*1 order in which establish the various questions should be considered and deter-
mined. forced on sum- Shook’s dismissal
mary judgment more will do little than com-
plicate procedurally action class remaining
cause class members to sustain expenses. encourage added also case-by-case assertion of additional offset strategy delay motions as a tactical progress defeat in the class action. Since the trial court can address offset issues in indi- vidual cases after the merits of the AWHA determined,
class action are I find no error.
Accordingly, I dissent. BERRY, Appellant,
Lora M. BERRY, Appellee. No. S-8258. Supreme Court of Alaska.
April
OPINION
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION Berry
Lora claims she have been of her ex-husband’s retire- awarded more mortgage and ment to repair payments she on the marital made parties separated. Because home after the findings on court made no pay- for a those credit for ments, does and because evidence permit as a of law that us to hold matter Lora is entitled to reverse the findings. But we affirm the and remand for (1) require court’s decisions not to Berry carry Lora on his survivor Samuel (2) expense, require benefit at his couple’s bear' half the tax debt they years separated. the seven before II. AND PROCEEDINGS FACTS Berry in and Lora married Geor-
Samuel Army gia joined in March 1973. Samuel May and retired in December 1993. agree they apart Samuel and Lora lived They for much career. of Samuel’s moved to Alaska but Samuel variety aat of locations thereafter stationed elsewhere, in Alaska while remained family ap- home. lived pears to have visited Alaska and Lora only about fifteen weeks total between parties sepa- when December rated. November 1994 filed for In divorce in Alaska. Their children were divorce entered adults when their decree was in 1997. hearing court held a in Janu-
ary date-of-separation and 1997 to resolve property-division issues. conclud- The court ed that the ended as a enter- prise in re- December when Samuel Pharr, C. Law Offices John C. John turned to Lora the Colorado. awarded Pharr, Anchorage, Appellant. equity associ- and debt ated with it. It also Lora her Indi- awarded Eschbacher, Law Office of G.R. Eseh- G.R. Account, profit vidual Retirement shar- bacher, Appellee. Anchorage, for debt,
ing plan parties’ and associated MATTHEWS, Justice, vehicles, percent Before: Chief COMPTON, EASTAUGH, FABE, gross military effective De- BRYNER, the mili- Justices. cember when he retired from tary only clearly supe- service. The court awarded Samuel versed erroneous.5 The seventy-five gross military equitable of his re- rior allocation of require him pay, tirement and did not “is reviewable under the abuse of discretion carry plan. standard, Lora on the survivor benefit and we will not disturb the trial split equally court also ordered the clearly court’s allocation ‘unless it un- *3 ”6 just.’ tax their tax refunds and debts from 1987 to Finally, parties 1993. the court ordered the We review for abuse of discretion a fees, their own costs and but ordered court’s decision whether to $1,102 Lora to for costs and fees spouse credit to a for made to paternity testing associated with for a child maintain property, family such as the 1994; previous- born to Lora the court had home.7 Whether it was error not to make ly found that the child was not Samuel’s. particular on disputes legal is a reconsideration, challeng- Lora moved for question which we review de novo.8 ing the court’s treatment of retire- Samuel’s pay, ment for a credit for her B. Posiy-Separation Mortgage and post-separation mortgage payments and Home-Repair Payments and Samu- repair expenses, the survivor benefit Military Pay el’s Retirement plan,' tax debt. The court denied the Finding that Samuel’s motion. $200,000 present had a net value of at the trial, time appeals. concluding of and that all of property,
retirement benefit was marital
seventy-five percent
court awarded
III. DISCUSSION
of the retirement benefit
to Samuel and
A.
Review
Standards of
so,
twenty-five percent
doing
to Lora. In
admirably
court came
achieving
close to
court has broad discre
equal division of marital
dividing
assets:
it awarded
property
tion when
in a divorce act
$150,000
Samuel marital
property
ion.1
worth
commingled
When the
(consisting exclusively
duration,
of
share
long
in a
their assets
of
benefit)
“(1)
and it
mar-
property
steps:
of
awarded Lora
division consists
three
$150,703.
property
ital
worth
determining
property
what
The marital
is available for
(2)
distribution;
property awarded to Lora included the house
placing
prop
on that
value
(valued
(3)
erty;
at the difference
allocating
property
between its market
equitab
owing
value at time of trial and the
ly.”2
debt then
it), twenty-five
on
percent of Samuel’s retire-
We review a trial court’s determi
benefit,
ment
and other items.
property
of
nation
available
division
that it was error to award her
for abuse
of discretion.3 If the
fifty percent
less than
of Samuel’s retire-
any legal
court reaches
conclusions while de
$58,000
ment. She reasons that she
available,
termining
which
is
$8,000
mortgages
for home
review those conclusions de novo.4
parties separated
between the time the
trial,
The valuation of available
is
the’time of
and that those
a factual determination
twenty-five
that should be re-
exceeded the
value of her
Cox,
25.24.160(a)(4);
1. See AS
Cox v.
882 P.2d
5. See id. at 913-14.
909,
(Alaska 1994).
913
(quoting Moffitt,
4. See
9.
It is
property subject
can be
marital
considered
equitable
divorce
division in
settlements.
Chase,
944,
(Alaska 1983);
Chase v.
662 P.2d
946
Brotherton,
Compare
14.
Brotherton v.
941 P.2d
(upholding
also
P.2d at 370
award
see
815
1997)
(Alaska
(remanding for consid-
1246
wife of
one-half of nineteen-twentieths of hus-
"preservation
husband’s
eration of former
par-
band's
because the
by
debt
marital estate
reduction of the marital
were married
about nineteen of hus-
ties
Cox,
income”),
882
post-separation
with
service).
twenty years
band’s
(noting
findings on
P.2d at
absence of
919-20
post-separation
ex-
whether
of marital
Brown,
(Alas-
v.
10. See Brown
914 P.2d
209
distribution,
penses
change property
1996); Wanberg,
at
574-75.
ka
findings),
remanding
v.
for such
with Harrelson
Harrelson,
P.2d
& n. 7
Brown,
1997)
But there are
reasons
the court
appeal
He
may
oppose
on
that he does not
requested
have denied the
credit for the
awarding
plan,
Lora an interest
in the
mortgage payments.
example, might
as
For
it
long
as her interest is limited to
have
that
mortgage payments
found
Lora’s
pays
and she
roughly equaled
it.
the benefit she received
living
from
in a three-bedroom home.
hearing,
At
the
court an-
Further,
“[ujnder
some of Lora and Samuel’s testi-
nounced that
the circumstances es-
mony
imply
proceeds
seems to
that
from a
survivorship
tablished
this case no
benefit
mortgage
loan were used to
for the
awarded
should be
to the defendant.” This
so,
remodeling.
If
ruling implicitly
the court
have decid-
declined to make Samuel
inequitable
ed that it would be
carrying
to reimburse
bear the cost of
Lora on the surviv-
("[T]he
explicit
sufficiently
separate increased the cou- Samuel that she was entitled to a credit claim liability ple’s tax wasted marital assets. post-separation mortgage origi- repair payments, and RE- had REVERSE returns, nally proceedings. MAND further leave it decided file that he forms, sent Lora his W-2 and that failed to the court to she discretion to file on time. He maintains that learned decide to make on the he whether those August permit had not 1993 that Lora filed basis of the evidence before it or to the. AF- returns and that he owed the submission of additional evidence. We IRS (Alaska 1997). P.2d 16. 942 id. at 1140-41. rulings authority
FIRM as to the on the survivor recapture bene- had the previously dissipated assets. Because of this incor fit and tax debt. conclusion,
rect we reverse the court’s property division and remand the issue to MATTHEWS, Justice, concurring. Chief allow the opportunity trial recapture any dissipated assets and then fully agree majority opin- I While with appropriate determine the prop division of ion, separately I write to make one additional factors.[1] erty using the Merrill doing In observation. so, the court should take care that it does count, is, not double recapture dissi recognizing pated preferential assets and make a separate property made from her award to Patricia because assets have been preserve separation after house but dissipated. unequal before the divorce would result in an This, property. argues, division of he Expenditures separate proper- made from equal run counter to the ty preserve rule property are the oth- er They side of the property “waste” coin. can presumptively is fair. I be believe recognized by making deductions from the argument fundamentally this flawed. party award to the expendi- who made the equal The rule that an division of assets of adjustment tures. The regarded can be as is fair is more representing property what the on which the money complicated adjust- spent than it sounds. would be worth if Often the ex- value, penditures had not been made. Once this ments to must be made before the rule adjustment made, is property all the marital applied. can examples Obvious are that can be divided. And the division is gross value of must be reduced adjustment made, after the the rule of debt, involving period- for secured and assets presumptive fairness will be satisfied. present ic must be reduced to val- ue. reason, For giving recognition expenditures need not violate the When marital is wasted one equal division rule. party separation divorce, after but before “recaptured” by giving can be it a *7 pre-waste crediting value and that value to wasting party. award to the Once this
adjustment made, the whole of the marital property can be divided accordance with See Hartland v. Hart principles.
the usual land, (Alaska 1989): sought
The trial dissipated Patricia for the giving assets larger percentage her a remaining marital estate because it did not believe it Merrill, 1. Merrill v.
