This is an appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict finding appellees guilty of negligence and awarding appellants damages of $7,000. Appellants complain of the trial judge’s refusal to grant a new trial solely on the issue of damages, asserting that the damages assessed by the jury are so grossly inadequate as to be incorrect as a matter of law, and contend that the trial judge abused his discretion in restricting summation at the close of trial to thirty minutes per side. We hold against appellants on both arguments and affirm.
The refusal to grant a new trial, sought on the ground of inadequate or excessive damages, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose action thereon should be overturned only in exceptional circumstances
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In a long line of cases this Court has consistently emphasized that “the granting or denial of a new trial on the ground of excessive [or inadequate] damages is a
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matter of discretion with the trial court, not subject to review except for grave abuse of discretion”. Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelley,
The trial judge restricted counsel to thirty minutes per side for summation and denied appellants’ request for additional time. Appellants argue that this allowed insufficient time to develop fully the issue of damages, which materially contributed to the disregarding by the jury of uncontroverted evidence concerning damages and constituted an abuse of discretion. A trial judge in the exercise of sound discretion may always limit argument. Biggs v. Mays,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. See generally 6 Moore Federal Practice Sec. 59.08 [6] (1953).
. Indeed, “[t]here are very few cases in which this Court has reversed the trial judge’s refusal to grant a new trial because of inadequate damages”. Silverman v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
. This Court, in Silverman v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra, note 2, at 263, noted that “when there is no prejudicial error, an appellate court should discipline itself not to substitute its judgment for a jury’s judgment, or its discretion for the reasonable exercise of a trial judge’s discretion”.
