123 Minn. 76 | Minn. | 1913
Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state and engaged in the brewing and sale of beer. In connection with its business it operates a bottling plant, wherein beer is bottled and prepared for sale and shipment to the trade. Plaintiff, for about a month prior to the time complained of, was in defendant’s employ as a common laborer, and as such performed such work about the brewing and bottling works as he was from time to time directed by the superintendent or foreman. HA was set to work at the bottling machine and was engaged in filling bottles with beer, when one of the bottles being filled exploded, from which a particle of glass struck him in the eye, totally destroying the sight thereof, and to some extent disfiguring his face. Plaintiff thereafter brought this action to recover for the injury so received, charging in his complaint that the same was caused by the negligence of defendant'. At the trial a verdict was returned for plaintiff, and defendant subsequently moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the court denied. Judgment was entered and defendant appealed. There was no motion for a new trial.
At the close of plaintiff’s case in chief, defendant moved the court that a verdict be directed for defendant on the grounds: (1) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to justify a verdict for plaintiff. Again at the conclusion of the trial defendant moved for a directed verdict, and the motion was denied. The issues submitted to the jury included the questions: (1) Whether defendant was negligent in failing to provide a guard for the bottling machine; (2) whether plaintiff assumed the risk incident to working at the machine with
Conceding, without stopping to consider the question, that defendant may, on its motion under the statute for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, raise the point that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, we find no substantial defect in the complaint before us. That it states a cause of action for the negligent use of this machine -without a guard, and requiring plaintiff, an
The further suggestion of defendant that the statutes of the state requiring dangerous machinery to be guarded and protected so far as practicable, to the end that employees may not be injured therefrom, has no application to the machine in question, is not involved on this appeal. The trial court charged the jury that the statutes did apply, to which no objection or exception was taken by defendant. The instructions of the court became the law of the case. Smith v. Pearson, 44 Minn. 397, 46 N. W. 849; 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 9792.
The evidence also showed, or tended to show, that plaintiff was inexperienced in this class of work, that he did not know that a guard for the machine had been provided by defendant, and further that he was wholly ignorant thereof when he commenced work at the machine. He cannot therefore be said to have been guilty of contributory negligence in working at the machine without putting the guard to use. Whether he assumed the risks of the employment was on the evidence a fair question for the jury. While he knew that bottles frequently exploded when being filled, the testimony was that he did not, because of his inexperience, understand or appreciate the risks and dangers before him. He was given no warning or instructions upon the subject, nor was he informed that a guard was at hand which he could use. The question of assumption of risk was one of fact. Shaver v. J. Neils Lumber Co. 109 Minn. 376, 123 N. W. 1076; Snyder v. Waldorf Box Board Co. 110 Minn. 40, 124 N. W. 450. The truthfulness of the witnesses was for the jury and trial court. The jury gave credence to plaintiff’s evidence, the learned trial court approved their verdict, and we discover, from the record, no reason for interference.
Judgment affirmed.