*1
446
Mich BETTY v
&
BROOKS PERKINS
(Calendar
5).
5,
Argued April
Docket No. 96538.
No.
Decided
August
1994.
Betty, brought
Michigan
Rights
Carnell
an action under the
Civil
Act,
3.548(101)
seq.;
seq.,
Wayne
MCL
et
37.2101
MSA
et
in the
Perkins,
against
claiming
employer,
Circuit Court
&
Brooks
her
woman,
plaintiff,
race and sex discrimination. The
a black
alleged
similarly
employee
that a
situated white male
with less
qualifications
seniority
prefer-
and lower
was awarded
shift
applied.
court,
ence for
both
which
had
Leo
The
William
Cahalan, J., granted summary
defendant,
disposition for the
finding
preempted by
the case
301§
of the federal
185(a).
Act,
Management
Labor
Relations
USC
The
of
Jansen, P.J.,
Appeals,
J.,
Griffin,
(Michael
Kelly,
and
J.
J.
reversed,
dissenting),
finding
question
resolved
be
fact, regarding
employer,
was one of
motivation
and
law,
interpretation
regarding
collective-bargain-
not one of
aof
ing agreement
employer
plaintiff’s
between the
and
union
121952).
(Docket
appeals.
No.
The defendant
opinion
by
Griffin,
joined
In an
by
Justice
Chief Justice
Cavanagh,
Levin, Brickley,
Mallett,
and Justices
and
Supreme Court held:
The
state law claim of
sex
race and
discrimination
workplace
independent
collective-bargaining
in the
and, thus,
employer
between her
union
her
federal law.
1. United States
Court case law has held that
301§
Management
expresses
of the Labor
Relations Act
federal
policy
collective-bargaining
that federal courts should enforce
agreements
against
organizations by
on behalf of or
labor
applying
general,
alleging
law. In
federal
a state-law claim
preempted by
discrimination is not
federal law if the claim is
nonnegotiable
employers
based on
state-law
em-
ployees independent
any right
established
a collective-
bargaining agreement,
inextricably
or whether the claim is
agreement.
intertwined with
consideration
the terms of the
preempted only
application requires interpre-
State law is
if its
agreement.
tation of a
2. The essential
elements of
state-law claim advanced
&
Brooks
Perkins
similarly
people
been
are
situated
have
differently
of their
or sex.
claim turns
treated
because
race
employer’s
regarding
conduct
on a
determination
factual
independent
and motivation and can
resolved
*2
asserting
collective-bargaining agreement.
plaintiff
non-
is
The
Michigan
Rights
negotiable
state
secured
the
Civil
belong
employees,
they
apply
not
Act
whether or
all
union,
to a
waived
conditioned on success
and cannot be
duty
the
the
owed under the act
table. Because
employer
plaintiff
the
does
stem from the collective-
the
not
independent
purposes
bargaining agreement,
claim is
for
her
protection
preemption, parallel
the
the
under
terms of
301§
agreement notwithstanding.
Riley, concurring,
plaintiff’s
stated that the
Justice
not
under 301.
dispositive inquiry
the
law is not what
state
provides
agreement
collective-bargaining
what the motiva-
but
Moreover, merely because the defen-
tion of the defendant was.
compelled by
might
was
dant
claim in defense
its conduct
collective-bargaining
implied
gleaned
the
some
fairness
from
agreement
preempt
not
the claim in this case.
as a whole would
question
only help
whether
answer the factual
This would
discrimination,
but would not
was motivated
defendant
require
legality of
decision
the court
to determine the
the
collective-bargaining agreement. The
under the
defendant’s
persuasion.
production only,
than
After
is one of
rather
burden
case, Michigan
plaintiff
prima
courts
the
has set forth a
facie
place
production on
a means of
the burden of
the defendant as
issue, i.e.,
framing
dispositive
properly
the motivation
defendant,
then
so that
can
show
simply pretext
purported defense
for discrimination.
parts
majority
concurring in
i and hi Boyle,
Justice
essentially
opinion,
that the
conceded
stated that the defendant
male
did not entitle the white
employee to retake the test.
Affirmed.
(1993)
App 28;
affirmed.
198 Mich
497 NW2d
plaintiff.
K.
Rodrick
Green for
Symonds, MacFarlane,
Kirchner,
Larson
Blake,
Manolis),
Christopher
(by
for
Smith,
G.
&
P.C.
defendant.
Amicus Curiae: Hodges
Sachs, Waldman, O’Hare, Helveston, & (by Barnes, P.C. Sachs and J. Patricia Theodore Fabrizio), Michigan State AFL-CIO. plaintiff’s J. We must decide whether Griffin, employer state-law claim of race and sex discrimi preempted by §301 nation is federal Labor Management Relations Act Because her (lmra).1 upon Michigan Rights action, Act, based Civil 3.548(101) seq.; seq., MCL 37.2101 et MSA et independent, require and resolution does inter pretation collective-bargaining agreement employer, between union her we preempted by conclude that the claim is not fed eral law.
i Betty Plaintiff Carnell is black a female who began working for defendant Brooks & Perkins as Krawczyk, a welder 1979. She and Brian a white male who worked as a welder in same department, were members of the United Auto 157, Workers Union No. Local and were covered by collective-bargaining agreement. a quality pursued measure,
As a control with approval required group union, of the defendant a including plaintiff welders, of six Mr. Krawczyk, to attend classes for four weeks at Weld Welding Tech A Education Center.3 letter of un- 185(a). 1 29 USC Inc., AAR, corpora Brooks & Perkins was a division of an Illinois tion. Chrysler subsidiary Corporation. Weld Tech was then a v Brooks & Perkins of signed derstanding,4 union, and the defendant employees provided these re- that each of quired "successfully [the of] course to conclude qualified training to retain to as be considered seniority within Welder’s Classification.” completed Krawczyk a 14, 1983, Mr. March
On welding segment test. His and took a of the course Krawczyk Mr. advised defendant instructor completed passed. However, after he had had work, was noti- to defendant and returned course report was an Tech that the earlier Weld fied Krawczyk actually failed a that Mr. had error and portion result, Mr. examination. As Krawczyk seniority classifica- his within 'the lost off. and was laid tion meantime, had also taken the passed.
welding At that at Weld Tech and course understanding: Following letter the full text of the Agreement parties to been reached between the has This satisfy special customer schedules need for welders address modify replace the Memorandum and is intended 1,1983. Understanding February reached welding requirements present are Since the bulk thick, Mig configuration, quarter joint, confined it is one inch tee place agreed will into active Brooks & Perkins recall passing employment qualification who are successful those welders joint. employees type will be These test having qualification. under- It is further a limited considered as stood completed qualify successfully any will other test specific type Brooks & to weld those welds on that individual products. Perkins’ agreed It that all laid off welders have been offered Welding opportunity and must qualified Center” Tech Education to attend "Weld 1983, specified Agreement February prior as in the training as successfully to be conclude the considered *4 seniority to within the Welder’s Classification. retain may, option, Employees lay-off their waive on the list status, qualification accept opportunity into a limited to recall upon seniority training affecting and continue without their to displace training, seniority completion of use to their successful a junior employee. 446 Mich Opinion op the Court point, higher seniority she stood on the list than Krawczyk.5 Mr. Krawczyk complained union,
Mr. to the which complained management in turn to defendant’s timely failure, that if he had been he could have retaken the test before of the course. informed of his
completion Management that determined April unfair, 12, 1983, treatment was and on Mr. Krawczyk was return allowed to to Tech and Weld passed retake test. This he time and his senior- ity was reinstated. plaintiff
Thereafter, 17, 1984, on December Krawczyk applied Mr. each for the shift same preference. According preference defendant, to Krawczyk was to Mr. awarded with accordance collective-bargaining the seniority because his ranking higher.6 complained was Plaintiff grievance. union, which refused to file a suit, Plaintiff then filed this discrimination claiming similarly situated em- white male ployee qualifications seniority with less and lower preference. group the shift awarded While the required take the Weld Tech course included whites, both blacks asserts all of passed except one, the whites the test Brian Krawczyk, and that all blacks failed the test except plaintiff* Betty. one, Carnell She further collective-bargaining agreement provides Article VIII seniority employees in the welders’ classification is determined entry. undisputed Krawczyk date of of It is that Mr. had earlier date entry plaintiff. than VIII, agreement provides: Article Employees preference by date-of-entry shall have shift senior-
ity right may within the classification. This once exercised (6) period. preference granted each six month during Shift will also be bump year probationary employee within practica- changes Mondays All shift classification. will be on if ble. *5 275 v Brooks & Perkins employees contends that black who failed also passed; they however, retook the test and placed were seniority at the bottom of the list. discovery, At the close of defendant moved for 2.116(C)(4), summary disposition pursuant to MCR (8), (10), argued, alia, inter preempted by § discrimination claim was 301 of .7 granted the lmra The circuit court defendant’s ground preemption § motion on the narrow of 301 unnecessary it and found the other address issues.8 appeal, panel
On a divided of the Court of Appeals panel majority opined reversed.9 The "question the garding to be resolved is a factual one re- defendant,
the motivation of
and not the
legal
interpretation
one of
of the collective bar-
gaining agreement,” citing
Kelsey-Hayes
v
Hall
(1990).
App
Co,
277, 280;
184 Mich
judgment
law,
as a matter of
MCR
pre-emption
potentially dispositive
Inasmuch as the
issue is
case,
of the entire
the Court examines it first.
[plaintiff’s
pre-empted by
Court finds that
[T]he
is]
granted.
Federal Labor Law.
motion shall
It
Defendant’s
unnecessary
remaining
to discuss Defendant’s
issue.
(1993).
28, 30;
App
9 198Mich
We then
defendant’s
(1994).
leave to
ii
*6
Congress
The
state
authority
preempt
law
in
Supremacy
rooted
Clause of the United
(9
Ogden,
Gibbons v
States Constitution.10
US
Wheat)
(1824).
1;
A
Section 301
provides:
of the lmra
Suits for violation of contracts
em-
between an
ployer
ployees
organization representing
and a labor
em-
industry affecting
in an
commerce ...
or
any
organizations,
between
brought
may
such labor
any
in
district court of the United States
having jurisdiction
parties,
respect
without
in controversy
regard
to the amount
the
or without
citizenship
parties.
USC
[29
185(a).]_
VI,
provides
part:
Article
2 of the United States Constitution
in
§
Constitution,
This
and the Laws of the United States which
thereof;
made,
shall
in
be made
Pursuance
and all Treaties
made,
States,
Authority
which shall be
under the
of the United
Land;
supreme
Judges
every
shall be the
State shall be bound
Laws of
Law of the
and the
in
thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or
any
Contrary notwithstanding.
State to the
v Brooks & Perkins
Opinion op the Court
Mills,
448,
v Lincoln
US
Textile Workers
(1957),
912;
455; 77 S Ct
dispute question turned on the whether the collective-bargaining agree- strike breached "incompatible ment, held that doctrines give principles way of local labor law.” Id. at 102. In broad must of federal law
terms, the Court declared: require The dimensions of 301 the conclusion § principles of federal labor law
that must be statute. substantive by paramount in the area covered pro- Comprehensiveness inherent in the - under by which the law is to be formulated cess Mills, requiring issues the mandate of Lincoln 301 to be in suits of a kind covered raised § according precepts of federal labor decided to the policy. 446 Mich Opinion of the Court 301(a) important, More subject matter of § peculiarly "is one that calls for uniform law.” [Id. at 103.]
While Lucas Flour made clear that a state ac- alleges tion that agreement subsequent breach of a preempted by § 301,11 the Court’s delineating task of the extent to which displaces § 301 state-law claims when breach of a collective-bargaining agreement alleged specifically is not proved
has to be more difficult. Corp Lueck, 210, Allis-Chalmers at policies the Court "[i]f observed that given proper § animate 301 are to be their range, pre-emptive . . . the § effect of 301 must beyond alleging extend While suits contract violations.”
acknowledging that some tort actions must uniformity be the to achieve the desired
interpretation
contracts,12
of labor
the Court
11The Lucas Flour Court reasoned:
possibility
might
individual contract
terms
have
meanings
different
under state and federal law would inevita-
bly
disruptive
upon
negotiation
exert a
influence
both the
agreements.
administration of collective
[Id.
103.]
Corp
Lodge
557, 560;
See also Avco
v Aero
No
390 US
88 S Ct
(1968)
(where
plaintiff sought
yond suits for breach of would be congressional pre- ... inconsistent with empt lish intent conduct, proscribe state rules that or estab- rights obligations, independent and of a labor contract.
Therefore, rights obligations state-law independently private agreements, do not and that exist by pre-empted by a result can be or altered as waived private parties, are agreements. those at [Id. 212-213.] it, resolving In the case then before the Lueck Court articulated this standard: analysis ... on
Our must focus whether . . nonnegotiable tort action . confers state- [state] rights employers employees independent law of on contract, or, instead, right any established whether bly inextrica evaluation of the tort claim is with consideration of the terms of
intertwined purports the labor contract. If the state tort law meaning relationship, define the of the contract pre-empted, Emphasis law at 213. [Id. added.][13] Chef, Inc,
In
Div of
Lingle Norge
Magic
again emphasized
unanimous
deci-
preemption.
limits of
§
sion,
"application
the Court ruled that
of state law
applica-
301 . . .
if such
pre-empted by
only
requires
interpretation
tion
of a collective-
agreement.” The Court observed that
Williams,
386, 394;
Caterpillar,
482 US
107 S Ct
See also
Inc v
(1987) ("Section
governs
meaning any provision of a collective-bargaining agreement,” the Court con- cluded: remedy state-law "indepen- this case is [T]he dent” collective-bargaining agreement of the in the "independent” sense of pre- that matters for 301§
emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim require construing does not ing agreement. collective-bargain- at
[Id. 407.] suggested development It has been scope preemption driven, 301 has been " part, by 'parties an effort to make certain that requirements [are allowed] to evade the by relabeling § 301 their contract claims as claims ” for tortious breach of contract.’ United Steel workers v Rawson, 362, of America 495 US 369; (1990) (quoting 110 S Ct 109 L Ed 2d 362 211).14 Lueck, general principles parame- Guided these analysis ters, we turn now to of the issue before us—whether resolution of state requires interpretation civil collective-bargaining agreement.
B begin by focusing We on the essential elements by plaintiff. of the state-law claim advanced She complains similarly situated, that a nonblack male Stone, legacy pluralism: See also Van Wezel of industrial employment rights The tension between individual and the New Deal (1992). bargaining system, collective 59 U Chi L R Brooks & Perkins Opinion of the Court qualifications
employee and lower senior- with less during ity special received treatment defendant rights pro- testing process, in of her the tected to establish a treatment” violation Michigan Rights In order Civil Act.15 "[d]isparate prima case of facie discrimination, "must race of the class entitled [she] show that to or similar than one who was a member of was a member protection that, for the same under the act and differently
conduct, [she]
treated
*10
a different race.”
App
Schipani
Co,
617;
v Ford Motor
102 Mich
(1981) (citing Pompey v General
discriminate an individual with sex, race, color, religion, origin, age, . . . because of national height, weight, or marital status. 446 Mich Opinion op the Court typical case a state tribunal could resolve either a discriminatory or retaliatory discharge interpreting "just without cause” lan guage of a collective-bargaining agreement. [Lin gle, 486 Emphasis US 413. added.] Implicit recognition is the that claims under state prohibiting statutes discrimination often turn on pertaining issues of fact of the to the conduct or motive interpretation defendant, rather than on the collective-bargaining agreement. of a That is the case here. undisputed Krawczyk
It that Mr. had an entry plaintiff, earlier date of than and therefore seniority more within the welder’s classification at point began the February when the Weld Tech course on parties registered
28, 1983. The have no disagreement concerning meaning the terms or collective-bargaining agreement as it relates to seniority, preference, lay Although shift off. emphasize Krawczyk defendant seeks to that Mr. preference was awarded the shift because of a higher seniority ranking, the critical issue is Krawczyk whether the decisions to allow Mr. *11 seniority retake the test and then to reinstate his gender were based on racial or considerations. argument indepen- Plaintiff’s that her claim is collective-bargaining agreement dent of the is strongly by buttressed the fact that she is assert- ing nonnegotiable Michigan rights by state the —secured Rights rights Civil Act. These are that apply employees, they belong to all whether or not rights to a union. Such cannot be waived or condi- bargaining tioned on success at the table. acknowledging may While that this factor alone independence not establish the claim, of a state Lingle the Court took note of the fact that "most pre-empted by state § that are laws not 301 will & Perkins Brooks op the Court by nonnegotiable grant shared all that are 408, n 7. . . . .” Id. at state workers jurisprudence Court of United States The In Appeals in accord. Circuit is the Sixth (CA Corp, Chrysler 879 F2d Smolarek v 1989) (en Corp banc), Chrysler v Smola- den cert (1989), majority eight-judge rek, an 493 US presented particular claims that the ruled Michigan’s Rights Handicappers’ Act Civil (hcra), 3.550(101) seq., seq.; et were MSA 37.1101 et MCL judges preempted Seven § 301. Id. at 1335. Judge through part. Speaking Ken- in dissented nedy, right they of ac- no reasoned that because handicapped upon a is conferred commodation employee by sought accommodation hcra, negotiable, plaintiffs Smolarek a claim is to that extent such recog- dissenting judges However, even the 301. interpretation of a nized that typical agreement required case in the is not Judge age alleging race, sex, or discrimination. Kennedy explained: race, sex, cases, age interpretation . . unnecessary. . bargaining contract collective race, sex, age discrimina- right to be free of right independent any ancillary con- tion is bargaining agreement. in a collective
tained Likewise, for a employee if is terminated perform the handicap ability unrelated to his interpretation of a collective job, functions of his unnecessary to his claim. nonnegotiable right to provided a The hcra has at 1338 of discrimination. type free of this [Id. J., dissenting (Kennedy, part).][16] regarding majority Judge Kennedy agreed with the Smolarek However, determining preemption. appropriate disagreed plaintiffs’ she 301§ standard for majority’s application the standard to with prohibits Noting Michigan’s dis claims. hcra hcra respect handicap only is unrelated to to "a crimination with *12 284 446 Mich 270 Opinion op the Court Lingle Smolarek,
Relying on supra, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir- News, held in O’Shea v Detroit cuit later 887 F2d (CA 6, 1989), 683 that a plaintiff’s hcra discrimi- nation claim was not preempted by 301. Recog- § nizing the nonnegotiability rights certain hcra, the court explained: Michigan employees right have the not to be against discriminated on age the basis of or handi
cap regard without to the collective agreement’s language about employee’s rights. an [Id. 687.][17] Other federal courts have embraced the notion that state antidiscrimination statutes confer non- negotiable rights that are independent col- any lective-bargaining agreement. In particular, United States Court of Appeals the Ninth Circuit, relying on Lingle, has ruled generally that state claims, discrimination whether age, based on race, handicap, religion, or national origin, are See, 301. e.g., Ramirez v Fox Tele- Station, Inc, vision (CA 1993).18 998 9, F2d 743 ability perform individual’s position,” particular job the duties of a or 37.1202(1)(a); 3.550(202)(1)(a), MCL MSA see Carr v General Corp, (1986), Motora Judge Mich Kennedy NW2d 686 right accommodation,” concluded that "the hcra confers no negotiable right provided accommodation is therefore "a either bargaining agreement, . . . the collective voluntarily.” Id. at 1338. Co, (ED Brewery See also Supp Mich, Gavie v Stroh 668 F 1987), (CA 1989) 6, (§ aff’d 877 F2d 62 preempt age 301 does not discrimination claim because such a claim invokes a state statute that independent any right confers contract). are established Growers, (CA 1990) Lindsay See 9, also Cook v Olive 911 F2d 233 (a religious preempted); discrimination suit was not Jackson v South (CA Co, 1989) (a 9, ern California Gas 881 F2d 638 racial discrimina preempted); tion suit 873 preempted); Beverly Co, was not Chmiel v Wilshire Hotel (CA 1989) (an 9, age F2d 1283 discrimination suit was not (CA Co, Ackerman v Western Electric 860 F2d 1514 1988) (a handicap preempted). discrimination suit was not *13 & v Brooks Perkins the Court Ramirez, a suit reasoned that
In the court charging of national discrimination on basis preempted by origin § 301 because the was rights plaintiff ployment Em- under the California asserted ” " 'nonnegotiable’ Act that are ” " private by Id. at be removed contract.’ 'cannot Lindsay quoting Growers, 911 748, Cook v Olive 1990). (CA 9, defendant would Ramirez F2d argued re- claim that also collective-bargaining quire to the "reference” sug- rejected any agreement. However, the court gestion collective- "reference” to a mere equivalent of "inter- is the agreement. pretation” Id. supra, Rawson, the United States ground worthy of focused on a different origin analysis: § 301 in the
consideration legal duty by allegedly the defen- breached the dant. in an ninety-one case, were killed
In that miners underground four deceased fire. Survivors of America, sued the United Steelworkers miners claiming that deaths were caused the decedents’ alleged negligent They union. acts of the designated by safety
members of the
the Union
committee
inadequately
had
on mine
been
trained
negligently performed
.
had
safety issues
. . [and]
promised
it
inspections of the mine that
had
conduct, failing
uncover
and discovera-
obvious
deficiencies.
at
ble
[Id.
365.]
neg-
ruled that the state-law
The Rawson Court
ligence
301 because the
independent
duty
did not exist
owed
the miners
agreement.
The Court
of
explained:
Union’s dele-
is not a situation where the
This
of union status. Because owed in this case not does stem from the collective- bargaining agreement, plaintiff’s we find merit independent pur- contention that her claim is poses preemption.20 §of 301 argues hand,
On the other defendant that reso- plaintiff’s requires interpretation lution of (the Hechler, plaintiff’s See also Electrical Workers v n 7 negligently provide workplace care arose claim that the union failed to a safe completely preempted duty was held under the because the of union’s collective-bargaining agreement). plaintiff’s rights 20 Our determination state civil claim is independent collective-bargaining agreement is consistent with rights protected the United by States Court’s view of similar Act, Rights seq. title VII of the Civil 42 USC In 2000e et Alexander v Co, 36, 48-49; US Gardner-Denver 39 L S Ct Ed 2d 147 (1974), Court, speaking Powell, through a unanimous Justice ruled discharged employee pursue that a could a VII action title in federal court, despite previously the fact that he had his submitted claim to pursuant arbitration ato nondiscrimination in a clause collective- bargaining agreement. explained: The Court legislative history congressional of Title VII a [T]he manifests pursue independently intent to allow an individual to under both Title his applicable and other VII state and federal designed statutes. The clear inference is that Title was VII to supplement, tions supplant, existing than rather laws and institu- relating employment to discrimination. & Brooks Perkins of agreement.21 collective-bargaining dis-We Krawczyk agree. First, that Mr. was it is clear regain his retested to defendant be allowed seniority perceived of of notion fairness out a upon provision any of rather collective-bargaining than reliance
agreement.22 Indeed, understanding agreement of are letter and the respect completely to the treatment silent with Krawczyk’s employee in Mr. situa- be accorded tion. conduct and motivation were
That defendant’s of under- not standing on the or letter based conceded defendant’s counsel posed response question argument. oral stated that the Justice defendant’s counsel Boyle, Krawczyk to retested was decision to allow Mr. that, provi- solely fairness, no based on notion understanding letter referred to a sion in the right to retake an unsuccessful test be- welder’s unanticipated. cause such a situation was agree Moreover, with even if we were to defen- portions dant
agreement, seniority provision, including were determining conduct motives relevant defendant, this alone would transform dispute claim into a federal contract *15 21 juris federal have Defendant also contends that courts exclusive disputes of the § diction labor that arise 301 over contract However, question Courtney, Co this was settled in Dowd Box lmra. 368 (1962), 519; 483 the United 82 S Ct 7 L Ed 2d wherein US that, applica Supreme federal law is States Court determined while ble, jurisdiction respect have concurrent with state and federal courts disputes within the ambit 301. § to contract 22 affidavit, Howat, manager, personnel Mr. stated defendant’s representative complained approached by who that a union he was delayed "unreasonably unfairly” process had and in that the school ing punished testing Krawczyk. agreed that he not be "would be be the of Mr. "It was should Tech,” oversight by he and that for an Weld passing, upon he the . . . and would allowed to re-take test seniority layoff and restored.” from his would be recalled Mich Opinion op the Court within § the ambit of 301.23The dispute every Lueck
cautioned in that "not con- cerning employment, provision tangentially involving a collective-bargaining agreement,
of a is pre-empted by § 301 . . . .” Id. at 211. The Court explained Lingle, supra further in at 409-410: dispute pursuant if resolution ato collec [E]ven hand, tive-bargaining agreement, on the one law, other, state precisely on the require addressing would facts, long the same set of as the as state- claim can be interpreting resolved without the law agreement itself, "independent” the claim is for 301 pre-emption § purposes.[24] Co, Similarly, Kelsey-Hayes supra, plaintiff, Hall v the a black male, alleged employees he and other black were denied wait- listing on program. the apprenticeships, employees positions while white secured waiting ultimately placed apprenticeship the list were in an Hall, plaintiff’s complaint On basis of a the the review of panel unanimously agreed complaint the did not assert rights rather, collective-bargaining agreement; denial of under the he disparately compared claimed that similarly the defendant treated him Thus, employees. opined panel white situated that the inquiry focus of its was whether treated in was manner, disparate regard motivated racial discrimination without collective-bargaining agreement. to the terms panel The Hall reasoned: State law discrimination claims which assert denial bargaining require necessarily under a collective interpretation contract contract, preempted by and so are However, plaintiff alleges discriminatory 301. . . . where the disparate treatment and the defendant claims that treatment inwas accordance with terms of the collective contract, preemption there no federal plaintiff’s discrimination at [Id. claims. 280-281.] Smolarek, See also in which the court concluded plaintiff’s handicap that despite plaintiff’s] labor discrimination claim fact, "Chrysler likely to assert as its defense to [the provisions it cláim that based actions its on the of agreement regarding reinstatement and accommodation.” The court reasoned: light defense, In order to resolve the hcra claim in of this only Chrysler
court need decide whether took actions adverse plaintiff] handicap solely because [the of his or rather *16 289 Perkins v Brooks & Opinion the of although Finally, the collective- in this case provision agreement de- a includes gender protect employees signed race and from to render discrimination,25 does not this fact alone "dependent” plaintiff’s on the state law agreement. collective-bargaining As the Lingle, 412-413: Court observed protec- contractual fact that broad mere [T]he retaliatory discriminatory against tion charge may —dis- —or for provide remedy conduct make the does not coincidentally violates state law state-law violation the contours of the existence or private contract. dependent upon the terms "[p]arallel protection Consequently, state discrimina- of contract and under terms must be that the contract law not mean tion interpreted does Like law claim.”26 to resolve state Supreme Court, decline to we United States preempts discrimi- state rule that employer merely has because nation claim agreement to Chrysler felt union take bound because legitimate It reason. or for some other the actions necessary interpretation federal labor law. Chrysler’s or not decide at the outset whether agreement matter correct as a question The is a factual one: What was Chrysler’s motivation? [itf.] provides III-A, 3, Article ¶ part: apply employees provisions Agreement this to all shall Agreement on account covered of national the federal race, this without discrimination sex, status, race, color, religion, handicap, age, marital addition, origin, political .... creed or affiliation applicable Company fully comply state and intends with statutes, relating account of to non-discrimination on sex, status, origin, color, religion, age, national marital creed, political handicap. affiliation or 26White, preemption A law claims: model 301’s of state Section (1990). analysis, 41 Ala L R 446 Mich Riley, J. agreed comply statutory with the mandates of *17 Michigan labor law.
hi plaintiff against conclusion, In a asserts claim employer Michigan Rights her Civil Act damages alleged for as a of result an violation of nonnegotiable right her and state be free from racial
gender-based workplace. discrimination right independent We find this of the collective-bargaining agreement, i.e., the resolution require interpretation of her claim does not agreement. the therefore, hold, We plaintiff’s
that because discrimination independent agreement, claim is claim her preempted by § is not 301 of lmra.27 Appeals We affirm the decision of the Court of and remand the case the trial court for further proceedings opinion.28 consistent with this C.J.,
Cavanagh, Levin, Brickley, and and JJ., J. Mallett, Griffin, concurred with (concurring). plain Riley, J. case, In the instant tiff, female, a black asserts a racial and sexual Michigan discrimination § claim under 3.548(202). Rights Act, Civil 37.2202; MCL MSA essence, claims that she should have been given preference Krawczyk, a shift over Brian employee who, white male because he failed a Michigan argues Amicus curiae State AFL-CIO that our decision today apply "only brought should to state law discrimination claims against employers brought against and such claims labor organizations.” Inc, Maynard Products, Copper See v Revere 773 F2d (CA 1985). We neither decide nor intimate whether similar by plaintiff brought against preempted. her would union 28Although we conclude that claim is not lmra, 301 of any we neither decide nor intimate view with respect grounds summary disposi to other advanced in the motion 2.116(C)(8) (10). tion, i.e., MCR & Brooks Perkins Riley, J. seniority, welding his test, have lost should seniority. giving plaintiff However, thereby more Krawczyk to retake the Mr. allowed defendant test, ity passed, his retain senior- he later which Accordingly, plain- plaintiff. to the detriment maintaining brings that defendant suit tiff was motivated this discriminatory purposes, i.e., employees test, later failed the female other black retook passed, yet lost their still the test and seniority, the same white male who did whereas a seniority. to retain his was allowed part that this on the basis defends Defendant preempted by § fed- 301 of the state-law claim Management Act of 1947.1 Relations Labor eral Essentially, that resolution
defendant contends requires interpretation the instant claim *18 preempts agreement collective-bargaining and thus Magic Norge Lingle Chef, v Div of this claim. See Ed 410 Inc, 399; 1877; S 100 L 2d 486 US 108 Ct (1988). join majori- accordingly disagree the I finding preemption. ty’s noof development outset, of At I note that the the precedent in this Court United States contradictory. Indeed, seemed area has at times ques- 1987, the the Court seemed resolve before independent a claim is tion whether the of state-law purposes collective-bargaining by asking preemption evaluation of "whether inextricably intertwined [state-law] the with” claim is "substantially dependent” on the terms of or agreement. collective-bargaining Allis- the Corp 213, Lueck, 202, 220; 471 US Chalmers (1985). However, L as 1904; 85 Ed 2d S Ct Lingle, Supreme the demonstrated gates preemption to have narrowed seemed changing by whether resolution the focus to construing interpreting requires state-law claim 185(a). 1 29 USC Mich 270 Riley, J. agreement.2 Lingle, supra
at 407.
Nonetheless, undergone while the test has some refinement, general approach making this Lueck, and, inquiry Lingle has not. In most re Rawson, United cently, Steelworkers America v 1904; 495 US 110 Ct (1990), S 109 L Ed 2d dispositive Court found its whether analysis prima case facie under state law court requires a to construe the collective-bargaining agreement, i.e., whether elements of the underlying state- law construing agreement. claim necessitate Lueck, supra 216-218; Lingle, See at at 406- 407. Lueck, the Court considered the Wisconsin
tort of bad-faith of an handling insurance claim. The Court determined that Wisconsin law intrinsically relates to the nature and existence of Co, the contract. Hilker v Western Automobile Ins 413, (1931). 13-16; 204 Wis 235 NW 414-415 Thus the tort exists for breach of "duty de- upon the insurer implica- reasonable
volved] tion from the express contract,” terms of the which, scope of crucially, is "ascertained from a consideration of the contract itself.” [Id. 216.] Moreover, the Court buttressed its conclusion noting that under Wisconsin law "the tort duty was derived from implied good covenant faith dealing and fair found in every contract.” Id. at 217._ *19 Supreme On remand from the United States Court for considera light Lingle,
tion in of the Court of Alabama noted: appears Lingle It analysis that the Court shifted its the from "inextricably "interpreting agree- intertwined” test to the the thereby application preemp- ment” test and restricted the of [Reynolds Mays, (Ala,
tion. Metals Co v So 2d 1989).] & Perkins v Brooks Riley, J. plaintiffs Similarly, Rawson, in the —survivors brought a state-law suit four deceased miners — inspecting negligently against a union for the finding plaintiffs’ In worked. decedents mine where preempted, "the that the Court noted the claim participating representatives the in were Union’s inspection process provisions pursuant to the agreement” collective-bargaining and under the the nature "the determined state law scope duty. If the Union failed and of the Union’s inspection, perform duty it with to connection collective-bargaining arising duty out of the was a agreement signed by the Union as agent Indeed, 371. the Court for miners.” Id. at duty this to these deceased work- that owed noted separate from "a situation ers and distinct acting delegates are accused where the Union’s in might duty way of reasonable violate light every person society.” In Id. owed to care law, the found of this basis in state preempted. Lingle, hand, in the Court found On the other discharge retaliatory the Illinois tort of compensation filing require agreement. claim does a worker’s interpreting examining tort, the elements of the "(1) plaintiff he must show
the Court noted that was discharge discharged with or threatened (2) discharging employer’s or threat- motive in discharge ening exercising to deter him from him was the Act or to interfere
his rights.” Accordingly, with his exercise of those rely suit, on did not have maintain this collective-bargaining agree- any provision purely express implied. "Each of these ment, questions pertains to the conduct of factual employee the conduct and motivation employer.” Indeed, 407. the Court held Id. at *20 294 446 Mich 270 Opinion by Riley, J. any possible reason for the having nonretaliatory defense, i.e., a discharge, would re- likewise not quire construing any provision merely inquiry
because this also is a with factual regard to defendant’s motivation.3 In case, the instant racial and sexual strikingly discrimination claim is similar to tort sexual in Lingle. To establish unlawful racial and plaintiff discrimination, would have to prove by preponderance a of the evidence that disparate discrimination exists either treatment or intentional discrimination. See Ruppal v Treas- App 219, 226; 163 Mich 413 751 ury Dep’t, NW2d (1987). plaintiff prove so, To do must she was under the statute and protection a member of a class entitled to that, or the same similar conduct, differently she was treated than a man sexual or discrimination a nonblack [for employee for racial The crux of a discrimination]. sexfual similarly discrimination action is that situ- racial] ated persons been have accorded different treat- [Slayton v ment because of their sex [or race]. Host, Inc,
Michigan
App 535, 541;
144 Mich
(1985) (citations omitted);
Jenkins
NW2d 664
Michigan Chapter,
Southeastern
American Red
Cross,
App 785, 793-795;
141 Mich
natory reason for its actions. reason, must articulate such able to then prove by pre- given opportunity of- the reasons ponderance of the evidence *21 its true were not reasons by the defendant fered pretext for the discrimination. mere but were supra Citation [Slayton, at 541-542. omitted.] elements, it is that the these clear reviewing express or interpret any not have to court will collective-bargaining the provision of implied Rawson, supra, Lueck and Unlike both agreement. under state law is not what the dispositive inquiry but, agreement collective-bargaining provides, the the motivation of defen Lingle, in what was as dant, i.e., no or discrimination. discrimination Moreover, Lingle, as in because defendant merely com that its conduct was might claim defense the gleaned from implied some fairness pelled by as a whole would agreement the This would preempted. not make instant help question answer the factual whether only discrimination,5 but defendant was motivated to the require would not the court determine persuade that was defendant need the court it The not actually proffered the reasons. ... It is sufficient motivated genuine of fact as to if the defendant’s evidence raises whether this, issue plaintiff. accomplish against it the To discriminated forth, clearly through the must set introduc- the defendant evidence, the for the tion of admissible reasons rejection. argument particular what At oral defendant could indicate require interpreta collective-bargaining agreement provisions tion the of Indeed, resolving counsel this discrimination suit. defense understanding nothing the in the of or collective- conceded that letter Krawczyk agreement be Mr. should addressed whether Moreover, agrees permitted that the defendant to retake test. collective-bargain understanding provisions in and letter other Thus, only ing agreement plain unambiguous. defendant’s are understanding linking argument collective-bargaining this decision to letter agreement fairness stem- is some measure of 446 Mich Riley, J. legality of the decision under the collective- bargaining agreement.6 ming Krawczyk initially from the fact Mr. was informed he passed, welds, testing had but after further destructive on the Admittedly, later determined to have failed. resolution this issue require agreement interpreting would tially contending since defendant is essen- implied right that the created some Lueck, However, above, conduct. this See at 215. indicated as the court need not decide this issue as a matter of law because simply inquiry focus harbored an illicit or plaintiff. this suit is the factual whether defendant discriminatory motive to the detriment of If, however, implicated this claim had the terms of the collective- bargaining agreement Bawson, as in both Lueck we would authority simply express without implied provisions conclude that neither the nor the provide did, of the contract for such If conduct. we doing do, i.e., we would be interpret what we set out not to contract: assumption implied the labor contract creates no rights question Rather, may is not one that state law make. it is a interpretation of federal contract whether there was obligation provide payments this labor contract *22 manner, and, so, timely ain if whether Allis-Chalmers’ conduct implied provision. [Lueck,
breached that contract at 215.] view, my majority dangerously In principle standing violating the comes close to this noting agreement when are "the that and the letter of under- completely respect silent with to the treatment to employee Krawczyk’s accorded an in Mr. situation.” Ante at 287. necessary "It not to decide at the outset or whether not [the interpretation agreement the defendant’s] of is correct as a of matter Chrysler 1326, (CA Corp, federal labor 6, v law.” Smolarek 879 F2d 1989). Indeed, News, 683, (CA in 6, O’Shea v Detroit 887 F2d 1989), following the court made the observation: question plaintiff of [T]he whether or not the was discrimi- against separate any possible nated was from defense the employer might plaintiff have under the contract. All the has allege against to motive is that an action was taken him because of a impermissible It under the Act. is irrelevant to the preemption question employer whether or not the can defend by showing right it had the under the collective plaintiff’s to do what it did. . . . The claim stands separate this from defense. Lingle We plaintiff’s hold that and Smolarek save the claims preemption. respect claim, from right With to the discrimination the against not employment to be discriminated decisions handicap age independent question based on or of plaintiff whether O’Shea was demoted or not. The in this case Brooks & Perkins Boyle, J. reali- Indeed, the this conclusion is buttressed pro- only burden is one that defendant’s zation plaintiff persuasion. After the rather than duction Michigan prima case, courts set forth a facie has production place as on the defendant the burden of dispositive framing properly issue, the means defendant, so that the i.e., the motivation the purported defense then show that can pretext simply Once for discrimination.7 was again, nothing inquiry require an in this would agree- interpretation ment. agree
Accordingly, I because join 301, I is not claim majority’s opinion to the trial
and would remand proceedings. for further court majori- (concurring). agree I with J. Boyle, parts ty’s i with and in result and concur essentially opinion. conceded that The defendant collective-bargaining agreement did entitle Krawczyk to Mr. retake the test._ show, try example, midnight may shift handicapped employees were and that older or undesirable non-handicapped assigned younger to it more often than or by arguing that it had ones. The defendant could then defend the paper, argue right improve employees its its in order to transfer just Lingle could as the and Smolarék defendants employees they good to fire there. had cause their right point Michigan employees not to be is that have age against handicap discriminated regard on basis of without bargaining agreement’s language the collective about rights. employee’s Co, 280-281; App Kelsey-Hayes 184 Mich See also Hall v *23 (CA 6, (1990); Corp, 922 Welch v General Motors F2d NW2d 1990). Bay Burdine, City, n 4 at 255-256. See Balwinski v See also (1988). 766, 768-769; App 168 Mich NW2d