Lead Opinion
OPINION
The threshold issue in each of these cases is our jurisdiction to review by cer-tiorari an interlocutory decision of the tax court. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction in each case and therefore dismiss the writs of certiorari.
Respondent Beuning Family Limited Partnership (Beuning) is a part-owner of 8.92 acres of unimproved vacant land in LeSauk Township in Stearns County (the County). Before 2008, the County classified the property as residential nonhome-stead for tax purposes, in accordance with its zoning. With the January 2008 assessment, the County changed the property’s tax classification to commercial.
In May 2009, Beuning filed a petition under Minn.Stat. § 278.01 (2010), claiming the property was misclassified, unequally assessed, and overvalued. Because Beun-ing’s petition was filed after the statutory filing deadline of April 30, the tax court dismissed the petition as untimely. Beuning Family Ltd. P’ship v. Cnty. of Stearns, No. 73-CV-09-5831,
Beuning did not appeal from the tax court’s dismissal of its May 2009 petition. Rather, in March 2010 Beuning filed a verified claim under Minn.Stat. § 278.14 for a refund of taxes paid in 2009. Beun-ing claimed that the property was misclassified for taxes payable in 2009. The County denied the refund claim a few weeks later. In May 2010, Beuning appealed to the district court from the County’s denial of the refund claim pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 278.14, subd. 3.
After the district court transferred Beuning’s section 278.14 appeal to the tax court, the County moved for partial summary judgment on four grounds: (1) that Beuning’s May 2010 petition under section 278.14, seeking a refund of tases paid in 2009, was untimely because it was not filed in the year in which the taxes were due and payable; (2) that because Beuning’s petition under section 278.14 sought a refund of taxes paid for the same reasons advanced in Beuning’s earlier petition under Minn.Stat. § 278.01, the petition under section 278.14 amounted to an improper attempt to appeal the tax court’s dismissal of the earlier petition; (3) that Beuning’s claim for refund had already been determined in the dismissal of Beuning’s earlier petition; and (4) that the property was properly classified as commercial. The tax court denied the County’s motion for partial summary judgment. In a second order, the tax court determined that there was no just reason for delay and directed entry of judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The writ of certiorari for review of the tax court’s order denying the County’s motion to dismiss the section 278.14 appeal with respect to taxes payable in 2009 is matter All-1479.
In the meantime, in April 2010 Beuning filed a timely petition under Minn.Stat. § 278.01 with respect to property taxes assessed in 2009 (payable in 2010), claiming that the property was overvalued, unequally assessed, illegally taxed, and improperly classified. In June 2011, the tax court ruled that the property was properly classified as residential nonhomestead, its original classification, but did not determine the value of the property for property tax purposes or the amount of taxes properly assessed against the property. In a second order, the court determined there was no just reason for delay and directed entry of judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The writ of certiorari for review of the tax court’s determination of the classification of the property for the 2009 assessment year is matter All-1480.
Minnesota Statutes § 271.10, subd. 1 (2010), provides for our review by certiora-ri of “any final order of the Tax Court ... on the ground that the Tax Court was without jurisdiction, that the order of the Tax Court was not justified by the evidence or was not in conformity with law, or that the Tax Court committed any other error of law.” By order filed on September 23, 2011, we questioned our jurisdiction to hear these cases, stayed briefing on the merits, and requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the jurisdictional question.
Appeal No. All-14,79
The County asserts five grounds for our jurisdiction over the County’s appeal in
Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03
The County contends that the tax court’s order denying the County’s motion for summary judgment is reviewable under various provisions of Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03, specifically, 103.03(a) (“a partial judgment entered pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02”), 103.03(g) (“a final order, decision or judgment affecting a substantial right made in an administrative or other special proceeding”), and 103.03(j) (“such other orders or decisions as may be appealable by statute or under the decisions of the Minnesota appellate courts”).
Rule 103.03, by its terms, applies to appeals to the court of appeals: “An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals .... ” It does not expressly apply to appeals to this court, much less to petitions for writs of certiorari filed with this court. The tax court’s denial of the County’s motion for partial summary judgment is not reviewable by our court under Minn. R. CivApp. P. 103.03.
In asserting Minn. R. CivApp. P. 103.03 as grounds for our jurisdiction in this case, the County relies on a footnote to our opinion in Brookfield Trade Center, Inc. v. County of Ramsey,
We then proceeded to observe:
It also does not appear that this decision of the tax court satisfies any of the rules that might otherwise permit an appeal from an interlocutory ruling. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 (“When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved in an action, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon express determination that there is no just reason for delay for the entry of judgment.”); Minn. R. CivApp. P. 103.03(h) (providing that an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for summary judgment “if the trial court certifies that the question presented is important and doubtful”); Minn. R. Civ-App. P. 105 (providing for discretionary review of an order not otherwise appealable). Although we ... exercise our discretionary authority to adjudicate this appeal in the interests of justice and judicial economy, the tax court and litigants should not assume that future nonfinal orders will be reviewed by this court in the absence of compliance with an appropriate rule authorizing appeal.
Id. at 874 n. 6. By our comments, we intended only to suggest that an order granting partial summary judgment, even if rendered by a district court, would not be immediately appealable. We did not intend to suggest, eyen in dicta, that Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03 authorizes our court to review an interlocutory decision of the tax court, and we so clarify our decision in Brookfield.
Minn.Stat. § 271.10
The County further contends that we can review the order of the tax court under Minn.Stat. § 271.10. Minnesota Statutes § 271.10, subd. 1, provides:
A review of any final order of the Tax Court may be had upon certiorari by the Supreme Court upon petition of any party to the proceedings before the TaxCourt. Such review may be had on the ground that the Tax Court was without jurisdiction, that the order of the Tax Court was not justified by the evidence or was not in conformity with law, or that the Tax Court committed any other error of law.
The tax court is an administrative agency of the executive branch, created by statute. See Minn.Stat. § 271.01, subd. 1 (2010). As an administrative agency, the tax court’s jurisdiction is limited by statute. See Minn.Stat. § 271.01, subd. 5 (2010) (prescribing the jurisdiction of the tax court). The doctrine of separation of powers dictates that our jurisdiction to review decisions of the tax court by certio-rari is similarly limited by statute. See State ex rel. Ryan v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Minneapolis,
The County contends that because the tax court entered judgment on its order denying the County’s motion for summary judgment, the order is renewable as a “final order” under section 271.10. Under Minn.Stat. § 271.08, subd. 1 (2010), the tax court is to “determine every appeal by written order containing findings of fact and the decision of the tax court,” including “[a] memorandum of the grounds of the decision.” Minnesota Statutes § 271.08, subd. 2 (2010), provides: “Upon the filing of the order of the tax court, described in subdivision 1, with the court administrator of the tax court, judgment shall be entered thereon in the same manner as in the case of an order of the district court.” The order at issue here does not “determine” Beuning’s appeal, but determines only that the tax court has statutory authority to address Beuning’s appeal.
Whether or not the tax court properly entered judgment on its order, we have observed that a writ of certiorari, “being in the nature of an appeal, is designed to bring up for review the final determination of an inferior tribunal which, if unreversed, would constitute a final adjudication of some legal rights of the relator.” Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout,
Nor does the fact that the tax court entered judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 make the order final. Rule 54.02 provides, in relevant part:
When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved in an action, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewerthan all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
Assuming, but not deciding, that rule 54.02 applies to tax court proceedings, the tax court’s entry of judgment does not comply with the rule. The tax court’s order denied the County’s motion for partial summary judgment but the County has no claims here: it is the taxpayer who is seeking a refund under Minn.Stat. § 278.14 of taxes allegedly mistakenly billed. Nor did the tax court’s order dispose of the taxpayer’s refund claim. The court did not, for example, determine whether the taxpayer was in fact improperly billed for taxes payable in 2009, nor did the court determine whether the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of taxes paid. Rather, the court determined only that its earlier dismissal as untimely of Beuning’s petition under Minn.Stat. § 278.01 did not bar Beuning’s later petition for refund under Minn.Stat. § 278.14. The dissent contends that our decision today ends “an unbroken line of cases spanning more than a century” in which (according to the dissent) we have held “that an unsuccessful challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of a tribunal is immediately appealable because a court’s decision to retain jurisdiction finally determines a party’s positive legal rights.” (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court rejected the employer’s challenge, holding that the federal district courts were “without jurisdiction to enjoin hearings” of the NLRB. Id. at 48,
The contention is at war with the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. That rule has been repeatedly acted on in cases where, as here, the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.
Id. at 50-51 & n. 9,
The statutory scheme under Minn.Stat. ch. 271 reflects this principle. Except for appeals, Minn.Stat. § 271.01, subd. 5 makes the tax court “the sole, exclusive, and final authority for the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under the tax laws of the state” in cases appealed or transferred to it. Minnesota Statutes § 271.10, subd. 1, allows for a challenge to the jurisdiction of the tax court, but only in the context of a “final order.” A “final order” must therefore reflect the exhaustion of all of the taxpayer’s administrative remedies. To construe “final order” to include an interlocutory order asserting the agency’s jurisdiction over the dispute renders the language of section 271.10, subdivision 1, a mere tautology: if all jurisdictional orders are “final,” then there is no need for the Legislature to have specifically permitted appeal from “final order[s]” on jurisdictional grounds. Moreover, to allow interlocutory appeals to our court on jurisdictional questions as a matter of right supplants the tax court as “the sole, exclusive, and final authority” for the hearing and determination of questions arising under Minnesota’s tax laws.
The tax court’s order denying the County’s motion for partial summary judgment is not reviewable under MinmStat. § 271.10 because it is not a final order that determines Beuning’s appeal.
Independent of the appellate rules, the County asserts that this matter is reviewable “as a matter of right” as an “appeal of jurisdictional issues that may be disposi-tive of a party’s obligation to defend a case.” According to the County, this limited right to appeal “exists because retaining the action for trial determines a ‘fundamental right that compels the defendant to take up the burden of litigation.’ ” (quoting MA. Mortenson Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue,
Mortenson was an appeal by the commissioner of revenue from a district court order denying the commissioner’s motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, part of a complaint filed by taxpayer Mortenson.
Mortenson is therefore distinguishable from the facts of this case on several grounds. First, Mortenson was an appeal from the district court, not from the tax court. Id. The statutory limits on the right to seek review of tax court orders imposed by Minn.Stat. § 271.10 were therefore not at issue. Second, because Mortenson was an appeal from the district court, it was heard by the court of appeals, not our court.
Moreover, allowing interlocutory review of orders of the tax court as a matter of right would vitiate the limits imposed by the Legislature in Minn.Stat. § 271.10. Under Minn.Stat. § 271.10, our jurisdiction over the tax court is limited to review of “final order[s]” and, as we have explained, that jurisdiction must be strictly construed. See State ex rel. Ryan,
The tax court’s order denying the County’s motion for partial summary judgment is not reviewable by our court as a matter of right.
Plenary powers
The County further contends that we have jurisdiction over this appeal because we have “plenary power concerning questions of law,” and the County’s appeal presents only questions of law. See Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Cnty. of Hennepin,
Interests of justice and judicial economy
Finally, the County urges us to permit discretionary review of the tax court’s order in the interests of justice and judicial economy, as we did in Brookfield. See
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the tax court’s denial of the County’s motion for summary judgment is not immediately reviewable by certiorari, and we therefore dismiss the writ of cer-tiorari issued in appeal All-1479.
Appeal No. All-1180
Our review in matter All-1480 is from the tax court’s denial of the County’s motion for partial summary judgment, and the tax court’s grant of Beuning’s motion for partial summary judgment, on the issue of the classification of the property. The County concedes that the tax court’s denial of its motion for partial summary judgment is not a final order. Nevertheless, as with appeal All-1479, the County asserts a variety of theories under which we have jurisdiction to review the tax court’s order.
First, the County asserts that we have jurisdiction to review the tax court’s order under Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03. As we have explained in connection with appeal All-1479, rule 103.03 is by its terms limited to appeals to the court of appeals.
Second, the County asserts that we have jurisdiction to review the tax court’s order because in denying the County’s motion for summary judgment the tax court committed an error of law. See Minn.Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1 (providing for review of a final order on the ground “that the Tax Court committed any other error of law”). But our statutory jurisdiction is limited to final orders. Under section 271.10, we can review final orders of the tax court on grounds that the tax court committed an error of law, but the mere fact that the tax court may have committed an error of law does not convert an interlocutory order— over which we have no jurisdiction — into a final order.
Finally, the County asserts that we have discretionary authority to hear matter All-1480 in the interests of justice and judicial economy. Again, even if discretionary review were available — a question we do not decide — we would decline to exercise it here.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the tax court’s denial of the County’s motion for partial summary judgment nor the tax court’s grant of Beuning’s motion for partial summary judgment, solely on the issue of the proper classification of the property, are immediately reviewable by certiorari, and we dismiss the writ of certiorari issued in matter All-1480.
Writs of certiorari dismissed.
Notes
. The dissent cites two cases as examples of (what the dissent characterizes as) “an unbroken line of cases spanning more than a century” and holding "that an unsuccessful challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of a tribunal is immediately appealable.” (Emphasis added.) But both examples involve appeals from the district court, not from an administrative agency. See State v. Ali,
Other references by the dissent to "tribunals” are equally misleading attempts to blur the distinction between judicial branch courts and administrative agencies. For example, the dissent cites Plano and Curran v. Nash,
. The dissent cites our decision in In re Estate of Janecek,
. To the extent that the County believed that the tax court had exceeded its statutory authority, Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 120.01 allows for a petition for an extraordinaiy writ filed in this court and directed to the tax court.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with the court that we lack jurisdiction over appeal number All-1480. However, I respectfully dissent from the court’s conclusion that we lack jurisdiction over appeal number All-1479, which involves Beuning Family LP’s petition regarding taxes payable in 2009. In appeal number All-1479, Stearns County filed a motion for summary judgment with the tax court, claiming that the tax court lacked
The court concludes that we lack jurisdiction over the County’s appeal because the tax court’s order denying summary judgment did not “finally adjudicate any legal rights.” If we were writing on a clean slate, the court’s conclusion would have considerable merit. But we are not. Instead, we have held in an unbroken line of cases spanning more than a century that an unsuccessful challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of a tribunal is immediately appealable because a court’s decision to retain jurisdiction finally determines a party’s positive legal rights. See, e.g., State v. Ali
I.
Minnesota Statutes § 271.10, subd. 1 (2010), defines our appellate jurisdiction over tax court orders:
A review of any final order of the Tax Court may be had upon certiorari by the Supreme Court upon petition of any party to the proceedings before the Tax Court. Such review may be had on the ground that the Tax Court was without jurisdiction, that the order of the Tax Court was not justified by the evidence or was not in conformity with law, or that the Tax Court committed any other error of law.
Minn.Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Section 271.10, subdivision 2, in turn, sets out the procedural requirements for perfecting an appeal from a “final order” of the tax court, including the time limits for seeking a writ of certiorari and the manner in which the petition must be served. See Minn.Stat. § 271.10, subd. 2 (2010). Here, there is no dispute that the County timely and properly filed its petition for a writ of certiorari. The sole question, therefore, is whether the tax court’s order rejecting a jurisdictional challenge constitutes a “final order” within the meaning of section 271.10.
We have consistently defined the phrase “final order” to mean an order that “ends the proceeding as far as the court is concerned or that finally determines some positive legal right of the appellant relating to the action.” In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
The court, at least at one point, agrees that appealability in this case depends on whether the tax court’s order “constitute[s] a final adjudication of some legal
The court’s final observation, however, is precisely the reason we have jurisdiction over appeal number All-1479. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the question of whether a tribunal has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is a determination of a positive legal right of the relator. See McGowan v. Our Savior’s Lutheran Church,
We have repeatedly held for over a century that an order denying a jurisdictional challenge is immediately appealable because it determines a positive legal right of a party. In Plano, for example, we recognized the immediate appealability of a district court’s order rejecting a jurisdictional challenge to the validity of the summons issued to the defendant.
Curran and Plano are by no means outlier cases. Rather, those two cases represent the beginning of an unbroken line of cases spanning over a century in which we have treated the denial of motions challenging the jurisdiction of a tribunal as final orders, distinct from the denial of other types of dispositive motions. We further explained the rationale for our longstanding rule, to which we continued to adhere despite labeling it as the “minority view,” in the 1969 case of Hunt v. Nevada State Bank,
I would apply our longstanding rule to the tax court’s denial of the County’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the tax court. Consistent with precedent, I would conclude that the tax court’s order finally determined the County’s jurisdictional claim, which we have characterized as a “positive legal right[ ]” to avoid the further burdens of litigation. Plano,
II.
The court reaches the opposite conclusion by drawing immaterial distinctions between the district court and the tax court, the latter of which the court characterizes as an “administrative agency” rather than a “court.” However, our appellate jurisdiction over tax court orders is delineated by statute, not by abstract distinctions between courts and agencies. Minnesota Statutes § 271.10, subd. 1, clearly states that we have jurisdiction over “any final order,” a term of art that includes the “final[] determin[ation of] some positive legal right of the appellant.” GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
Instead of applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “final order,” as defined by our case law, the court confuses our precedent by importing notions of finality from federal case law in order to support its conclusion in this case. The court’s approach is problematic for at least four reasons. First, in determining the finality of tax court orders, we have specifically looked to the finality jurisprudence applicable to civil cases decided by Minnesota district courts, not to federal case law. See, e.g., Cnty. of Hennepin v. Decathlon Athletic Club, Inc.,
Third, even if federal case law were persuasive, the case relied upon by the court, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
Fourth, and most fundamentally, the court’s approach turns our traditional separation of powers jurisprudence on its head. We have stated that quasi-judicial adjudications by executive-branch agencies are generally permissible only if those adjudications “lack judicial finality and are subject to judicial review.” Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor,
Yet, rather than construing section 271.10 to ensure robust judicial review over tax court orders, the court construes our jurisdiction more narrowly than our jurisdiction over comparable district court orders.
III.
In my view, the plain language of section 271.10, subdivision 1, read in light of our consistent definition of the phrase “final order,” is determinative of the jurisdictional question presented by this case. For that reason, I would conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction to hear the County’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the tax court in appeal number All-1479.
. The court alternately appears to argue that Minn.Stat. § 271.08 (2010) indicates that an order is final for purposes of chapter 271 only if it ''determine[s]'' the appeal and leads to the entry of judgment. To be sure, section 271.08 provides that “the tax court ... shall determine every appeal by written order containing findings of fact and the decision of the tax court.” But that section says nothing about "final order[s]” and requires only that the tax court issue its final judgment in written form containing findings of fact and its decision. The court seems to assume that a "final order” and a "final judgment” mean the same thing. They do not. See State v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co.,
. In arguing that my reading of section 271.10 is incorrect, the court posits that construing every jurisdictional ruling as a final order would render section 271.10 a mere tautology: "if all jurisdictional orders are 'final,' then there is no need for the Legislature to have specifically permitted appeal from ‘final order[s]’ on jurisdictional grounds.” But the court misinterprets the statute. The first sentence of section 271.10, subdivision 1, specifies what types of tax court orders are appealable: "any final order.” The second sentence of section 271.10, subdivision 1, by contrast, limits the grounds upon which we can review otherwise appealable tax court orders and specifies the scope of our appellate review. See Stronge & Lightner Co. v. Comm'r of Taxation,
. Notably, among the three decisions we cited in Decathlon Athletic Club was Hall v. Community Credit Co. — a case in which we expressly recognized that, unlike the denial of other motions to dismiss, the denial of a jurisdictional claim is immediately appealable. See
. In arguing that we must strictly construe section 271.10, the court relies on State ex rel. Ryan v. Civil Service Commission of Minneapolis, in which we held that a writ of certio-rari was ineffective because the petitioner failed to comply strictly with the statutory requirement that the writ be endorsed by "some responsible person as surety for costs.”
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Stras.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Stras.