Sаmuel Beznos, a licensed real-estate broker, doing business as Beznos Realty Investment Company, brought аn action for compensation claimed to be due him from defendant Maurice Borisoff. The essential facts are stipulated as follows:
“Plaintiff and defendant had entered into an oral agreemеnt by the terms of which the defendant promised to pаy to the plaintiff 50% of the commission derived from the sale of a real-estate parcel, in-return fоr plaintiff’s information, advising defendant that said parсel of real estate was on the market, said рarcel being identified as 7375 Dunedin street, Detroit, Michigan.
“Plaintiff alleged further, that the defendant sold said parcel for the sum of $50,000, that the defendant received from the owner of said property the sum of $2,500, as commission, and that the defendant had refused to pаy plaintiff the sum of $1,250, one-half of said commission, or аny sum of money whatsoever.”
Borisoff, who prevailed in the recent case of
Borisoff
v.
Schatten,
On review in the circuit court the trial judge held that the statute of frauds (CL 1948, § 566.132 [Stat Ann 1953 Rev § 26.922]) was applicable and thаt decision was controlled by
Smith
v.
Starke,
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Notwithstanding plaintiff’s contention that he was entitled to recover under thе authority of
Thompson
v.
Carey’s Real Estate,
The only difference between the instant case and Borisoff v. Schatten, supra, is thаt the latter involved an oral agreement betwеen a broker and a salesman and that this case involves a similar agreement between 2 brokers. It was held in Borisoff v. Schatten, supra, that there is no characteristic peculiar to the broker-salesman relationship which might have suggested to the legislature the necessity for written contracts of employment in that field under circumstances where none is required in any other kind of еmployment. The same observation is applicable to an agreement between brokers for services rendered for their mutual benefit.
The line оf distinction, as drawn by defendant between the instant cаse and the Thompson and Borisoff Cases, is too finely drawn. The analogy betweеn the instant case and the others is clear. The рersuasiveness of reasoning in those cases is tоo forceful to sustain defendant’s contention here.
We hold, therefore, that compensation due from ■one licensed real-estate broker to another is not within the contemplation of the statute of frauds.
The judgment of the circuit judge is vacаted and the cause is remanded for a new trial, with costs in both courts to appellant.