Lead Opinion
Oрinion by Judge McKEOWN; Concurrence by Judge BETTY B. FLETCHER.
OPINION
At the heart of this case is a disappointed litigant’s attempt to obtain in federal court the very relief denied to him in state court, namely an injunction vacating a decision by the California Court of Appeal and reassigning his case to a different division or district because of the alleged bias of one of the justices. Maurice L. Bianchi unsuccessfully presented his bias claim to the California state courts, citing both a California procedural statute and the state and federal constitutions. After losing on two separate occasions, he filed a fеderal civil rights suit, which, in this case, is the functional equivalent of an appeal of the state court decision. For us to entertain his challenge and grant relief would necessarily require us to review and invalidate the state court decision, a result that is inconsistent with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court. Thus, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Bianchi’s complaint against the California Court of Appeal justices who adjudicated his appeal.
Factual Background and Procedural History
In the early 1990s, Bianchi commenced an action against Bank of America in the Superior Court of California (Orange County). Following a protracted trial, in which Judge Mason L. Fenton presided, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bank of America on all of the claims asserted by Bianchi and on Bank of America’s counterclaim. Bianchi then filed a series of post-trial motions. During the post trial proceedings, Bank of America moved to disqualify Judge Fenton. Although he denied Bank of America’s mo
After the recusal, the case was transferred to then-Superior Court Judge William Rylaarsdam. Immediately upon reassignment and before any substantive proceedings took place, Bianchi’s trial counsel took advantage of a statutory disqualification available under California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6(2), resulting in the automatic disqualification of Judge Rylaarsdam.
For his appeаl, Bianchi’s appellate counsel compiled an excerpt of record that included documents reflecting Judge Ryla-arsdam’s disqualification in the trial court. Thus, at the time Bianchi’s case was assigned to be heard before the appellate panel, Bianchi’s counsel knew that Bianchi had previously used a “peremptory” challenge under § 170.6(2) to remove then-Judge Rylaarsdam from his case. Bianchi did not, however, bring this information to the court’s attention or file a motion to disqualify Justice Rylaarsdam at that time. Only after he lost his appeal did Bianchi object, via a Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court, to Justice Ryla-arsdam’s presence on the panel that decided his appeal. Without reaching the merits of Bianchi’s argument, the California Supreme Court rejected Bianchi’s Petition for Review as untimely.
With the direct review of his case apparently concluded, Bianchi then tried another tactic; he filed a motion before the California Court of Appeal to recall the remitti-tur, claiming that Justice Rylaarsdam’s presence on the panel violated his federal and state constitutional right to due process and was contrary to California procedural rules. Through this motion, Bianchi sought to have the Court of Appeal vacate its opinion and reassign his appeal to a different panel. Justice Sills entered a summary order denying Bianchi’s motion. Although Justice Sills did not reference the state or federal constitutional argument in his decision, nothing in the record suggests that the court neglected its responsibility to consider Bianchi’s claims, including his constitutional challenge.
Not satisfied, Bianchi sought a Writ of Mandate from the California Supreme Court, again asserting that his due process rights were violated and again seeking to have the appellate court’s opinion vacated and his appeal reassigned to a different panel. The California Supreme Court denied his petition.
Having lost before the state courts, Bianchi filed suit in federal court against the three appellate justices, once again claiming that his due process rights were violated and once again seeking to have the appellate court’s opinion vacated and his appeal reassigned to a different panel. In his federal suit, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1988, Bianchi sought a declaratory judgment that would “declar[e] repugnant tо the Constitution of the United States, the practice of a Judge previously disqualified from hearing a matter as a Trial Court Judge from sitting in judgment of the same matter as an Appellate
Justices Sills, Wallin and Rylaarsdam moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. They also moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion to dismiss based on Rooker-Feldman. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., La Reunion Francaise SA v. Barnes,
Discussion
In analyzing a Rooker-Feldman challenge, it is instructive to consider the Supreme Court’s precise language that was the genesis of this doctrine. Although the principle that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions was firmly established in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States District Court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiffs application [for relief], then the District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision. This the District Court may not do.
Id. at 483 n. 16,
United States District Courts ... do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.
Id. at 486,
Rooker-Feldman is a powerful doctrine that prevents federal courts from second-guessing statе court decisions by barring the lower federal courts from hearing de facto appeals from state-court judgments: If claims raised in the federal court action are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules, then the federal complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Feldman,
With these principles in mind, we conclude that the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider Bianchi’s claims. Far from bringing a general constitutional challenge that is not “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision, Bianchi essentially asked the federal court to review the “state court’s denial in a judicial proceeding,” Feldman,
A comparison of Bianchi’s pleadings in state court and federal cоurt reveals that the constitutional claims and related claims in this federal suit are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial of relief. In his state court Motion to Recall Remittitur and For Further Relief, Bian-chi stated:
[T]o avoid infringement of Mr. Bianchi’s due process rights and protections, this Court should recall its Remittitur, vacate the Opinion entered herein on or about May 23, 1997, assign this matter to hearing before the Court, en banc, or transfer the case to another District of the Court and allow the appeal to proceed as if the Opinion entered on or about May 23, 1997, had never been issued.
His federal cоmplaint is a mirror image and seeks relief specific to his individual case:
This action seeks a declaratory judgment declaring repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the practice of a Judge previously disqualified from hearing a matter as a Trial Court Judge from sitting in judgment of the same matter as an Appellate Court Judge; and a mandatory injunction to require the Defendants to recall the Remittitur ..., and the resetting of that matter for argument and decision after transfer of that case to a different division or Appellate District of the Court of Appeal of the State of California.
And finally, Bianchi’s appellate brief in this court underscores that he seeks to overrule the state decision and to have this court order relief in the state action:
Mr. Bianchi complained that his constitutionally protected right to Due Process and, specially, his right to have his claim adjudicated by an impartial tribunal, was violated by a Judge, previously disqualified, acting as the authoring Judge of the Opinion in the appeal from the same case in which the Judge had been disqualified below and that, to remedy the deprivation of Due Process, the Court should mandatorily enjoin the panel of the Court of Appeals to reassign the case to an impartial tribunal.
Bianchi now seeks an order from us instructing the state court to do what it refused to do when he made the identical claim before that court — to reassign his case to a different panel of judges. It is difficult to imagine how any federal action could be more “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment than this proceeding. See Phifer v. City of New York,
Although Bianchi admits that he raised the samе issues presented here in his motion to recall the remittitur and in his petitions before the California Supreme Court, Bianchi asserts that his due process claim is not inextricably intertwined with his state court action because the substantive issues presented in his underlying state court complaint and his federal complaint are not the same. This argument misses the mark and blurs the distinction between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the principles of preclusion.
Because we cannot grant the relief Bian-chi seeks without “undoing” the decision of the state court, it is immaterial that the state courts did not specify the grounds on which they dеnied Bianchi’s claims. The silence of the California courts does not indicate that they failed to consider the constitutional claims presented to them. See Craig,
In any event, Bianchi’s claims would still be barred under Rooker-Feldman even if the state court had not actually decided his constitutional claims. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not require us to determine whether or not the state court fully and fairly adjudicated the constitutional claim. Nor is it relevant whether the state court’s decision is res judicata or creates the law of the case under state law. See Feldman,
Our conclusion parallels the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Howell v. Supreme Court of Texas,
After the Texas Supreme Court denied Howell’s motion for recusal and denied his application for a writ of error, Howell filed a complaint in federal court in which he asserted that the justices’ refusal to recuse themselves was a due process violation.
Our analysis also draws support from the principles of federalism and comity that underlie the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Under that provision, the movant must state generally that the judge should be disqualified on grounds of prejudice. Once the motion is made, the judge is automatically disqualified. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 170.6(3). No assessment of prejudice is undertaken.
. See GASH Associates v. Village of Rosemont,
. Another way to look at Bianchi's claim— and one that leads us to the same result — is through the doctrine of standing. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Facio v. Jones,
. It is immaterial thаt Bianchi frames his federal complaint as a constitutional challenge to the state courts' decisions, rather than as a direct appeal of those decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over any claim that is "inextricably intertwined” with the decision of a state court, even where the party does not directly challenge the merits of the state court's decision but rather brings an indirect challenge based
. The suggestion in the concurrence that Rooker compels a different result is strained. In Rooker, the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction over any part of the suit presented to it, including the bias claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision in its entirety.
. We acknowledge that Rooker-Feldman is not a constitutional doctrine. See In re Gruntz,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in the judgment:
I write separately because the majority’s expansive reasoning is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s decision in Rooker and unnecessarily enunciates a doctrine of “appellate jurisdiction” for Rooker-Feldman purposes that, as I explain below, is unwarranted on the facts of this case. I concur in the judgment, however, because the record presents no affirmative evidence that the California Supreme Court’s summary decision denying Bianchi’s petition for a writ of mandate was not a decision on his federal due process claim. See, e.g., Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
Regardless of how broadly the majority wishes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to sweep, Rooker itself carved out a clear exception to the rule that the general jurisdictional statutes do not permit a lower federal court to adjudicate a federal-law claim that, if meritorious, overturns a state court’s judgment. In Rooker, the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff alleged that the state Supreme Court’s judgment was void because one of the judges had an improper “interest in the case which worked his disqualification.” Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
Because this aspect of Rooker has not been overruled, an attack on the authority of a state court to adjudicate a case because a state court judge should have been disqualified is not subject to dismissal under thе Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Congress has not altered the jurisdictional statutes to abrogate this aspect of Rooker. There is nothing in D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
Accordingly, if Bianchi had come directly to federal court in a § 1983 action to challenge the California Court of Appeal’s disposition of his direct appeal, his claim could not be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman. Bianchi, however, did not come straight to federal court, but sought to vindicate his federal rights in state court. He sought relief from the same court that allegedly violated his rights, and he twice sought relief from the California Supreme Court.
Bianchi’s attempt to have the Court of Appeal recall its remittitur does not bar his federal court suit under Rooker-Feldman for the simple reason that thе Court of Appeal’s denial of relief is allegedly tainted by judicial bias, just as was its initial disposition of his direct appeal.
However, Bianchi does not allege that the state Supreme Court’s justices should have been recused.
There is no doubt that Bianchi presented the substance of his federal due process claim regarding the Court of Appeаl’s disposition of his appeal to the state Supreme Court when he petitioned for a writ of mandate. Despite the state Supreme Court’s summary dismissal of that petition, we assume that the state court considered the merits of Bianchi’s federal claim since Bianchi presented no affirmative evidence to the contrary. Cf. Michigan v. Long,
Regardless of how broad or narrow the circumstances in which adjudication by a lower federal court is an improper exercise of appellate jurisdiction for Rooker-Feldman purposes, it is plain that review by a federal district court of a state Supreme Court’s decision on the merits of a federal issue raised and presumed decided by the state court (where no improper bias is asserted) is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. As such, it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that should end this court’s analysis of Bianchi’s case.
However the majority goes on to enunciate a sweeping doctrine of “appellate jurisdiction” for Rooker-Feldman purposes. The majority relies almost exclusively on analytically confused authority from other circuits to create a standardless test for improper “appellate jurisdiction” that takes into account the relief a plaintiff seeks in federal court, whether the plaintiff has standing to bring a constitutional challenge on its own, a new federal common law of res judicata that is unmoored from any congressional specification оf the limits of preclusion doctrine,
In this case, we need not decide whether the correct yardstick by which to decide if a federal case is an improper appeal of a state court decision is the relief sought, the claims asserted, or the injury alleged. Those questions are simply not presented.
In sum, I conclude that Bianchi’s case is barred because he seeks to have the feder
. Indeed, it would be extraordinary if Feldman even reached the issue of whether federal judicial disqualification claims against state judges are barred because the question of improper judicial bias was not presented in Feldman.
. In this, of course, Bianchi's case differs from that of Rooker. See
. Indeed, thеre is absolutely no need to announce any theory of improper federal "appellate jurisdiction” over the California Court of Appeal’s decision in this case because Bianchi’s petition to the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandate raised and is presumed to have decided the federal question presented here. The majority's analysis is flawed because it assumes that it is the Court of Appeal’s decision that is before us, not the state Supreme Court's.
. Congress mandated that federal courts look to state preclusion law. It is not the force of state lаw that limits federal court consideration of claims that were decided in state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
In this case, the defendants never raised— and therefore waived — any claim that Bian-chi's claims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Nonetheless, it appears as though the majority has permitted the defendants a second bite at the proverbial apple by including some amorphous form of these preclusion defenses in its test to determine whether the federal court adjudication of Bianchi’s case is an improper appeal of a state court decision.