116 So. 796 | Ala. | 1928
Lead Opinion
Appellant sued appellee for setting fire to its building and contents. The argument for a reversal of the judgment is based exclusively upon those rulings of the trial court in which it gave certain written instructions to the jury at appellee's request. The evidence was in conflict as to all material facts.
Stress is laid upon charge A, and Alabama Great Southern v. Davenport,
The charge is further criticized for omitting the hypothesis of proper equipment. In this connection also Alabama Great Southern v. Davenport is cited. That case in turn cited Sherrill v. Louisville Nashville,
"Maintenance of its engine or locomotive which caused or permitted it to throw out or emit sparks in a large or unusual quantity."
Our judgment is that "maintenance," as used in the charge, sufficiently covered the alleged case of improper equipment. The trial court instructed the jury in its oral charge that:
"The mere communication of the fire from the railroad engine [if the jury so found] is of itself sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence against the company. With this prima facie proof of defendant's liability raised in plaintiff's favor, the burden is then devolved upon the defendant of reasonably satisfying the jury, by the evidence, that the engine alleged to have caused the fire was properly constructed, was equipped with approved devices and appliances to prevent the escape of fire and sparks, was in good repair, and prudently managed and controlled."
The complaint was stated in language of utmost generality, charging merely that defendant negligently set fire to plaintiff's property. A charge positively erroneous cannot be cured by another charge; but a charge may be explained without error, and that was the effect of the oral charge in this case — this we say on the assumption, for the argument only, that the word "maintenance" needed explanation. If plaintiff was of that mind, it should have requested an explanatory charge.
As to Wilson v. Mobile Ohio, supra: Reviewing that case, our present opinion is that the judgment there was properly reversed, but we do not now think that all of the charges listed by this court as having been erroneously given in the trial court misplaced the burden of proof. Charge 5 in that case correctly stated the burden of proof upon the case as a whole and made no effort to deal with the inferences authorized by law upon proof that plaintiff's property was burned by fire set out by defendant's locomotive. In that case, as in this, the evidence upon the issue whether defendant's locomotive had set out the fire was in conflict. The giving of this charge was not error. Or if charge 5 be construed as asserting in substance the same *449 proposition as the other charges condemned by the court in that case, then our opinion is, none of them were out of harmony with what has been thus far written in the present case.
Exception is also taken in the brief to the word "convince" as used in the charge. If "reasonably convince" means more than "reasonably satisfy," it was not so considered in Alabama Great Southern v. Davenport, supra. One meaning of "convince" is "to satisfy by proof." Webster's International. The charge postulates reasonable conviction, and while the old and frequently approved form, "reasonable satisfaction," were better, we are unwilling to order a reversal on account of the different language employed in the charge. Probably it may be said that the charge was in some very slight degree misleading and called for explanation.
In giving charge C the court ruled in harmony with what has been heretofore said. Upon the case as a whole the burden of proof rested upon plaintiff. This burden could not be displaced by a mere surmise that defendant's engine set out the fire, and this, in substance, is the affirmation of the charge. Like reason justifies the court in giving the charges made the subject of assignments of error 6 and 9.
Charge 7-A (assignment of error 3) was given without error. Defendant was authorized to operate its locomotive by steam, which must be generated by fire. It is impossible to construct them so as to be successfully operated without emitting sparks or burning cinders. Defendant's liability arose only upon proof and a finding that its right was exercised negligently. L. N. v. Marbury Lbr. Co.,
Charge 1-B (assignment 12) was properly given. It was tantamount to the proposition that upon the case as a whole the burden of proof was with plaintiff appellant. As to that all the cases are agreed.
The proposition of charge 13 (assignment 7) is undoubtedly correct. There must be negligence. The rule that the burden of proof shifts when it is shown that the fire which destroyed plaintiff's property was set by defendant's locomotive is adopted for the sole reason that the evidence as to the operation, construction, and equipment (if there be a difference between the two) lies within the peculiar knowledge of defendant on whom, for that reason, the burden of producing it is placed. Still the jury must find that defendant, or its agents, were guilty of negligence before a verdict can be rendered for plaintiff.
Charge 14 (assignment of error 8) was given without error. As for the "construction" of the engine, defendant proved abundantly and without dispute that its construction was of the most modern and efficient character. As for the suggestion that the defendant's engine may have been defective in some respect other than the spark arrester, we are not informed that there were any other "equipment" defects which might have contributed to the setting out of a fire. If there were such other defects, neither the briefs nor the record contain any suggestion as to what they were. The jury were not authorized to proceed on mere surmise, nor can the court extend the rule which permits the shifting of the burden of proof to the extent suggested by appellant. To do so would burden every case with a mass of testimony about irrelevant matters.
We find no error.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SOMERVILLE, GARDNER, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
BOULDIN and BROWN, JJ., dissent on the ground that charge 7-A was erroneously given.
Dissenting Opinion
The fault of the majority opinion, in my judgment, is due primarily to the assumption that an engine properly constructed, equipped, and operated may emit live sparks which may be carried by the wind and set fire to property off the right of way, in this case some 125 feet from the track.
In view of the well-known and manifest duty to use due care to avoid injury to the property of others, and the destructive properties of fire, I think it a violent presumption in this day of mechanical skill to say that an engine cannot, in the exercise of due care, be so constructed and operated as to eliminate such hazard, barring unforeseen accidents to the mechanism.
In Southern Railway Co. v. Ross,
In dealing with charge 7-A we must keep in mind that it was given for defendant. A charge given for plaintiff predicating a right of recovery upon the mere fact that the property was destroyed by sparks from the engine would be invasive of the province of the jury in the face of evidence of proper equipment and operation. I think it is equally invasive of the province of the jury when given for defendant.
The fact that the engine emitted sparks which set fire to the property is evidence of negligence, indeed such evidence as to create a presumption of negligence. No matter what other evidence is offered, it remains evidence of causal negligence.
The charge does not deal with the burden of proof, nor the shifting of the burden. If it had merely said the jury should consider the whole evidence in passing upon the issue of negligence, and on the whole evidence must be reasonably satisfied of negligence, it would be correct. After the evidence is all in, the jury may regard the evidence on the direct issue of proper equipment and operation as equally balanced, and the fact of the burning by sparks, the only established fact in the case.
The charge in effect tells the jury that in such case they cannot find for plaintiff. I think it an invasion of the province of the jury.
Addendum
Appellant complains of this charge given on request of defendant, apropos, evidently, of the fact that one of plaintiff's witnesses had, on cross-examination, confessed that he had been convicted of receiving stolen property:
"The court charges the jury that concealing stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, is a crime involving moral turpitude."
The charge asserts a correct principle of law and it may be conceded that it affected the credibility of the witness. Viberg v. State,
In the next place, appellant, overlooking intermediate matter of much import, and connecting the last sentence of charge "A" directly with the first, would, in order to establish error, have the charge read as instructing the jury that a verdict for defendant should result from a disagreement of the jury. But we do not so read the charge. But if the charge in the respect under consideration was capable of the interpretation put upon it by appellant, at worst it was of misleading tendency merely and should have called for explanation. Partridge v. Forsyth,
Application overruled.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SOMERVILLE, GARDNER, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
BOULDIN and BROWN, JJ., dissent. They are of opinion that charges 7-A and A were erroneously given.
