15 Ga. 194 | Ga. | 1854
By the Court.
delivering tho opinion.
The defendant, therefore, ought not to have been allowed to introduce this proof. In not allowing him to do it, the Court, consequently, did right.
It is insisted for the plaintiff in error, that it was, and in this particular, viz: “ If Hardy’s title and possession were fraudulent, the possession so, fraudulently, held by him, could not be tacked to the years in which it was, bona fide, held by others, to make up the time of seven years in them, adverse to the true owner”. And it is insisted that the charge was erroneous in this particular, because there was nothing in evidence to justify any charge at all, upon the point to which this charge •is applicable, because there was no evidence going to show that Hardy’s possession was fraudulent”.
Is the plaintiff in error right, in respect to this matter of Tact? Was there really no such evidence?
Let us see. Hardy claimed under a deed from one “ Dionyssius J. C. Wright”, bearing date in 1840. In the signature to this deed, the middle initial letters, whatever they were, had boen erased, and the letters “ J. C.” written just above the place of erasure, with a caret underneath. This is a thing which would have been likely to occur, if the person who made the signature was not Dionyssius J. C. Wright, but was somebody personating him. It is not such.a thing as would have been likely to happen, if the person who made the signature was Wright himself. It is, in short, a thing from which the Jury might infer that the deed was made, not by Wright himself, but by some one personating him, and with a view to defraud him.
It is also a thing which the Jury might infer to have been done, at the time when the deed was executed; and therefore, done in the presence, and with the knowledge of Hardy.
There are other facts in the case, which the Jury might consider as showing that Hardy knew something about this deed
. These things being so, the plaintiff in error is not right, in respect to this matter of fact. From these things, the Jury might have inferred that Hardy’s possession was fraudulent.
It follows, that the charge of the Court complained of, was •called for by the facts of the case.
And if called for, it is not insisted that it was wrong. Not was it wrong, in the judgment of this Court.
The verdict does not appear, to this Court, to have been contrary to law or evidence.
The refusal of the Court to grant a new trial is, therefore, on the whole, affirmed.