Bhinder v. Sun Co.Bhinder v. Sun Co.
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- Norcott
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff, Autar Singh Bhinder, the administrator of the estate of the decedent, Baljit Singh Bhinder, brought this wrongful death action against the defendant, Sun Company, Inc., alleging, inter aha, that the defendant had failed to provide adequate security to protect its employee, the decedent, from foreseeable harm from criminal assault by a third party. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a defendant in a negligence action may cite in a criminal assailant as an apportionment defendant. The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant’s apportionment complaint against the assailant because it concluded that
“In an appeal from a judgment granting a motion to strike, we operate in accordance with well established principles.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 696, 694 A.2d 788 (1997). “[W]e must take as true the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint and must construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270-71, 709 A.2d 558 (1998).
We assume as true the following facts as alleged in the plaintiffs complaint. The defendant was the owner of a Sunoco gasoline service station and convenience store (station) located at 336 Main Street in Norwalk. Nandú C. Patel and Sumitra N. Patel leased the station
We first consider the defendant’s argument that Bohan is authority for the proposition that a defendant in a negligence action may cite in reckless and intentional tortfeasors for apportionment of liability. The defendant’s reliance on Bohan is misplaced because, unlike the present case, the allegations in the apportionment complaint in Bohan involved claims of negligence. Bohan v. Last, supra, 236 Conn. 674. The plaintiff in Bohan brought a wrongful death action against a bar, which was alleged to have served alcohol to a minor who later was involved in a motor vehicle accident that led to the death of a passenger in the car the minor was operating. Id., 672. The defendant thereafter sought
We next address the defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly concluded that
Our resolution of the defendant’s claim is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
We begin our analysis by examining the text of the statute.
“By its own terms, the comparative negligence statute [
The defendant argues nonetheless that the term “negligence” as used in
A review of the legislative history of
An important element of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 (Tort Reform I); Public Acts 1986, No. 86-338; was § 3, which “provided that each defendant would initially be liable for only that percentage of his negligence that proximately caused the injury, in relation to one hundred percent, that is attributable to each person whose negligent actions were a proximate cause of the damages.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Donner v. Kearse, supra, 234 Conn. 667. The Tort Reform Act of 1987 (Tort Reform II); Public Acts 1987, No. 87-227; revised, inter alia, “the class of individuals to whom the jury could look in determining whose negligence had been a proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries” from “person” to “party.” Donner v. Kearse, supra, 668; see
Our conclusion that the text of
“[I]n interpreting statutes we have on occasion read specific statutory references to indicate a legislative intent to exclude, by implication, other related potential referents. . . . [I]f in this case either the explicit language or the legislative history of [
As an initial matter, our review of the statutory text and the pertinent legislative history does not evince an intent by the legislature to preclude the recognition of apportionment in a negligence action between negligent and intentional tortfeasors. With respect to public policy considerations, the plaintiff argues that such considerations militate against extending the principle of apportionment underlying
In Veazey, the plaintiff was a resident in the defendant’s apartment complex and was sexually assaulted in her apartment. Id., 713. The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant, alleging, inter alia, that it had provided inadequate security. Id. At the close of trial, the defendant requested that the trial court submit a special interrogatory to permit the allocation of fault to the nonparty assailant. Id., 714. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that its comparative fault statute, which provides that a jury may allocate the
Citing Veazey as support, the plaintiff argues that apportionment should not be permitted because it is not appropriate to permit a negligent defendant to relieve itself of liability when the very basis of that liability is premised on the occurrence of a criminal act that the plaintiff alleges the defendant should have foreseen and taken reasonable steps to prevent. The plaintiff offers § 449 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as support for its claim that the defendant should not be able to “avoid” liability based on the occurrence
We previously have recognized that a defendant might be liable for injuries to a plaintiff as a result of a criminal assault by a third party if the type of harm caused is within the scope of the risk created by the defendant’s negligent conduct. See Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 607-608, 662 A.2d 753 (1995);7 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 442B (1965).8 We have never intimated, however, that a negligent party should be solely responsible for a plaintiffs resulting injuries inflicted by a criminal actor. In addition, we do not construe § 449 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to compel such a result. Section 449 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “If the
Furthermore, precluding the defendant from allocating fault is inconsistent with the principle of comparative negligence that a defendant should be liable only for that proportion of the damages for which he or she was responsible. Donner v. Kearse, supra, 234 Conn. 668-69; Baxter v. Cardiology Associates of New Haven, P.C., 46 Conn. App. 377, 381, 699 A.2d 271, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 933, 702 A.2d 640 (1997) (“a primary purpose of enacting [§ 52-572h] was to change the common law of joint and several liability such that a defendant would be liable only for that proportion of the damages for which he was responsible”); Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1, 6, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (1991) (“the purpose of [the comparative fault statute] is to prevent the unfairness of requiring a tortfeasor who is only minimally culpable as compared to the other parties to bear all the damages” [emphasis in original]); Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 99, 590 A.2d 222 (1991) (“the labels attached by the law to various types of conduct should not thwart the principle that it is the overall fault of the parties which is to be measured” [emphasis added]). The plaintiffs construction would have the incongruous effect of rendering a negligent party solely responsible for the conduct of an intentional actor, whose deviation from the standard of reasonable care is clearly greater.9 An apportionment
We are also unpersuaded by the plaintiffs claim that apportionment would permit a defendant to avoid liability or diminish a defendant’s incentive to exercise a standard of reasonable care in providing security for his premises. Apportionment does not affect the determination of whether the defendant is liable under a theory of negligence but, rather, affects the determination of his degree of fault once a trier of fact has determined that his breach of a reasonable standard of care was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injuries.10 “Once it is determined that the defendant’s conduct has been a cause of some damage suffered by the plaintiff, a further question may arise as to the portion
The plaintiffs final argument is that negligence is different in kind rather than degree from reckless, wilful and wanton conduct, and cannot be compared to these types of conduct. We disagree.
In Blazovic v. Andrich, supra, 124 N.J. 107, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the different types of conduct could not be compared for purposes of apportionment of fault, concluding that “we view intentional wrongdoing as different in degree from either negligence or wanton and willful conduct. . . . [By allowing comparison of] the various types of tortious conduct . . . we adhere most closely to the guiding principle of comparative fault — to distribute the loss in proportion to the respective fault of the parties causing that loss.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)13 These cate
We are unpersuaded by the plaintiffs policy arguments against extending § 52-572h as a matter of common law to permit a negligent defendant to apportion liability to an intentional defendant. We conclude that permitting apportionment in the present case would effectuate the principle underlying the comparative negligence statute of equitable apportionment among responsible tortfeasors. “Where possible, courts should, as a matter of common law adüudication, assure that the body of the law — both common and statutory—
The judgment is reversed.
In this opinion KATZ, PALMER and MCDONALD, Js., concurred.
Notes
“(b) In causes of action based on negligence, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative 1 o recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property if the negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section. The economic or noneconomic damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion of the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering which percentage shall be determined pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.
“(c) In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages except as provided in subsection (g) of this section.
“(d) The proportionate share of damages for which each party is liable is calculated by multiplying the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages by a fraction in which the numerator is the party’s percentage of negligence, which percentage shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, and the denominator is the total of the percentages of negligence, which percentages shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, to be attributable to all parties whose negligent actions were a proximate cause of the injury, death or damage to property including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section. Any percentage of negligence attributable to the claimant shall not be included in the denominator of the fraction. . . .”
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
“(b) The apportionment complaint shall be equivalent in all respects to an original writ, summons and complaint, except that it shall include the docket number assigned to the original action and no new entry fee shall be imposed. The apportionment defendant shall have available to him all remedies available to an original defendant including the right to assert defenses, set-offs or counterclaims against any party. If the apportionment complaint is served within the time period specified in subsection (a) of this section, no statute of limitation or repose shall be a defense or bar to such claim for apportionment, except that, if the action against the defendant who instituted the apportionment complaint pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is subject to such a defense or bar, the apportionment defendant may plead such a defense or bar to any claim brought by the plaintiff directly against the apportionment defendant pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
“(c) No person who is immune from liability shall be made an apportionment defendant nor shall such person’s liability be considered for apportionment purposes pursuant to
“(d) Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitation or repose, the plaintiff may, within sixty days of the return date of the apportionment complaint served pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, assert any claim against the apportionment defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original complaint.
“(e) When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a person not a party to the action to be brought in as an apportionment defendant under circumstances which under this section would entitle a defendant to do so.
“(f) This section shall be the exclusive means by which a defendant may add a person who is or may be liable pursuant to
“(g) In no event shall any proportionate share of negligence determined pursuant to subsection (f) of
The apportionment complaint alleged that Garcia presently was incarcerated, but did not specify the offense.
The defendant also filed an apportionment complaint against Nandú and Sumitra Patel.
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1812 (C), provides in relevant part: “In cases to recover damages for injury, death, or loss, the court may submit to the jury special written questions inquiring as to . . .
“(2) (a) If appropriate, whether another person, whether party or not, other than the person suffering iqjury, death, or loss, was at fault, and if so:
“(i) Whether such fault was a legal cause of the damages, and if so:
“(ii) The degree of such fault, expressed in percentage. . . .”
To determine whether a harm is within the scope of the risk created, “the harm actually suffered must be of the same general type as that which makes the defendant’s conduct negligent in the first instance.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 609. In Stewart, the plaintiffs decedent was murdered by a third party in a parking garage owned and operated by the defendant. Id., 599. We concluded that in view of the previous criminal activities that had occurred in the defendant’s garage, “the harm that befell [the decedent] had been reasonably foreseeable and was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” Id., 612.
We previously adopted § 442B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; see Tetro v. Stratford, 189 Conn. 601, 605, 458 A.2d 5 (1983); which provides in relevant part that “[w]here the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is not within the scope of the risk created by the actor’s conduct.” 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 442B.
The Kansas Supreme Court illustrated the contradiction in treatment between a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor that would result were we to adopt the plaintiffs argument by the following hypothetical situation: “Assume that a visibly intoxicated third person in [a] restaurant negligently stumbles into and knocks down one guest, then intentionally pushes down another guest. In each case the restaurant breached its duty in the same manner — by failing to remove the intoxicated person from the premises before he harmed a guest. The results, however, vary. The restaurant is liable for only a proportionate fault share of the damages suffered by the first guest, but is jointly and severally liable for all damages suffered by the second guest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., 249 Kan. 348, 376, 819 P.2d 587 (1991).
“A breach of duty by the defendant and a causal connection between the defendant’s breach of duty and the resulting harm to the plaintiff are essential elements of a cause of action in negligence. Catz v. Rubenstein, 201 Conn. 39, 44, 513 A.2d 98 (1986); see RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994) (essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 225, 682 A.2d 106 (1996).
The plaintiff s skepticism regarding the effectiveness of apportionment, as compared to joint liability, in achieving an incentive for employers to maintain safe premises “does not render [apportionment] against public policy.” Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, supra, 1 Cal. App. 4th 8; see Blazovic v. Andrich, supra, 124 N.J. 107 (“[ajpportionmentoffaultbetweenintentional and negligent parties will not eliminate the deterrent or punitive aspects of tort recovery”).
To effectuate consistency between § 52-572h and the common law, we engraft the provisions of § 52-572h to common-law apportionment between a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor. The statute provides for certain reallocation in the situation of an insolvent tortfeasor. In this regard, we note that in addition to the damages based on its percentage of fault, pursuant to 52-572h (g) (2) and (3), a negligent defendant also would be liable for the entirety of the plaintiffs economic damages should the share apportionable to a given defendant prove to be uncollectible, thus creating a further financial incentive for a defendant to exercise reasonable care.
We note that other states have enacted statutes permitting the comparison of fault for apportionment purposes between a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor. See Martin By and Through Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1993) (construing California statute to permit defendant in negligent supervision action, wherein child was sexually assaulted, to seek apportionment of noneconomic damages from intentional tortfeasor); Thomas v. First Interstate Bank of Arizona, 187 Ariz. 488, 489-90, 930 P.2d 1002 (1996) (statute permitted apportionment of liability between negligent and intentional tortfeasors as between allegedly negligent bank and murderer); Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, supra, 1 Cal. App. 4th 6-7 (statute permitted apportionment between business owners and third party assailant in action involving security of premises); Blazovic v. Andrich, supra, 124 N.J. 106-108 (statute permitted apportionment between restaurant alleged to have failed to provide adequate lighting and security, and intentional conduct of assailant); Reichert v. Atler, supra, 117 N.M. 625 (business owner’s negligent failure to protect patrons from foreseeable harm from third parties compared to conduct of assailant); Siler v. 146 Montague Associates, 228 App. Div. 2d 33, 39-41, 652 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1997) (apportionment statute permitted defendant landlords in action involving security of premises to seek apportionment of liability from intentional tortfeasor); Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1998) (term “fault” as utilized in comparative fault statute permitted apportionment of responsibility between negligent and intentional conduct); but see Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., supra, 249 Kan. 376 (school in negligence action wherein student was sexually assaulted by school bus driver could not apportion liability with assailant); Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd., supra, 650 So.2d 720 (landlord in negligence action could not apportion liability with sexual assailant); Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 821 (Tenn. 1997) (psychiatrist’s negligence in failing to protect against assault by hospital patient could not be compared to intentional conduct of patient).
Wanton, reckless, wilful and intentional conduct demonstrate “a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts. . . . [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence.. . .[I]n order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them. . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights and safety of others or of the consequences of the action. . . . Wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct .... While we have attempted to draw definitional boundaries between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532-33, 542 A.2d 711 (1988).
Dissenting Opinion
joins, dissenting. I agree with the majority that
For all of the reasons so persuasively marshaled by the majority, it is clear that the apportionment provision of
The purpose of this aspect of tort reform, as the majority explains, was to ameliorate the common-law rule of joint and several liability, pursuant to which one insured party was liable for the entire judgment at the option of the claimant. Thus, under the apportionment provision of the statute, the defendant who is sued can implead another potentially negligent defendant so as to permit an equitable sharing of liability between them. Furthermore, as the majority explains, this apportionment scheme was aimed at protecting what are ordinarily insurable interests, on the theory that, in the main, negligence claims are protected by insurance.
It also compels the conclusion, in my view, that the court should not in this instance extend the statute beyond its boundary. “[E]very statute has some boundaries, and the question then arises whether, and when, it is appropriate to apply the statute, as a matter of common law, beyond its designated boundaries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 585. By applying the statute’s apportionment policy beyond its boundary of negligence, the majority permits the defendant to do more than share its liability with another tortfeasor. In effect, it permits the defendant to shift most, if not virtually all, of its liability to that tortfeasor. Any jury that takes the court’s instructions and its own duty seriously will inevitably conclude that the fault for the death of the plaintiffs decedent lies mostly, if not virtually completely, with the intentional tortfeasor, Garcia. Moreover, in most future cases in which an intentional — and uninsured — tortfeasor is cited in as an apportionment defendant, the likely outcome will be similar: the negligent and insured defendant will end up with responsibility for only a veiy small percentage of the judgment. This is not what the legislature intended when it enacted the apportionment provision of
I acknowledge that my reasoning would result in what could be considered an anomaly in the law. Under my interpretation of the legislative policy, a party cited in who the defendant alleges was negligent could escape
I also disagree with the majority’s engrafting onto its common-law adjudication the reallocation provision of the statute. See footnote 12 of the majority opinion. That is a statutory provision that concerns only the question of the collectibility of the ultimate judgment. In fashioning rules of liability under our common-law powers, courts do not ordinarily fashion mechanisms for the collectibility of the ultimate judgments. Such matters — which include hens, attachments and the like — are ordinarily matters for the legislature. Courts go too far in what can be a useful adjudicative technique of using a statute as a source of common-law adjudication when they start legislating. I believe that is what the majority has done in footnote 12 of its opinion.
I would, therefore, leave the defendant’s liability to the ordinary common-law rules, without the benefit of apportionment with the criminal assailant in the present case. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Dissenting Opinion
joins, dissenting. I agree with the majority that
With the adoption of
Pursuant to
Furthermore, apportionment of damages between negligent and intentional tortfeasors is not appropriate when the intentional acts that harm the victim are within the scope of the risk created by the negligent tortfeasor. In other words, in cases like the present case, where the intentional acts of Raul Garcia, Jr., that caused the death of the plaintiffs decedent were within the scope of the risk created by the alleged negligence2 of the defendant, Sun Company, Inc., the defendant should be responsible for the plaintiffs damages without apportionment. See Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 607-10, 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 784, 758-59, 563 A.2d 699 (1989); 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 449 (1965).
“If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.” 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 449; Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., supra, 234
Accordingly, I dissent.
Specifically, the plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent’s estate, alleged in the complaint that the defendant was negligent for failing “to fix, for an extended period of time, a faulty ‘cash drawer’ [at the gas station where the decedent was employed] necessitating that the door to the station remain unlocked at all times, including during mandated night time operation, in order to sell ‘snacks,’ ” and for failing “to install adequate security measures when it became obvious that the franchisee and its employees faced a threat to their physical weE being during mandated night time operation.”
This is clearly demonstrated by the following scenario. A security alarm company negligently installs a security system in a residence and, as a result, a third party is able to gain access to the premises and causes harm to the property owner. The alarm company should not be allowed to reduce its liability for the full damages caused to the property owner by seeking to implead the third party intruder for the purposes of apportioning damages when the harm caused by the third party was within the very risk that the alarm company had a duty to prevent. As § 449, comment [b], of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains, that would make the duty owed by the alarm company to the property owner a nullity.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I do not believe that a negligent defendant should be able virtually to absolve itself of liability by impleading an intentional tortfeasor whose very conduct it allegedly had a duty to protect against. I, therefore, join the dissents of Justices Borden and Berdon.