*1 (§ Code) to collect the assets Ins. his dis- among (§ Code), ratably them Ins. tribute the creditors subject priorities (§ 1033, Code) to certain Ins. in which appellant is not included. appellant, general creditor, permitted
If an unsecured were levy receiver, on and obtain dividends held the bank deprived any the other creditors would be those share dividends, preference would obtain or a greater percentage other than creditors. general jurisdiction subject trial court did have matter and the but in view of the fact liquidation proceedings pending court, were another provisions in view of the Code, particularly of the Insurance it would have been an error in the exercise judgment to authorize the issuance the writ of execution.
The trial court did not Although abuse its discretion. granted stated would have the motion if it had been a matter only, of discretion it did discretion in its exercise determination that the motion should be denied. The rea son ruling for the is not material. If the decision is correct it regardless must sustained considerations have moved the trial court to (Rapp its conclusion. v. South ern Co., (1931) Service 705-6 195].)
The order denying the motion is affirmed.
Shinn, Acting pro tem., No. 13282. Dist., Second Div. Three. H. BESSINGER, Respondent, FREDERIC MYRTLE A.
GROTZ, Appellant. *2 Appellant. for Jaffray R.
James Respondent. for L. Howden Baker and Gordon Robert N. SHAW, judgment tem. Plaintiff is a debtor whose judgment foreclosing to under a was defendant property sold real brought this action under mortgage. He
a step Procedure, preliminary as a Code Civil 707 of the accounting and disclosure compel to an redemption, to a alleged to rents have been received defendant. profits defendant plaintiff, for from which Judgment given was appeals. upon state the facts made
The trial court right including depends, plaintiff’s to plaintiff’s redeem profits of rents and on defendant for a statement demand it, also find that failure to furnish defendant’s redemption defendant made a during period for in possession persons, some whom were property sell the to to sale, and received tenants at time of plaintiff’s as forth, amounts of which are not payments, installment set any rents and do not state that contract, said conclusions of law profits In its were received defendant. an referee to take appointment a the court directed judgment appealed accounting from defendant. Judgment Accounting,” decrees “Interlocutory for is entitled redeem, appoints a plaintiff that have leave accounting the defendant an directs him “to take from ... by her . . from the use and of all . sums when property,” and orders “that is and been rendered and received and settled that a has entered, fixing, be accordance with the herein, and conclusions law sum for which by plaintiff. redeemed It also be ...” sums defendant all under the contract that
above mentioned are the use and property.
We have come to is conclusion unquestionably a purports be, interlocutory what it mere judgment, Pomper not Superior Court, (1923) 577], where the question appealable, was whether a thus general stated the rule: “The rule is that where fixing liability made parties which refers case to a master or subordinate tribunal purpose, such, instance, statement as the an account, upon entered, which a further decree tois [citing decree not final This rule authorities].” approved been Gunder, (1929) and followed Gunder v. *3 208 559, 561 794]; Finney, Cal. Middleton v. [282 (1931) 214 Cal. (2d) ; 526 78 P. L.A. R. [6 1104] Hollar Products, v. Inc., Saline 3 (1935) (2d) 80, 81 Cal. (2d) P. 273]; and many [43 other cases. Lyon Goss, (1942) v. (2d) 659, 19 Cal. 670 P. [123 (2d) 11], again the rule is declared, in “As a these words:
general test, adapted particular must be the circumstances case, of the individual it that where issue no is left for except future consideration fact of the compliance or noncompliance the terms of first with the decree, that final, anything decree is where but further in the judicial nature of action part the on of the court essential rights of determination the parties, of the the interlocutory.” judicial Further action is essential here to a final of determination the the of parties, by and either of these statements rule the is interlocutory appeal and not The must therefore be dismissed. point by
This has not respondent, been raised the or by attempted discussed in case appeal an of order, from a nonappealable it is court on its own motion appeal. (Collins Corse, to dismiss v. (2d) ; Johnson v.
(1936) 123, 124 P. 8 Cal. 137] [64 (2d) 140].) (1932), Solomons, dismissed. appeal The J.,
Schauer, J., (Parker), and Wood concurred. rehearing 1942, and petition A June was denied opinion thereupon following rendered: THE COURT. By petition rehearing appellant points price, exact amounts out state the that the specified monthly the rate interest payments and times of defendant, by in sale made that contract are for the use that payments appellant question, judicial no action seeks to draw the conclusion by the court. But the the referee or remains to be done money by the defendant state the do not amount they find that the defendant contract, nor do under this no other sums for use yet determined to be the land. there are matters Hence for a settlement referee, provides and since obviously contemplates taken making the court further action settlement. rehearing is petition denied. tem., J.
Schauer, (Parker), J.,P. Wood No. 3015. Fourth Dist. B. al., LOWRY Respondents, H. BRAKHAGE et *4 McCASLIN, Appellant.