Bidegain v. Plazas VegaBidegain v. Plazas Vega
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Second, Third, and Fourth Affirmative Defenses (“Motion”), [ECF No. 274], filed on May 26, 2026. Defendant filed his Response in Opposition (“Response”), [ECF No. 290], on June 24, 2026. Plaintiffs filed their Reply in Support (“Reply”), [ECF No. 294], on June 29, 2026. Having carefully considered the Motions, the record, and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Second, Third, and Fourth Affirmative Defenses, [ECF No. 274], is GRANTED as set forth herein.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case has been exhaustively recounted elsewhere in the record—most recently in the Court’s Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 317]. Accordingly, the Court summarizes it only to the extent relevant to evaluating the issues presented in the instant Motion.
Defendant filed his Answer and Affirmative Defenses, [ECF No. 61], on April 27, 2023, in which he raised four affirmative defenses. In his first affirmative defense, Defendant asserted that “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred because they have not exhausted their remedies in Colombia.” Answer at 14. In his second affirmative defense, he asserts “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations,” pointing to the TVPA’s ten-year statute of limitations. Id. And his third and fourth affirmative defenses assert that he “did not subject Dr. Urán to torture” and “did not extrajudicially kill Dr. Urán.” Id. at 14–15. In support of the third and fourth affirmative defenses, Defendant explains that “Colombia’s Supreme Court held that COL Plazas Vega had nothing to do with and did not know of the torture or extrajudicial killing of the Palace hostages.” Id. Thus, “[b]ecause he was not involved in such activities he cannot be held liable for same [and t]his Court should provide full faith and credit to this prior judicial determination.” Id.
On May 26, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Second, Third, and Fourth Affirmative Defenses, [ECF No. 274]. Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment in their favor is warranted on Defendant’s second affirmative defense because “[t]he TVPA’s ten-year limitations period was equitably tolled during, inter alia, the time that Defendant was absent from the United States and beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.” Mot. at 7. And Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment in their favor is proper on Defendant’s third and fourth affirmative defenses because “[t]he Colombian Supreme Court decision regarding that criminal proceeding . . . has no preclusive effect on Plaintiffs here.” Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
If the moving party shoulders its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “demonstrate the existence of evidence that would support a verdict in its favor.” United of Omaha Life Ins, 894 F.2d at 1557 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23). “If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then [a court] should deny summary judgment.” Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 868 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th Cir. 1989).
However, a different analysis applies when affirmative defenses are contested at the summary judgment stage. See United States v. Tubbs, No. 19-80553, 2019 WL 7376706, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2019). It is the defendant who bears the burden of proof at trial as to the applicability of any affirmative defenses. See Thorsteinsson v. M/V Drangur, 891 F.2d 1547, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, when a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on a defendant’s affirmative defense, “the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the affirmative defense is applicable.” Tubbs, 2019 WL 7376706, at *2 (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990)). Then, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the affirmative defense does not apply. Id.
ANALYSIS
A. Defendant’s Second Affirmative Defense
Here, Defendant fails to make a showing that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the TVPA’s 10-year statute of limitations. As such, summary judgment is warranted in favor of Plaintiffs on Defendant’s second affirmative defense.
Defendant’s second affirmative defense states:
Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations: Plaintiffs filed the present action under the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) on February 15, 2022—almost 37 years after the incidents alleged by Plaintiffs occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred as “no action shall be maintained under [the TVPA] unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause of action arose.” See
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(c) .
Answer at 14. In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs argue that there is “no genuine issue that Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims are timely” because the TVPA’s ten-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling while a defendant is outside the United States and thus beyond the jurisdictional reach of its courts. See Mot. at 12–13. Plaintiffs are correct that the legislative history of the TVPA, Eleventh Circuit precedent, and the undisputed evidence in the record all confirm that the TVPA’s statute of limitations does not bar their claims because it was tolled during the time Defendant was outside of the United States.
“Once a defendant shows that the applicable statute of limitations bars the claim, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that an exception or tolling provision applies.” Weitz, 913 F.2d at 1552 n.13. In his second affirmative defense, Defendant points to the fact that Plaintiffs filed this action in 2022, almost 37 years after the events underlying this action took place. Answer at 14. And because the TPVA provides that “[n]o action shall be maintained . . . unless it is
However, as the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in Jean v. Dorelien, “the statute of limitations must be tolled at least until [the defendant] entered the United States and personal jurisdiction could be obtained over him.” 431 F.3d 776, 779–80 (11th Cir. 2005). In so holding, the opinion invoked Senate Report 102-249, which expressly disclaimed that the then-proposed TVPA’s “statute of limitation should be tolled during the time the defendant was absent from the United States.[.]” Id. at 780 (quoting S.Rep. No. 102–249, at 11 (1991)); see also Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Congress clearly intends that courts toll the statute of limitations so long as the defendants remain outside the reach of the United States courts or the courts of other, similarly fair legal systems.”).
Here, it is undisputed that Defendant moved to the United States on February 16, 2016. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“P’s SUMF”), [ECF No. 274-1] ¶ 20; Defendant’s Counterstatement of Material Facts (“D’s CMF”), [ECF No. 291] ¶ 20. It is also undisputed that between 1985 and 2016, Defendant’s brief visits to the United States did not amount to more than two months collectively. P’s SUMF ¶ 19; D’s CMF ¶ 19. Finally, it is undisputed that Defendant admitted in November 2024 that he had resided in the United States for less than 10 years in the aggregate. P’s SUMF ¶ 22; D’s CMF ¶ 22. Accordingly, there is no dispute of material fact that Defendant had been in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction of the American judicial system, for fewer than 10 years at the time this action was filed on February 15, 2022.
Defendant devotes only two paragraphs of his Response to argue that Plaintiffs fail to establish that the statute of limitations was tolled as a matter of law. See Resp. at 15–16. Defendant
Accordingly, Defendant has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the TVPA’s statute of limitations. Summary judgment is therefore granted in Plaintiffs’ favor as to Defendant’s second affirmative defense.
B. Defendant’s Third and Fourth Affirmative Defenses
Summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor is also proper as to Defendant’s third and fourth affirmative defenses, which state:
COL Plazas Vega did not subject Dr. Uran to torture: Any person who subjects another to torture is liable to the tortured party. See
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a)(1) . Colombia’s Supreme Court held that COL Plazas Vega had nothing to do with and did not know of the torture or extrajudicial killing of the Palace hostages. Because he was not involved in such activities he cannot be held liable for same. This Court should provide full faith and credit to this prior judicial determination.COL Plazas Vega did not extrajudicially kill Dr. Uran: COL Plazas Vega did not kill or order the killing of Dr. Uran. Colombia’s Supreme Court held that COL Plazas Vega had nothing to do with and did not know of the torture or extrajudicial killing of the Palace hostages. Because he was not involved in such activities he cannot be held liable for same. This Court should provide full faith and credit to this prior judicial determination.
Answer at 14–15. By asserting these affirmative defenses and invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Defendant suggests that the Court should give preclusive
In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue that “the Colombian Supreme Court decision upon which Defendant’s third and fourth affirmative defenses are predicated, is inadmissible and lacks preclusive or collateral estoppel effect on Plaintiffs in this action.” Mot. at 14. Plaintiffs identify “several fatal flaws” that they claim each independently doom Defendant’s third and fourth affirmative defenses. See id. at 9–11. The Court agrees that Defendant cannot invoke the Colombian Supreme Court’s holding to establish that he cannot be held liable for the torture and extrajudicial killing of Magistrate Urán.
First off, Plaintiffs correctly note that the Colombian Supreme Court’s decision is not entitled to full faith and credit by this Court. See Mot. at 15. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”
Nor can Defendant rely on the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect to the Colombian Supreme Court’s decision. The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, “bars the filing of claims which were raised or could have been raised
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, also does not apply. The doctrine of collateral estoppel “foreclose[es] relitigation of an issue that has already been litigated and decided.” Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2003). It requires that
(1) the issue at stake is identical to one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior litigation; (3) the determination of the issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the prior litigation; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.
McCulley v. Bank of Am., N.A., 605 F. App’x 875, 877–78 (11th Cir. 2015). As noted above, the issues regarding Magistrate Urán’s torture and killing were not litigated and decided in Defendant’s prior criminal proceedings in Colombia. See P’s SUMF ¶¶ 16–18; D’s CMF ¶¶ 16–18. And Plaintiffs did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the prior proceedings, as evidenced by the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs’ mother sought to be included as a civil party but the request was denied because “the allegations surrounding Magistrate Urán’s death were distinct from those pertaining to the individuals who had been forcibly disappeared by
For these reasons, Defendant’s third and fourth affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law. Defendant’s acquittal by the Colombian Supreme Court on charges for the forced disappearance of other individuals cannot be used to preclude liability for the torture and killing of Magistrate Urán. As such, summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs is warranted on Defendant’s third and fourth affirmative defenses.
Undeterred, Defendant also argues that his third and fourth affirmative defenses “do not ask this Court to hold that an acquittal automatically bars civil liability”—even though these affirmative defenses do just that. Compare Resp. at 3 with Answer at 14–15 (“Because he was not involved in such activities he cannot be held liable for the same.”). Instead, he “asks this Court to recognize the final merits judgment of Colombia’s highest criminal court and to afford appropriate respect to the factual determinations necessarily decided therein.” Resp. at 3.
Defendant invokes “international comity” throughout his Response as the primary basis for the Court to recognize the Colombian Supreme Court’s judgment and factual findings. See generally Resp. However, the Court has already rejected these very arguments in its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judicial Notice. See [ECF No. 56]. In its prior Order, the Court emphasized that it “has the utmost respect for the judicial proceedings of sister countries, like Colombia . . . [b]ut here, Defendant’s criminal proceedings simply did not involve these Plaintiffs or the subject matter of the case before this Court.” Id. at 13.
And as Plaintiffs point out in their Reply, Defendant’s Response “is essentially one large request for judicial notice, repeatedly exhorting the Court ‘to recognize’ the ‘factual determinations’ and findings contained in Defendant’s alleged acquittal decision for the truth
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s second, third, and fourth affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion, [ECF No. 274], is GRANTED. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiffs as to Defendant’s second, third, and fourth affirmative defenses.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida this 1st day of September, 2026.
RODOLFO A. RUIZ II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE