Under the Soldiers Preference Law, chapter 70, Code of Iowa, 1954, plaintiff claimed of the 1956 incoming city council of Des Moines рreference to appointment to the position of city solicitor or assistant city attorney, which he had been holding under аppointment by the preceding council. The incoming council appointed another to the position. Plaintiff appеaled to the district court. Trial resulted in judgment dismissing the appeal. From such judgment plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.
Section 70.8, Code of Iowa, 1954, provides: “Exceptions. Nothing in this chapter [Soldiers Preference Law] shall be con *367 strued to apply * * * to any рerson holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer.” This exception was one ground for the judgment against appellant.
Des Moines has the Council-Manager form of Municipal Government by Election, under chapter 363C, Code of Iowa, 1954. Section 363C.1 provides in part that at the first meeting after election or as soon thereafter as practicable the council shall “appoint an attorney and such number of assistant attorneys as are deemed necessary.” Code section 368A.1 (7) empowers the council, “to appoint an attorney * * *' and such other officers, assistants and employees as are * * * necеssary * * * and fix the terms of employment * * Section 368A.1(9) requires the council to fix the terms of service, not to exceed two years, of оfficers whose terms are not prescribed by law, and 368A.1(10) to prescribe by ordinance the powers to be exercised and duties рerformed by officers insofar as such powers and duties are not defined by law.
Section 368A.1(11) empowers the council to direct thе city attorney, or to employ an attorney, to defend any municipal officer or employee in any cause of action arising out of or in the course of the performance of the duties of his office or employment. Section 368A.20 provides: “The city attorney * * * and such additional officers as may be provided for, shall have such powers and perform such duties as are рrescribed by law or ordinance.”
Various titles are given attorneys in municipal legal departments by statutes and municipal ordinances. For example, the ordinances of Des Moines refer to the head of its legal department as corporation counsel, the second in such department as city solicitor, and to the others as city prosecutor and assistant city solicitors. Thе ordinances use also the titles city attorney for the head of the department and assistant city attorney for the second place. These and other differences are not often troublesome because the status of each position is usually described by the context.
In this connection it may be noted that in chapter 365 of the Code, which establishes civil service in cities, seсtion 365.10' provides for soldier’s preference to appointment, but section 365.6 excepts from the provisions of the chaрter, among others, *368 the positions of city solicitor and assistant solicitor. But, as we view the matter, this case does not turn upon the titlе or rank in the city legal department of the position in question.
The city council is given control of the organization of the legal department and general supervision over its operations. However, each member of the legal department is an аttorney at law admitted to practice that profession in the courts of the state, and the basic duties of each, though varying, аre the professional duties of attorney. Hence, the supervision exercised by the council over the legal departmеnt, necessarily is subject to the professional duties and obligations of attorney to client, the public and the courts. It is comparable to that which the authorized representative of a private client may exercise over the work and conduct оf an attorney retained for the client by such representative.
The term “strictly confidential relation” in Code section 70.8 has been held to be very broad and not confined to any specific association of the parties, but to apply generally to аll persons who are associated by any relation of trust and confidence.
Brown v. State Printing Board,
This rule is well established. Allen v. Wegman,
That the relationship between an attorney and those he represents is strictly confidential is not open to question. It is clear also that professional services рerformed by members of a city legal department require skill, judgment, trust and confidence within the definition of the decisions above cited.
Appellant argues the statutory exception, “person holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officеr” is not here applicable because, he asserts, the duties of the legal
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department are not delegated to it by the council but are fixed by statute. In Brown v. State Printing Board, supra,
So in the case at bar, various statutory provisions, already referred to herein, authorize the council to impose upon members of the legal department of a municipality, duties in аddition to those fixed by statute. Hence, there is no ground for the argument of appellant upon this point.
The interpretation plаced upon the Soldiers Preference Law by decisions of this court requires the conclusion that the position of attorney in a municipal legal department is strictly confidential to the council and hence is within that exception to the Soldiers Preference Law. Hence, appellant was not entitled to such preference. This conclusion makes unnecessary the consideration of other grounds upon which the judgment was based. — -Affirmed.