Berry v. Dial Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Berry)Berry v. Dial Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Berry)
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cosetti
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOSEPH L. COSETTI, Bankruptcy Judge.FACTS
On May 30, 1980 the debtors filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On September 15, 1980 an Order granting the debtors a discharge was entered. On December 4, 1980 a discharge hearing, which debtors attended, was held pursuant to
ISSUES
Whether the Automatic Stay under
Does a second mortgage accumulating debts have the status of a mortgage or is it only a judicial lien, even though it was recorded as a mortgage?
Whether a debtor can file a Complaint to Determine Discharge after the Order of Discharge has been entered and the discharge hearing held?
DISCUSSION
When a petition is filed an automatic stay becomes effective which operates to enjoin, among other things:
“... (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6)any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.11 U.S.C. § 362(a) .
When the debtor filed his petition on May 30, 1980, this section operated to stay any action by the defendant.
Judge Washabaugh stated in
In re Bryne
that: “It is our view that the above provisions (
In attempting to interpret the provisions of
§ 362(c) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (d), (e) and (f) of this section—
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until the earliest of—
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; and
(C) if the case is a case under Chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case under Chapter 9, 11 or 13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied.
The legislative history to this section states that paragraph (1) “... terminates a stay of an act against property of the estate when the property ceases to be property of the estate, such as by sale, abandonment or exemption. It does not terminate the stay
“Congress made it clear that a termination of
The House Report explaining the content of
Subsection (c) ofSection 362 specifies the duration of the automatic stay. Paragraph (1) terminates a stay of an act against property of the estate when the property ceases to be property of the estate, such as by sale, abandonment, or exemption. It does not terminate the stay against property of the debtor if the property leaves the estate and goes to the debtor. Paragraph (2) terminates the stay of any other act on the earliest of the time the case is dismissed, or the time a discharge is granted or denied (unless the debtor is a corporation or a partnership in a chapter 7 case). H.R.Rep.No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 643 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 6299.
Termination of the protection given in
Paragraph (5) [of§ 362(a) ] stays any act to create or enforce a lien against property of the debtor, that is, most property that is acquired after the date of filing of the petition, property that is exempted, or property that does not pass to the estate, to the extent that the lien secures a prepetition claim. H.R.Rep.No.95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 341 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 6298.
“Unless earlier relief is requested by the creditor, the creditor may not repossess property, despite any abandonment by the trustee, until one of the three acts specified in
The procedure is clear: debtor files his bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 and the automatic stay comes into effect pursuant to
(a) Claim of Exemptions. A bankrupt shall claim his exemptions in the schedule of his property required to be filed by Rule 108.
(b) Trustee’s Report. The trustee shall examine the bankrupt’s claim for exemptions, set apart such as are lawfully claimed and allowable, and report to the court the items set apart, the amount or estimated value of each, and the exemptions claimed that are not allowable. The report shall be filed with the court no later than 15 days after the trustee qualifies. If the trustee reports that any exemption claimed is not allowable, he shall forthwith mail or deliver copies of the report to the bankrupt and his attorney.(c) Objections to Report. Any creditor or the bankrupt may file objections to the report within 15 days after its filing, unless further time is granted by the court within such 15-day period. Copies of the objections so filed shall be delivered or mailed to the trustee and, if the objections are by a creditor, to the bankrupt and his attorney. After hearing upon notice the court shall determine the issues presented by the objections. The burden of proof shall be on the objector.
* * * * * *
(e) Approval of Report if No Objections. If no objections are filed within the time provided by this rule, the report shall be deemed approved by the court. On request, the court may at any time and without reopening the case, enter an order approving the report.
1978 Bankruptcy Code — Comment
The report required by subdivision (b) is abolished.
No time for filing objections to the debt- or’s claim of exemptions is specified. Until a new rule is promulgated this matter must be covered by a local rule or order pursuant to the grant in Rule 927. Subdivision (e) has been restated as follows: “Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”
Therefore, if property is claimed as exempt initially it becomes property of the estate, but revests in the debtor upon failure by any party to object to the exemption within a specified period of time.
Bankruptcy Rule 404 states the procedure for granting or denying a discharge. It provides:
(a)Time for Filing Complaint Objecting to Discharge. The court shall make an order fixing a time for the filing of a complaint objecting to the bankrupt’s discharge under § 14c of the Act. The time shall be not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors, except that if notice of no dividend is given pursuant to Rule 203(b), the court may fix such time as early as the first date set for the first meeting of creditors.
(b) Notice. The court shall give at least 30 days’ notice of the time fixed for filing a complaint objecting to the bankrupt’s discharge under § 14c of the Act except that only 10 days’ notice is required if notice of no dividend is given under Rule 203(b). Such notice shall be given to all creditors in the manner provided in Rule 203, and to the trustee and his attorney, if any, to their respective addresses as filed with the court.
(c) Extension of Time. The court may for cause, on its own initiative or on application of any party in interest, extend the time for filing a complaint objecting to discharge.
(d) Grant of Discharge. On expiration of the time fixed for filing a complaint objecting to discharge, the court shall forthwith grant the discharge unless (1) a complaint objecting to the discharge has been filed, (2) the bankrupt has filed a waiver under Rule 405, (3) it appears that the bankrupt has failed to attend and submit himself to examination at the first meeting of creditors or at any meeting specially called for his examination, or (4) the prescribed filing fees have not been paid in full.
Local Rule 4004 in this district mandates that “within no more than 30 days after the entry of an order granting or denying a discharge ... the court shall hold a hearing provided in
On the issue of whether the mortgage held by Dial is valid, we hold that it is.
The law in Pennsylvania is clear that absent fraud or duress, a person who signs the agreement is bound by it. Estate of Brant, 463 Pa. 230, 344 A.2d 806 (1975); Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. McCaffrey, supra. The plaintiffs did not present testimony showing fraud or duress. They may not have understood or read the document which they signed, but they are bound by it and cannot ask to be relieved of liability because of their own neglect.
CONCLUSION
The automatic stay remains in effect as to property of the estate until such property is sold, abandoned, or exempted.