and McNeil, appeared at Prosser with the bonds issued in serial number from 1 to 250, inclusive, aggregating $125,000. The bonds were dated December 4th, and contained an unsigned certificate of registration. On December 3, Mr. Zent and commissioner Clements, the chairman of the board, appeared at the home of county treasurer Harper, and there commissioner Clements signed the bonds as chairman of the board, and the county treasurer, at the request of Clements, attached his signature to the certificate of registration. On the same day, the county auditor was re
At the trial, witnesses on behalf of appellant, representing reputable bond buyers and the state board of finance, testified that, based upon market conditions and actual sales of like municipal securities at the time, these bonds, if advertised and offered for sale on the open market, would have brought par at 4% or 4%, and if sold at 5% would have brought a premium of at least eleven points. ■ Respondents
The motive actuating commissioners Clements and McNeil to take the action they did, while not very material or relevant, is plainly shown. The term of office of both would have expired the following January; each had been a candidate at the preceding election and each had been defeated. The record is not silent to the effect that these defeats were not graciously accepted; that the defeated candidates intended to do something before leaving office that would reflect their opinion of the political sagacity of those persons in the county who had opposed them.
It does not seem necessary to dwell longer upon the facts before us. Sometimes a statement of the facts announces the law—this is such a case. A board of county commissioners is a legislative and deliberative body, and as such, acting within its scope and discretion, its action is final. In the exercise of its discretion such a board must, however, act in good faith and without fraud in law or in fact to those whom it serves. This much the law demands, and when county commissioners go beyond the limits of good faith and palpably abuse the discretion vested in them, the law will inter
No citation of authorities is necessary to sustain the conclusion we have reached that the action of these two commissioners was so arbitrary, fraudulent, and in such bad faith as to merit the censure of the law and grant appellant the relief prayed for. Our reasoning is sustained in the following of
Two other interesting legal questions are presented by the record; one is as to the political status of commissioner McNeil on December 4th. He had been appointed to fill a vacancy and his successor had been elected at the previous November election. There is a question as to whether or not the successor had qualified on December 2d. In view of the conclusion reached upon the greater question of good faith, we have not gone into this matter. It is probable McNeil was an officer de facto, if not de jure on December 4th, at least, we prefer to treat him as such. The other question is. as to whether the board was legally in session on December 4th. In view of our general conclusion, this question need not be passed upon.
The judgment is reversed; case remanded with .instructions to grant relief prayed for.
Ellis, C. J., Mount, Main, and Chadwick, JJ., concur.