Betty Craig appeals from the district *435 court’s 1 judgment affirming the denial of her application for social security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. We affirm.
I.
Craig was born on August 7, 1952. After obtaining a gеneral equivalency diploma, Craig received one year of vocational training for office work. Her past relevant work includes thаt of a cook, factory worker, convenience store clerk, and telemarketer. Craig filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 19, 1994, alleging an onset disability date of December 10,1993.
The Social Security Administration denied Craig’s application initially and agаin on reconsideration. Craig then requested and received a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on August 15, 1996. The ALJ evaluated Craig’s claim according to the five-step sequential analysis prescribed by the social security regulations.
See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f);
Bowen v. Yuckert,
The ALJ concluded that Craig’s history of Bell’s palsy was a “non-severe impairment,” and that, although Craig’s other conditions amounted to “severe impairments,” they did not meet оr equal the criteria found in the Listing of Impairments.
See
20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. The ALJ then discounted Craig’s subjective complaints of pain, finding that they were inconsistent with thе overall record in light of the factors set forth in
Polaski v. Heckler,
Thе Appeals Council denied Craig’s request for further review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Craig then sought review in the district court рursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision to deny Craig disability bеnefits. On appeal, Craig contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her residual functional capacity and failed to evaluate the actual physical and mental demands of her past relevant work as a telemarketer.
II.
Our role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
See Prosch v. Apfel,
Craig argues that the ALJ improperly assessed her residual functional capacity by giving insufficient weight to certain parts of the opinion of Dr. Jock Cobb, Craig’s treating physician. Although the ALJ explicitly relied on Dr. Cobb’s opinion in finding that Craig “has severe impairments of degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine, headaches, and diagnoses of depression and a panic disorder,” Craig argues that the ALJ failed to appreciate the significance of this evidence and selectively ignored other portions of Dr. Cobb’s opinion noting that Craig’s ability to reach, push, or pull is “limited by pain.”
Although required to develop the reсord fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it was nоt considered.
See Black v. Apfel,
Moreover, in her testimony before the ALJ, Craig made no mention of any difficulties reaching, pushing, or pulling, and she stated that she continues to engage in many normal daily living activities including driving, shopping, visiting with friends and relatives, and picking up her grandchild. The ALJ determined that Craig’s pain was not as severe as she alleged, and Craig does not challenge this finding. Therefore, the ALJ acted properly in disregarding thоse portions of Dr. Cobb’s report that were based on Craig’s subjective descriptions to him of her pain levels.
See Gaddis v. Chater,
In addition, even if credited, Dr. Cobb’s observations regarding pain levels would not conclusively show that Crаig cannot engage in substantial gainful activity. The mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding of disability,
see Jones v. Chater,
Regarding Dr. Cobb’s unelaborated observation that Craig suffers from “moderate depression,” we note that Dr. Cobb is not licensed as a mental health professional,
see Loving v. Dep’t of Health & Human Svcs.,
Therefore, based on our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Craig pоssesses sufficient residual *437 functional capacity to engage in sedentary work. 4
Craig also contends that, by failing to consult the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the ALJ overlooked the actual рhysical demands of telemarketing that are inconsistent with “simple unskilled sedentary work,” and was therefore wrong to conclude that Craig is able to perform her past relevant work. Craig did not articulate this argument before the district court. The claim has thus been forfeited; accordingly, we decline to address it.
See Yeazel v. Apfel,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Jerry Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was submitted by consеnt of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
. Bell's palsy is a partial or complete paralysis of the facial muscles, usually confined to one side of the face. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1285 (26th ed.1995).
. Social security regulations define sedentary work as involving lifting no more than ten pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is generally defined as one that involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and stаnding is often necessary in carrying out job duties. However, the walking and standing should be occasional, and the other previously mentioned sedentary сriteria must be met. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
. We also find no inconsistency in the ALJ’s alternative use of the phrases “simple unskilled sedentary work” and, simply, “sedentary work.” Nowhere does the opinion state or imply that Craig was able to perform the “full range” of sedentary work, as Craig contends.