*2
Before BIRCH
BLACK,
Circuit
After proceeding a
yards,
few hundred
Judges, and PRESNELL,* District Judge.
pulled
into a shopping center and
stopped just long enough to let
passen-
BLACK,
Judge:
Circuit
ger out of his car. He then drove out of
*3
In this appeal, we consider whether Offi-
the parking lot
proceeded
and
south on
cer
Harrison,
Scott
who allegedly termi- Highway 17-A. Harrison turned on his
nated a high-speed
by
causing David sirens, called the truck’s
plate
license
into
crash,
Beshers’ vehicle to
violated Beshers’
dispatch,
reported
and
the suspect
Fourth Amendment right to be free from
vehicle was not stopping. Both vehicles
unreasonable seizures.
affirm
We
the dis-
accelerated to 55
per
miles
(mph)
hour
trict
grant
court’s
of summary judgment,
the 45 mph zone. As
fled,
Beshers
having determined that no constitutional
wove through traffic, occasionally strad-
violation occurred.
dling both southbound lanes.
I. BACKGROUND1
Corporal Matt Ramey and Officer Linda
On the
afternoon of
April
the Addis, were traveling
on High-
northbound
City of Toccoa Police received a report way 17-A when they heard the radio re-
from
Quick
Bev’s
Stop that a customer
port. According Addis,
to
Ramey ordered
(later
Beshers)
identified as
tried to steal
her to perform a
by
roadblock
driving the
beer after the clerk refused to sell it to police vehicle directly in
path
of Besh-
him. The customer appeared to be intoxi-
ers’ oncoming truck. Beshers
swerved
cated and had already
been
store
avoid
roadblock,
crossing the center
number of times
day
purchase
alco-
line and driving into oncoming traffic.
hol. Officer Scott Harrison responded to Beshers then returned to his proper lane
Quick
Bev’s
Stop and viewed video surveil-
and
driving
continued
south on Highway
lance of the suspect’s truck. Shortly after
17-A. About
time,
this same
Officer John
Bev’s,
leaving
Harrison
noticed
truck
joined
Whitworth
pursuit.
matching
description
of the suspect
vehicle at a nearby
proceeded
Beshers
gas station.
down Highway 17-A,
Harrison
watched the truck turn
followed in
by
line
Harrison,
out of the gas
Whitworth,
station and run a stop
and Addis
sign as
and Ramey.
it entered
Beshers continued
Highway 17-A, a busy
four-lane
weave through
road with
traffic and force numer-
shopping centers, fast
ous
food restaurants,
motorists to the side of the road. As
Wal-Mart, and an occasional
he approached
hotel on ei-
the intersection of Highway
ther side. Harrison activated his
17-A
emer-
Lane,
Rose
his lane of travel was
lights,
gency
triggering his video equip-
by
blocked
a car stopped at a red light.
ment
record,
and began to follow the To avoid stopping, Beshers drove onto the
car.
right shoulder of Highway 17-A. As he
*
Gregory
Honorable
Presnell,
A.
United
(2007),
States
typically
adopting
means
Judge
District
for the Middle District of Flori-
plaintiff's version of
qualified
facts in a
immu
da, sitting by designation.
nity
Nonetheless,
case.
in this
as in
1. We
required
are
view
all facts and draw
Harris, we have the benefit of viewing two
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
videotapes patrol
cars involved in
moving party when reviewing grant
of sum
pursuit. Thus,
to the
Appellant's
extent
mary judgment. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
version of the facts is clearly
contradicted
n.
125 S.Ct.
597 n.
the videotapes, such that no
jury
(2004).
L.Ed.2d 583
Supreme
Court
it,
could believe we do not adopt his factual
-
recognized
-,
Scott v.
allegations. Id.
al defendants were qualified entitled to that the use of deadly force was necessary immunity. They also argued Appellant prevent escape; gave a warning, provide could not evidence to support a feasible, if about the possible use of deadly claim for supervisor or municipal liability. force. The court found Harrison had probable cause to
On
believe
posed
November
the district court
an immediate
granted
others
motion for summary
because he
judgment
was driving erratically,
all
was suspected
First,
Defendants.
the court de
intoxicated,
be
and had
termined
struck
there was
another
no
mo-
evidence Officer
torist with his
Harrison
vehicle. The
intentionally
court
thus
caused his vehicle to
concluded it was not
collide
“obvious” that
no
so
Fourth
Gar-
Amend
«.erprohibited the
ment
seizure
occurred.
In
force to
alternative,
stop Beshers.
court
court
concluded
further
found
even if a constitu
that Appellant failed
tional
occurred,
identify
violation
any
“case
would
demonstrates a
entitled
qualified
clearly
established
immunity because
rule
prohibiting
there was no “clearly
officers from engag-
established” law that
ing
high-speed pursuits
would
put
attempting
notice that his
*5
use a rolling
conduct
roadblock to
violated
slow or
Beshers’
constitutional
fleeing suspect
rights. See,
who the
e.g.,
officers
Harlow
reasonably
v. Fitzgerald, 457
800,
poses
818,
danger
U.S.
2727,
102
others.”6
2738,
S.Ct.
73
(1982)
L.Ed.2d 396
(holding that qualified
On
15, 2005,
December
Jason Beshers
immunity
government
shields
officials
timely appealed the district
grant
court’s
from liability if their acts do not violate of summary judgment. After initial brief
“clearly established statutory or constitu
ing and
argument,
oral
the Supreme Court
rights
tional
of which a
—
person
issued
Harris,
Scott v.
U.S. -,
127
known”).
would have
The district court
1769,
S.Ct.
1774, 167
(2007),
L.Ed.2d 686
explained that under the then-controlling which discusses the use
of
force
law of
Garner,
Tennessee v.
1,
471 U.S.
during a high-speed police pursuit. After
11-12,105
1694,
S.Ct.
1701,
6. The district granted court also summary train against action county because the judgment City Toccoa, of of Chief Po- automobile accident did not rise to a level of Strickland, lice Frank Corporal Ramey, Matt violating their rights); constitutional Vineyard and Officers John Whitworth and Linda Ad- County v. Murray, 990 F.2d of 1211 dis. (11th Cir.1993) ("Only when it is clear that a specific violation of rights has We occurred can further conclude the district court did question § municipal 1983 liability err granting summary fo judgment to the r injury arise.”); Toccoa, City of Sikes, see also Campbell Chief of Police v. Frank Strick- land, Corporal (11th F.3d Cir.1999) Ramey. Matt We (stating need not Appellant’s address the that a claim supervisory claims municipal liability fails supervisory liability since where we there is no underlying conclude no constitutional constitutional violation). violation occurred. See Rooney Appellant did not appeal Watson, v. 101 F.3d 1381 n. 2 (finding court's grant summary judgment to Offi plaintiffs could not maintain a failure to cers John Whitworth or Linda Addis. 2002) (internal and cita quotation marks DISCUSSION
II. omitted). tions alia, inter argues, Appellant qualified questions of im- resolving “In summary by granting erred court district (1) required are to resolve munity, courts after favor judgment question: Taken in the ‘threshold an un subject to was not finding Beshers party asserting the Fourth most in violation lawful seizure alleged show the offi- (2) injury, do the facts Amendment, determining even conduct violated constitutional occurred, cer’s Officer if a violation — -, v. right?’” im Scott qualified entitled nonetheless 167 L.Ed.2d district court’s munity. We review Katz, 533 novo, (quoting Saucier v. de re summary judgment grant of 194, 201, 121 L.Ed.2d material genuine disputes all solving (2001)). “If, if, only the court Thorn of Beshers. Skrtich fact in favor Cir.2002). (11th right,” finds a violation of a constitutional ton, 280 F.3d clearly it does ask whether “if the appropriate Summary judgment is the time of the violation. established answers to inter depositions, pleadings, ques- file, We thus turn the threshold together rogatories, and admissions whether Officer Harrison tion this case: affidavits, there any, if show that Fourth Amendment violated Beshers’ fact any as to material genuine issue is no rights. to a moving is entitled party and that of law.” Fed. matter
judgment as a
pro
Fourth Amendment
56(c).
Harrison’s entitlement
R.Civ.P.
from the use of
right to be “free
vides the
*6
law to
question
is
immunity
a
qualified
of an investi
force
the course
excessive
Sutherland,
v.
Cagle
de novo.
be reviewed
per
stop or other ‘seizure’
gatory
Cir.2003).
(11th
980,
334 F.3d
985
Kesinger
rel.
Kesinger ex
Estate
son.”
immunity
government
(11th
Qualified
protects
1243, 1248
Herrington, 381 F.3d
v.
discretionary functions
performing
Cir.2004);
officials
amend. IV.
see also U.S. Const.
liability
long
as their
claim,
from individual
excessive force
To establish an
clearly estab
not violate
conduct “does
Beshers was
must first show
Appellant
rights of
statutory or constitutional
meaning
lished
of the Fourth
within the
“seized”
Cox,
a
would
343
person
reasonable
v.
Vaughan
which
See
Amendment.
(11th Cir.2003).
Fitzgerald,
1323,
457 U.S.
A
Harlow v.
Fourth
known.”
F.3d
1328
2727, 2738,
800, 818,
73 L.Ed.2d
is
occurs when “there
102 S.Ct.
seizure
Amendment
(1982).
immunity
of freedom of
purpose of
termination
governmental
“The
396
a
intentionally
carry
through
officials
means
governmental
allow
movement
Inyo, 489
County
discretionary duties without
Brower v.
applied.”
out their
1378, 1381,
593, 597,
103
harassing liti
S.Ct.
liability or
109
personal
U.S.
fear of
in original).8
(emphasis
suit all but
628
protecting from
L.Ed.2d
gation,
Brower,
Supreme
States
the United
one who is know
In
incompetent or
plainly
police cruiser
if a
explained
Lee
law.”
v. Court
violating the federal
ingly
(11th
car and side-
alongside
fleeing
a
Ferraro,
pulls
1194
Cir.
F.3d
284
place in order to
Brower,
put
motion
set in
found
decedent
8.
the Court
In
was meant
he was
.... Brower
stolen car
achieve that result
"seized” when the
489
driving
police roadblock.
...
stopped by
into a
crashed
...
roadblock—and
to be
Court
S.Ct. at 1383. The
at
at
U.S.
Id.
109 S.Ct.
stopped.”
at
was so
enough for a seizure that
“it [is]
reasoned:
1382.
instrumentality
very
person
stopped
it,
crash,
swipes
thereby producing- a
court must ask
reasonable offi-
occurs.
at
seizure
Id.
109 S.Ct. at
cer
would believe
this level of force is
1381. But if a
in a police
necessary
in the situation at hand.” Fer-
(internal
raro,
unexpectedly loses
of his car
control
him.”) Brower, (quoting 489 U.S. at noted, As the district court the Supreme 1381). Court that, found Tennessee Garner
Here,
maintains,
Officer
circumstances,
depending on the
the use of
agreed,
district court
deadly
there
no evi-
prevent
force to
escape
of a
intentionally
dence he
caused his vehicle to
felony suspect may may
not be constitu
(cid:127)
Nonetheless,
collide
tionally
decedent.
reasonable. 471 U.S. at
viewing
the evidence in the
most S.Ct. at
explained:
1701. The Court
favorable to the Appellant, we
conclude
Where the suspect poses no immediate
juror
could determine Harrison
to the officer and no threat
intentionally collided with Beshers. Ac-
others, the harm resulting from failing
cordingly, for purposes
only,
of this appeal
apprehend
him does not justify the
operate
we
under the
presumption
force to do so
A
.....
Harrison “seized”
as that term is
*7
police
may
unarmed,
officer
not seize an
defined under the Fourth Amendment.
nondangerous
suspect
deadly
[with
....
force]
We must next decide whether
...
[But] [w]here the officer
prob-
has
the force used to effectuate the seizure
able cause to
suspect
believe that
the
was reasonable.
“[A]
‘[s]eizure’ alone
poses
harm,
a threat
physical
of serious
enough
§
liability;
1983
the seizure
”
,
others,
either to the officer or
it is not
must be ‘unreasonable.’
489
Brower
constitutionally
prevent
unreasonable to
599,
U.S. at
1267
Officer’s]
[the
or not
“[w]hether
that
(2004).
sized
L.Ed.2d 588
598,
596,
160
125 S.Ct.
‘deadly
of
application
constituted
actions
precondi
three
Garner,
required
we
After
[the
matters
force,’
that
all
An
deadly force.
of
the use
tions
Id. at
were reasonable.”
actions
Officer’s]
cause
‘“(1)
probable
ha[ve]
must:
officer
threat
poses
suspect
the
that
believe
in de-
either
that
harm,
reiterated
Court
physical
The Harris
serious
of
commit
a seizure
he has
of
‘that
reasonableness
or
the
others’
termining
or to
officer
of
quality
infliction
the
nature
involving
the
balance
crime
it
“must
ted
Fourth
physical
individual’s
of serious
on the
infliction
intrusion
the
threatened
impor-
against
that
believe[]
(2) reasonably
interests
harm;’
al-
pre
necessary to
interests
governmental
of
deadly
[is]
force
tance
of
use
(quot-
given some
the intrusion.”
justify
leged
ha[ve]
escape;
vent
696,
Place,
U.S.
462
of
use
v.
States
possible
United
ing
warning about
110
77 L.Ed.2d
at 1329-
Cox,
F.3d
343
S.Ct.
force, if feasible.”
case,
risk
11-12,
ramming
Thus, in a
(1983)).
at
Garner,
U.S.
(quoting
pose
actions
original).
the officer’s
bodily
in
harm
1701) (emphasis
at
against
weighed
must
suspect
however,
in Scott
Recently,
ensuring public
interests
governmental
appli
Garner’s
limited
Court
Supreme
caused
eliminating
safety and
—
-,
cability.
consider-
Id. After
suspect.
fleeing
aby
noted
(2007).
Court
L.Ed.2d
perhaps
“weights]
a court
how
ing
Fourth
Garner,
applied
they
that
nu-
killing
injuring or
probability
lesser
po
to a
test
reasonableness
Amendment’s
perhaps
against
bystanders
merous
slight,
“young,
shooting a
lice officer
killing a
injuring
probability
larger
back
...
burglary
unarmed
stated:
the Court
person[,]”
single
away on
running
he was
while
head
of the
process
in this
appropriate
it
think
We
(quoting
at 1777
Harris, 127 S.Ct.
foot.”
number
only
account
take
at
21, 105 S.Ct.
at
Garner,
relative
their
risk,
but
lives
omit
marks
1706) (internal quotation
after
suspect],
[the
It
culpability.
“[w]hatever
that
ted).
found
Court
himself
placed
intentionally
all, who
might
the factors
said about
Garner
en-
unlawfully
danger
public
shooting
justified
flight
reckless,
speed
high
in the
gaging
appli
have scant
‘preconditions’
such
be-
choice
ultimately produced
reasonableness
cability” to
con-
officer]
[the
evils
two
tween
car
high-speed
ain
deadly force
cars,
blue
Multiple
fronted.
collision.
intentional
by an
*8
terminated
had
blaring,
sirens
flashing and
lights
in
(emphasis
at
Harris,
S.Ct.
nearly ten
suspect]
chasing [the
been
flee
a
bumping
car’s
“A police
original).
warning
their
ignored
miles,
he
but
police
a
like
fact, not much
is, in
car
ing
might
who
contrast,
those
By
stop.
per
hit a
as to
so
gun
a
shooting
man’s
officer]
[the
had
harmed
been
have
by
posed
son[,] [n]or
entirely
were
he did
action
taken
even
unarmed
an
foot of
flight
difficulty in
little
We
innocent.
dan
the extreme
comparable
remotely
Scott
reasonable
was
concluding it
in
respondent
by
posed
life
to human
ger
did.
that
action
take
marks
(internal quotation
Id.
case.”
this
omitted).
(footnote
Id.
flee
omitted)
to a
(referring
citations
no-
rejected
specifically
Court
in an
high speeds
at
driving
motorist
ing
by
public
protect
can
police
that
tion
empha
Court
police).
to elude
effort
ceasing
pursuit.
a
at
It
Id.
ex- We therefore hold Harrison did not vio-
plained
calling
that
a pursuit
does not
late Beshers’. Fourth
guarantee
driving
stop
will
reck-
be free from
during
excessive force
a sei-
lessly
may
“perverse
create
incen-
zure. Having found no constitutional vio-
tives” for individuals to flee and drive
Harrison,
lation
proceed
we need not
recklessly
Instead,
to evade arrest.
it
step
qualified immunity
the second
down more sensible rule: A
“la[id]
Harris,
analysis. See
at 1774.
attempt
dangerous
officer’s
terminate
high-speed car
threatens the
III. CONCLUSION
bystanders
lives
innocent
does not vio-
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the
Amendment,
late the Fourth
even
it
when
grant
district
summary judg-
court’s
places the fleeing motorist at risk of seri-
ment to the Defendants on all of Appel-
injury
ous
or death.” Id.
lant’s federal law claims.
apply
When we
Harris
the facts
AFFIRMED.
of this
we have no
that Harri
doubt
alleged
deadly
son’s
use
force to
PRESNELL,
Judge,
District
Beshers did
violate the Fourth Amend
concurring:
above,
ment. As we noted
to determine
Harris,
light
In
I
compelled
am
deadly
force was reasonable we
However,
panel
concur in the
I
decision.
must determine whether Officer Harri
panel
think
opinion
fails to portray the
son’s
objectively
actions were
reasonable
facts in the proper light.
in
We
light of the
start with
facts and circumstances of
pursuit.
Herrington,
premise
See
381 F.3d at
officer Harrison applied
Connor,
(citing
force to seize Beshers. The ques-
1872).
S.Ct. at
From
perspec
Harrison’s
is,
tion
objectively
was
of force
tive, he had reason to believe Beshers was
under
facts
circum-
a danger to the pursuing officers and oth
stances of this case? When the
facts
driving
and was
under the influence of
viewed,
this
they
case are
must be at
alcohol. Harrison observed Beshers weav
this
in
stage,
light
most
ing
traffic,
in and
crossing
out of
the dou
I
Appellant,
they
believe
demonstrate
yellow
line,
ble
driving
center
on the
a much closer case than Har-
wrong
road,
side of the
and forcing others
My
facts,
ris.
view those
assessed
off the road. He witnessed Beshers crash
standard,
of the appropriate
is as
Lyon’s
Ms.
vehicle and was rammed
follows:
several times
Beshers’ truck while trav
eling between 55
mph
and 65
on Highway
Background
I.
Harris,
145. As in
“intentionally
April
On
Officer Scott Harrison
placed himself and the
public
danger by
dispatched
Quick
to Bev’s
Stop,
unlawfully
engaging
reckless,
high-
Toccoa,
convenience
Georgia.
store
A
speed flight.”
Yet this decision troubles me. Realis-
tically, a suspect fleeing in a car
will inevitably violate some traffic laws. By so, doing he will endanger the lives (as
innocent motorists well as the pursuing
officers).12 And that danger always will
outweigh posed to the by the officer’s of deadly force, be- UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORA cause the suspect is the one who chose to TION, U.S. Mining Steel Company, put everyone else at risk by refusing to LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, stop. In words, other danger given no weight. For all of its talk of a test, balancing the Harris Michael ASTRUE,* court J. Commissioner of has, in effect, established a per se rule: Social Security Administration, Unless the chase occurs below speed Defendant-Appellee, * 12. As attested dangerous instrumental- Pursuant to R.App. 43(c), Fed. P. Michael J. doctrine, ity operation a of motor vehicle Astrue is predecessor, substituted for his Jo inherently dangerous Thus, to others. Barnhart, Anne B. as Commissioner of the occasioned fleeing motorist will Social Security Administration. itself arguably create an immediate and sub- potential stantial for harm to the traveling public.
