Case Information
*1
T HE U TAH C OURT OF A PPEALS
C HANDRA P RAKASH B HONGIR , Appellant, v.
V IDISHA M ANTHA , Appellee.
Opinion No. 20140707-CA Filed May 12, 2016 Third District Court, West Jordan Department The Honorable Charlene Barlow No. 124400853 Jerry Salcido and Spencer J. Salcido, Attorneys for Appellant
Steven C. Russell, Attorney for Appellee
S ENIOR J UDGE P AMELA T. G REENWOOD authored this Opinion, in which J UDGES J. F REDERIC V OROS J R . and K ATE A. T OOMEY concurred.
GREENWOOD, Senior Judge: Chandra Prakash Bhongir (Husband) appeals the district
court’s grant of Vidisha Mantha’s (Wife) motion to set aside the parties’ supplemental divorce decree, the court’s subsequent entry of temporary orders and a modified decree of divorce, and its denial of Husband’s motion to set aside the temporary orders. We affirm but remand on the limited issue of the reasonableness of the attorney fees the district court ordered Husband to pay. 1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11- 201(6).
BACKGROUND Husband and Wife were married in India in February
2011. Husband was living in Utah and, in March, Wife moved to Utah to be with him. By July the marriage ‚was troubled‛ and Wife returned to India. In January of the following year, Wife returned to Utah and lived at the YWCA. On May 4, 2012, Husband filed for divorce. Throughout their brief marriage, the two lived together for a total of only five months. The district court executed a supplemental divorce decree
(the Decree) in April 2013, which incorporated the parties’ stipulated settlement agreement. The Decree contained the statement, ‚Each party is fully capable of supporting themselves, and therefore, neither party shall be awarded spousal support.‛ Wife soon filed a motion to set aside the Decree under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that she was not able to support herself and that the contrary indication in the Decree was a mistake. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The district court granted the motion, finding that ‚there was a mistake in signing the stipulation as the parties signed something that was not true relating to [Wife] having no need of alimony‛ and that ‚there was no meeting of the minds when the stipulation was signed.‛ The district court eventually entered temporary orders, which were incorporated into another supplemental divorce decree (the Supplemental Decree), requiring Husband to pay Wife alimony of $1,000 per month for five months—the length of time the parties had lived together while married. The court also required Husband to pay a portion of Wife’s attorney fees.
2. An amended version of rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect on May 1, 2016. For purposes of this appeal, we use the version of rule 60 in effect prior to May 1, 2016. Husband moved—and the district court declined—to set
aside the temporary orders on the ground of fraud, arguing Wife had perjured herself regarding having a work visa. This appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Husband raises four issues for our review. First, he asserts
that it was error for the district court to set aside the Decree on
the ground of mistake. Second, he argues that the district court
erroneously denied his rule 60(b) motion to set aside the
temporary orders on the basis of fraud. Third, he contends that
the award of alimony in the Supplemental Decree should be set
aside. And fourth, he claims that the award of attorney fees and
costs was erroneous. We review each of these issues for abuse of
discretion.
See Ostler v. Buhler
, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (a
district court’s rulings on motions made pursuant to rule 60(b)
are reviewed for abuse of discretion);
Dobson v. Dobson
, 2012 UT
App 373, ¶ 7, 294 P.3d 591 (alimony awards are reviewed for
abuse of discretion);
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker
,
ANALYSIS ‚In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such
orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are
equitable. The trial court has broad latitude in such matters, and
orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be
lightly disturbed.‛
Jones v. Jones
,
I. The District Court’s Grant of Wife’s Rule 60(b) Motion The district court did not abuse its discretion when it set aside the Decree on the grounds of mistake. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court ‚may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Within ninety days after the entry of the Decree, Wife
filed a motion pursuant to rule 60(b), asking the district court to set aside the Decree because, among other reasons, her ‚gross monthly income is zero.‛ She contended that her lack of income rendered the Decree’s provision that ‚*e+ach party is fully capable of supporting themselves . . . clearly wrong.‛ The district court agreed, finding that ‚there was a mistake in signing the stipulation as the parties signed something that was not true relating to *Wife+ having no need of alimony.‛ Husband now complains that Wife impermissibly used rule 60(b) to correct a legal error. In his view, the district court’s finding ‚that the statement is a mistake, based upon the fact that 3. Wife’s motion also argued that she was ‚in the United States on a visa that does not allow her to work.‛ The district court ultimately determined that this statement was false. Wife was sanctioned for her misrepresentation, which is discussed in more detail infra ¶¶ 14–19. For purposes of this section, we discuss only the facts that Wife was not working and had no monthly income, which were the facts that drove the district court’s order setting aside the Decree.
[Wife] is not able to support herself, is a legal conclusion.‛ We disagree. The court did not set aside the Decree solely because of a
legal error. Instead, it set aside the Decree because the Decree contained a factual mistake, and that factual mistake affected the court’s legal conclusion that neither party should be required to pay alimony. This is exactly how rule 60(b) is intended to operate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also Goode v. Goode , 624 N.E.2d 788, 791–92, 795–96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (where spousal support award was based on stipulation containing mutual mistake as to the wife’s income, the trial court erred by denying the husband’s motion for relief under rule 60(b) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure). On appeal, Husband does not challenge the district
court’s factual finding that Wife could not support herself
during the time for which alimony was awarded.
See infra
¶ 19.
He instead rests his argument on the proposition that Wife
should have been precluded from using rule 60(b) to redress this
mistake. But by its very language, the rule operates to correct
mistakes
.
See
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). And here, the Decree’s
alimony determination was premised on the fact that Wife could
support herself. That was not actually the case. The simplest way
to describe this situation is to say that the Decree contained a
mistake, and thus this correction fits within the confines of rule
60(b). Further, given the ‚liberal standard for application of Rule
60(b) in divorce cases,‛
Boyce v. Boyce
, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah
1980), we cannot conclude that the district court acted in error.
See id.
(indicating that ‚a court should modify a prior decree
when the interests of equity and fair dealing . . . so require‛).
Wife used the appropriate remedy when she requested
relief from judgment under rule 60(b), which provides for relief
from final judgments when a mistake has been made. We
therefore determine the district court did not abuse its discretion
by granting Wife’s motion to set aside the Decree.
See Begum v.
Begum
,
II. The District Court’s Denial of Husband’s Rule 60(b) Motion Husband contends that the district court should have granted his rule 60(b) motion to set aside the temporary orders because Wife had made fraudulent statements to the court. As we did with the district court’s decision to grant Wife’s motion, ‚*w+e review a district court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion.‛ Lindsay v. Walker , 2015 UT App 184, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d 195 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). After granting Wife’s rule 60(b) motion and setting aside
the Decree, the district court held a hearing to determine whether Wife should receive alimony. Wife misrepresented to the court that she was not able to work in the United States when, in fact, she possessed a work visa. The district court initially found that Wife ‚was not employed at the time of the hearing although she stated she was ‘preparing’ to apply for a work visa.‛ It then ordered that Husband pay Wife ‚spousal support for the duration of the time that they lived together in the marriage, i.e., five months‛ and determined that Husband was capable of providing $1,000 per month for the five months. 4. Wife also initially indicated, in response to an interrogatory, that she had only a high school education. But in court she testified to having an MBA. There is no indication in the record that the district court based any portion of its decision on Wife’s level of education.
It also awarded Wife her attorney fees for work done through December 4, 2013. Husband’s motion pursuant to rule 60(b) alleged that
Wife had committed fraud. The district court agreed that Wife ‚did commit fraud by lying under oath to the Court‛ but determined that ‚the fraudulent testimony was not related to the reasons why the Court awarded [Wife] alimony and attorney fees.‛ The district court accordingly denied Husband’s motion. But the court also concluded that Wife ‚is in contempt of Court for her perjury and should be sanctioned for her actions.‛ Accordingly, in the Supplemental Decree—which incorporated the temporary orders—the district court sanctioned Wife by imposing a thirty-day suspended jail term and a $1,000 fine, of which it suspended $750. Husband is correct that rule 60(b) ‚provides for relief
from a judgment where fraud has been established.‛ But the rule does not require relief when fraud has been established. Instead, the rule is permissive: the court may provide relief. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). At the root of Husband’s argument are his assertions that
the district court ‚erred in allowing for *Wife+ to be awarded
alimony, attorney’s fees, and costs, despite [her] attempts to hide
the fact that she is able to work in the United States and produce
income,‛ and that his motion to set aside was therefore ‚proper
since it is unjust for [Wife] to receive an order based upon
fraud.‛ But Husband misapprehends the issue. Even if we
5. December 4, 2013, is the date the parties appeared before the
district court commissioner, who made recommendations
regarding alimony and attorney fees. Each party objected to the
recommendations, and the district court then ruled on the
objections and entered the order on which Husband based his
rule 60(b) motion. That order was entered March 13, 2014.
agreed that the district court ‚made the wrong call, it was, in its
essence, a discretionary call—and one that was within the broad
range of discretion entrusted to [it].‛
See Gunn Hill Dairy Props.,
LLC v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power
,
fraud; made its orders regarding alimony, costs, and fees with
that awareness; and declined to disturb those orders when
presented with Husband’s rule 60(b) motion. The district court
explained that Wife’s fraud did not affect its order regarding
alimony, costs, or attorney fees, and we have no reason to doubt
6. There is at least some indication in our jurisprudence that the
nature of Wife’s fraud is sufficient to decide this issue. In
Rice v.
Rice
,
III. The Alimony Award Husband separately argues that even if the district court
properly set aside the Decree, it erred when it entered an alimony award on Wife’s behalf. Insofar as Husband’s argument focuses on Wife’s perjury, we conclude that Section II, supra , resolves any question regarding the propriety of the district court’s handling of that issue. Beyond the issue of Wife’s perjury, Husband inconsistently argues both that the district court failed to make a finding regarding Wife’s ability to produce income and that the district court erred in making such a finding. He also asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Wife alimony because ‚the parties were only married for five months before separating.‛ We briefly consider each contention in turn. In determining alimony, the district court was required to
consider Wife’s financial condition and needs, her earning
capacity or ability to produce income, and Husband’s ability to
provide support. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) (LexisNexis
2013);
accord Bakanowski v. Bakanowski
,
discretion in awarding alimony when the parties were only
married for five months before separating‛ is also inadequately
briefed. He cites no authority other than the statutory allowance
that ‚when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which
existed at the time of the marriage.‛ Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(8)(h). But Husband fails to indicate how this statute should
guide our decision in this case. Without further development of
this issue, we see no reason to depart from the principle that ‚an
award of alimony up to the length of the marriage falls within
the trial court’s ‘broad discretion.’‛
See Kidd v. Kidd
, 2014 UT
App 26, ¶ 53,
IV. Award of Costs and Attorney Fees Finally, we address the district court’s decision to order
Husband to pay Wife’s attorney fees. We first consider Husband’s contention that the district court failed to make the requisite finding of reasonableness, and we then consider Husband’s contention that the district court should have instead required Wife to pay his attorney fees. To award costs and attorney fees in conjunction with an
award of alimony, ‚the trial court must base the award on
evidence of the receiving spouse’s financial need, the payor
spouse’s ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees.‛
Childs v. Childs
,
have required Wife to pay his attorney fees, we are not
persuaded. The court explicitly found that Wife could not pay
her own attorney fees. It further found that Husband ‚can pay
attorney fees.‛ It would have been illogical to require Wife, a
party who could not afford her own attorney fees, to pay fees on
behalf of Husband, who had no financial need to have his
attorney fees paid. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by avoiding this result.
See Nielson v. Nielson
,
have the ability to pay‛ another’s fees, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying an attorney-fee award).
CONCLUSION The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
granted Wife’s motion to set aside the Decree under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when it denied Husband’s similar motion to set aside the temporary orders, when it awarded Wife alimony in the Supplemental Decree, or when it declined to require Wife to pay Husband’s costs and attorney fees. Nevertheless, the district court failed to enter a specific finding as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees it awarded to Wife. We remand for the limited purpose of entering such a finding.