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Berry v. State
689 N.E.2d 444
Ind.
1997
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*1 compliance clearly with the Rules self laudato- The advertisements of Professional Furthermore, by by stating their adver- before the Commis- ry. Conduct intervention respondents attempt prompt “offer[ed] Their tisement that sion. action a you need win mitigates track record and resources rectify their flawed advertisement settlement,” message respondents’ severity somewhat the misconduct. unjustified expectation likely to create private satisfied that a We are therefore in ev- results could be obtained that similar reprimand appropriate in this case. is handle, they were hired to ery claim or case therefore, ordered, is, respon- It that the specific reference to factual without given repri- a private dents in this ease be particular legal claims circumstances set forth above. mand for the misconduct personal person A unfamiliar with or cases. against respon- Costs are assessed injury litigation might understand adver- dents. any that claim or ease promise tisement to by result in a respondents handled would settlement. We conclude that

favorable deceptive, misleading,

advertisement was of Prof. laudatory

self and thus violative 7.1(b).

Cond.R. Rule

Indiana Professional Conduct

7.1(d)(4)provides: not, himself, lawyer

A shall on behalf of BERRY, Defendant-Appellant, associate, any lawyer partner or or other firm, par- affiliated him or his use or any ticipate public in the use of form of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. STATE of communication which contains a statement opinion quality or of the services as No. 49S00-9612-CR-739. representation implication a or contains Supreme Court of Indiana. regarding quality legal services. “premier” By per- describing themselves Dec. area, injury sonal law firm their the re- spondents opinion as the quality offered an render, implying

of the services legal

their are better those services

provided practitioners. other area respondents’ advertisement con- implication regarding

tained at least an

quality legal violated services thus 7.1(d)(4).

Prof.Cond.R. advertisement,

Through respon- their sought

dents to attract clients with the lure unjustified expectations clearly unver- Ideally, attorney

ifiable statements. adver-

tising process of facilitates the informed se- lawyer by legal

lection of consumers of 7.1(a). See Prof.Cond.R.

services. Adver- misleading deceptive containing

tisements truly

assertions make informed im- selection

possible open overreaching the door

by lawyers. recog respondents

We note that the began

nized their errors and efforts to cor bring

rect the advertisement and it into

445 support judgment, weighing and without assessing credibility, evidence witness we that no conclude reasonable trier of fact could find the guilty beyond defendant reasonable doubt. Case v.

223, (Ind.1984); Loyd 226 272 Ind. 404, 407, 1260, (1980), 1264 cert. denied, 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 105. supporting judg

The evidence ment spent reveals that defendant evening of October with two other men, Ellis, Gregory Carlton Holcomb and visiting clubs driving various around. driving While near the Eagle Apart Terrace Complex, the defendant noticed Ed car, ward White’s a white Buick Park Avenue gold-colored rims. The defendant stat get ed that he wanted the rims from it. Ellis, time, driving who was stopped a corner to let out. the defendant A short later, try time Ellis and Holcomb decided to stop defendant. backed comer, around the saw a Holcomb flash and pulled up heard a shot. The then defendant them, driving behind White’s car. The three away, stopped briefly men drove at a hotel lot, parking and then drove to area where police eventually found the victim’s car. El helped lis strip and Holcomb the defendant Howe, rims, radio, Indianapolis, Howard for Defen- car three and the dant-Appellant. battery. placed The men then them in the driving. trunk of the car Ellis was Holcomb Modisett, Jeffrey General, Attorney A. that, away driving testified while from the Herriman, General, Deputy Attorney John B. car, victim’s the defendant admitted that “he Indianapolis, Plaintiff-Appellee. for up walked behind him and him.” Rec shot pathologist ord at A forensic testified DICKSON, Justice. that White’s was a gunshot death caused defendant-appellant, Berry, The was police The back the head. techni robbery convicted of murder and and sen- fingerprints cian recovered from several sixty years tenced consecutive terms for items found in the ear from the outside eight years robbery. the murder analyst fingerprint of the car. A identified The trial court also that these ordered sen- fingerprints on defendant’s the ear and run consecutive to a fingerprints also identified both Holcomb for an unrelated conviction Ellis either on car or on items found appeal, this direct the defendant claims with the ear. support that the evidence was insufficient offered alibi defendant an witness at his convictions and that the sentence consec- attempted to portray Ellis and Hol- utive to the unrelated conviction was error. perpetrators, explaining comb as the his own An appellate fingerprints by offering claim of insufficient evi on car the excuse if, prevail proba strip will considering helped dence that he later them the ear after tive evidence and reasonable inferences that the crime had been committed. He essen- evidence, further held reweigh the which We

tially asks us “whether terms of trial court determine appellate on review. undertake concurrently shall be served support evidence There sufficient consecutively,” granted in 35-50- Ind.Code the defendant commit- jury’s conclusion that l-2(a), general author was “restrictive. robbery. *3 ted the murder ity is limited to those occasions when next contends that The defendant of meting court is out two more terms authority impose the no to trial court had Kendrick, 529 at imprisonment.” N.E.2d consecutive to the sen in this case sentences Accord, State, Seay v. 550 N.E.2d 1312. separate, in a case. tence unrelated (Ind.1990). 1284, 1289 part: provides, in relevant applicable statute after the state of the law Ken- imprisonment may terms of “The court order Seay drick and was that consecutive sen- consecutively if sen even be served imposed only be under Ind.Code tence could imposed are at the same time.” not 35-50-l-2(a) § if the consecu- sentence was 35-50-l-2(c) (Supp.1996). § We IND.Code (i) imposed to another sentence tive portion noted of statute have that this (ii) by same time and the same court. contemporaneity “essentially overturned previous v. cases. Weaver requirement” 1994, the legislature In amended Ind.Code (Ind.1996). State, In may provide: § “The court or- 35-50-1-2 Weaver, imposed a the trial court sentence terms of to be served con- der that it consecutive and ordered be served not im- secutively even if the sentences are eases in imposed in unrelated tried sentences 1994 Ind. Acts. posed at the same time.” had different counties. Because the statute P.L. confronted this amendment 164 We effect, gone into court lacked yet not trial year last in Weaver v. 664 N.E.2d 1169 authority impose the consecutive sentence. (Ind.1996). There consecutive sentences had however, Here, Id. at 1170-71. the defen imposed in of Kendrick before been violation August after dant was sentenced on date of the 1994 amendment and effective statutory provision went into effect. found them invalid. the course of authority impose court therefore had result, trial enunciating “Although we said: consecutive the sentence this sentence essentially overturned the legislature though two sentences another case even requirement Seay contemporaneity contemporaneously imposed. not amendment, leg- Kendrick with the 1994 doing after islation so became effective The convictions and sentence of the defen- imposed. The ... Weaver’s sentence was affirmed. dant are scope statutory beyond acted of its Court Weaver, authority.” 664 N.E.2d at 1170-71 C.J., BOEHM, J., SHEPARD, concur. (footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied). SULLIVAN, J., dissents with language To indicates that me Weaver SELBY, J., opinion in concurs. which the 1994 amendment overturned the contem- i.e., SULLIVAN, Justice, poraneity requirement, the “same time” dissenting. Seay requirement, of Kendrick and but not The defendant here contends requirement. the “same court” Because the require had no court imposed to a sentence here was consecutive consecutively to that sentence here be served court, imposed by another I believe sentence I imposed another time beyond authority. its the trial court acted agree. background is order. In Ken Some SELBY, J., concurs in dissent. (Ind. drick 1988), courts, in the we held: “Trial absence express statutory authority, order i.e., sentences, the commence

consecutive cannot, of a in the absence authority, statutory postponed.”

express be

Case Details

Case Name: Berry v. State
Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 30, 1997
Citation: 689 N.E.2d 444
Docket Number: 49S00-9612-CR-739
Court Abbreviation: Ind.
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