52 Mo. 153 | Mo. | 1873
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a suit in the nature of a bill in Chancery. The petition in substance sets forth that John Biddle, on the first day of January, 1853, was the' owner of certain premises in the City of St. Louis, and that on that day, said Biddle demised said lot of ground to defendant for the term of ten years from and after said date, at a certain yearly rent as ascertained and set forth in a certain deed of lease of that date, executed by said Biddle and said defendant Ramsey; that by the terms of said lease, said defendant was during the first five years of said term, to pay to said Biddle $200 semi-annually, and for the remaining period of five years was to pay in like manner $250 per year and also all taxes; that s’aid lease also provided
And the petition concluded with a prayer to the effect that the defendant answer the premises, that the court should judicially ascertain the value of said rental and also of said buildings, according to the true intent and meaning of said lease; that plaintiff should have his option as reserved to him by said lease, that an account be taken between plaintiff and defendant and for other and further relief.
The defendant demurred to this petition assigning as grounds therefor:
That the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because by the lease the parties had stipu lated that the value of the buildings and improvements and the yearly rent of the leased premises should be fixed by assessors to be named by the parties.
Because there was no averment in the petition that defendant had refused to perform this agreement in the appointment of an assessor or that the valuation of the buildings, etc., had become impossible in the mode prescribed by the lease, by the parties themselves.
Because from aught that appeared in said petition, the valuation of the property could be ascertained as provided for in the lease.
That nothing was alleged in the petition that showed that plaintiffs were entitled to have the value of said rental and buildings ascertained by the court, or why he should have the option reserved by the terms of the lease, or why he should have any relief as prayed for in the petition.
The petition was adjudged insufficient on this demurrer» and plaintiff declining to amend, judgment was rendered on the demurrer, and this cause comes here on writ of error.
The only question necessary for solution in this cause is, not as has been with so much adroitness urged by respondent’s counsel, whether an agreement to arbitrate can be the subject of a decree for specific performance, nor whether, as has been further and with equal ingenuity urged, the court can substitute itself in place of the arbitrators, because the authorities to the contrary on both these points are unbroken in their uniformity, but whether the plaintiff on the facts stated is in this action absolutely remediless ?
For, if the allegations of the petition entitle the plaintiff to any measure of redress, a deaf ear will not be turned to his complaint simply because he thinks that justice should be dispensed to him in a particular way other than, and different from that to which he is aetualy entitled.
The defendant by his demurrer confesses the petition to be true; that by practices and contrivances the most inequitable and fraudulent, he has succeeded in retaining possession of the demised premises long after the termination of his term and by like means in preventing any estimate from being made of the yearly value of the rents of those premises, or any valuation of the buildings and improvements thereon, in the manner he had solemnly agreed should be done.
The arm of a court of equity would surely be shortened
Courts of equity also exercise a peculiar jurisdiction in matters of account.
These courts too have a concurrent jurisdiction which “ extends to all cases of legal rights, where, under the circumstances, there is not a plain, adequate and compléte remedy at law.”
Moreover, the prevention of a multiplicity of suits is a distinct ground of original jurisdiction in courts of equity.
Now, this is a case which, in a peculiar and eminent degree, combines all these essentials of equitable jurisdiction; here an account is necessary to be taken for rents which have accrued during a long period of years; an estimate required of .improvements made; a multiplicity of suits to be avoided; no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law ; and finally, the sinister designs of fraud to defeat.
It must be apparent that although resort could be had in this case to an action at law ; that it would fall far short of meeting the exigencies which 'have arisen in respect to the subject matter of this suit; such a remedy would be neither “ plain,” “ adequate ” nor “ complete.”
Damages would not be recoverable because there has been no breach of any contract capable of enforcement either at law or in equity.
Owing to the confessed machinations of defendant, an action for unlawful detainer could not be maintained, as he has “ continued three whole years in the peaceable possession after the time for which the premises were demised to him have ■ expired.” (1 W. S., 464, § 27.)
Ejectment would lie for recovering possession of the premises ; but that action, however, would at its conclusion, still leave the matter of payment for buildings erected and improvements made wholly unadjusted, and new proceedings would have to be thereupon instituted for the accomplishment of the ends desired.
Great care has been devoted to the examination of the authorities cited on behalf of respondent, but none of them are regarded as militating in the least against the views herein expressed.
For these reasons the petition should have been held sufficient, and the judgments both of the special and of the general term are therefore reversed and the cause remanded.