251 F. 39 | 9th Cir. | 1918
(after stating the facts as above). [1] It is contarded that the indictment is insufficient for its failure to set forth particulars and specify acts which bring the plaintiff in error within the purview of the statute, and that it is not sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the statute. But the indictment goes further than the language of the statute. It sets forth in sufficient detail the features of the offense, the manner in which the business of the accused was to be conducted, and the facts and circumstances showing that the women and girls were to be transported for the purpose of sexual debauchery. It is difficult to perceive how further details could have been set forth for the information of the accused. The indictment is no less specific than the indictment which we sustained in Simpson v. United States, 245 Fed. 278, 157 C. C. A. 470.
It is contended that neither the acts charged to have been contemplated by the conspiracy, nor the acts shown to have been committed, were such as to bring the plaintiff in error within the meaning of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. Thereby is presented the principal question in the case, which is whether the facts charged and proven are such as to show that the intention of the conspirators was to transport the women and girls for the purposes denounced by the statute. The case differs from Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U. S. 326, 33 Sup. Ct. 285, 57 L. Ed. 528, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 911, only in that there is no proof here that any of the girls was actually solicited to engage in sexual debauchery, and that there is no charge that such
The judgment is affirmed.