185 Iowa 1121 | Iowa | 1919
III. The appeal finally resolves itself into passing upon a question of fact concerning which there w'as a substantial conflict in the evidencé. The question of fact is whether Berry waived what interest he may have had in certain lands. Appellant urges that the court erred in finding that Berry, appellee, did not waive his rights to the land in controversy, because plaintiff, on the 24th of February, 1915, did waive and abandon any interest he might have in Exhibit A, or any of the deals described in the evidence. As to whether or not he waived these rights or released them, the testimony is in sharp conflict. We allow something for the advantage the trial court had in seeing and hearing the witnesses. With that to start with, our reading of the record satisfies us there is no substantial reason for disagreeing with the conclusions of fact reached below. See Wilkie v. Sassen, 123 Iowa 421, and Pryne v. Pryne, 116 Iowa 82, 83. We think the relief granted is fairly within the petition; at least, within its prayer for general, equitable relief. See Searle v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 80 Iowa 307, 311; Hoskins v. Rowe, 61 Iowa 180; and Iler v. Griswold, 83 Iowa 442. It is a serious question whether those who have appealed have not lost all interest in the controversy, and whether they • are entitled to maintain this appeal. See Price v. Baldauf,
Our conclusion works an affirmance. — Affirmed.