Appellant Michael Berrien challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Marcus Collins. We affirm.
1. According to the factual basis presented by the State during the plea hearing, on January 26, 2012, Appellant had Vanessa Marrero purchase a .380 caliber handgun for him. On the night of February 13-14, Appellant was driving around Douglas, Georgia, with Jacob Cornett and Brandon Williams, looking for marijuana. Appellant asked Collins, who was riding his bicycle, about buying some marijuana, and Collins told Appellant to go to a park and wait. Collins retrieved the marijuana from his supplier and brought it to the park to Appellant, who took the drugs and got back into the car with Cornett and Williams without paying. Appellant then pulled out the gun and shot at Collins several times from inside the car. Collins was struck three times and died from his wounds.
Appellant was later arrested and made statements that led the police to Cornett and Williams, who said that they were in the car with Appellant when he shot Collins. In a monitored telephone call from jail, Appellant asked his father in coded language to hide the gun that he used to shoot Collins, and his father hid the gun in a neighboring county. Appellant’s father later led the police to the gun — a Hi-Point .380 caliber handgun — which ballistics testing matched to the three bullets recovered from Collins’s body. Marrero, Cornett, and Williams all agreed to testify for the State against Appellant.
On April 25,2012, a Coffee County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated assault, use of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant’s trial began on September 2, 2014, and a jury was selected to try the case. Appellant was represented by J. Clayton Culp, a very experienced criminal defense lawyer who had been the circuit public defender for more than a decade. On the morning of September 3, Appellant met with his mother and Culp to discuss the possibility of entering a negotiated guilty plea, and before the jury was brought out for opening statements, the parties announced that they had reached an agreement.
With the jury still waiting in the jury room, the trial court conducted a plea hearing, at which Appellant entered a guilty plea to felony murder pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,
The court found that Appellant entered his plea freely and voluntarily and that there was a factual basis for the plea. After pronouncing a sentence of life in prison with the
Six days later, on September 9, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which he amended with new counsel on September 21, 2015, raising the two claims discussed below. On October 8, 2015, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Appellant, his mother, and Culp testified, and Appellant’s plea form and a transcript of the plea hearing were admitted into evidence. On October 28, 2015, the court entered an order denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
On December 3, 2015, Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. On December 21, 2015, he filed a motion for out-of-time appeal to which the State consented. On January 4, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting Appellant’s motion for an out-of-time appeal, and the trial court clerk then transmitted the record to this Court.
2. Appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea. To prevail on this claim, he must show that his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that, but for the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Lafler v. Cooper,
Appellant asserts that Culp failed to adequately investigate the case and prepare for trial and told him to enter a guilty plea to delay the trial with the false assurance that he could withdraw the plea a week later, and that he would not have entered his Alford plea otherwise. However, before denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Appellant, his mother, and Culp testified. The court was entitled to disbelieve the testimony of Appellant and his mother and to credit instead Culp’s testimony regarding his substantial investigative efforts and readiness for trial and his flat denial that he told Appellant to enter the Alford plea for purposes of delay or that Appellant could withdraw the plea a week later. Culp explained that the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was overwhelming and that Culp was unable to substantiate Appellant’s continually changing stories about who else supposedly shot the victim, so no strong defense was available.
3. Appellant also contends that he should have been allowed to withdraw his
To the contrary, the scenario that Appellant describes is the very situation that the United States Supreme Court confronted in Alford, where the defendant had entered a guilty plea to second-degree murder but “accompanied [his plea] with the statement that he had not shot the victim.” Alford,
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.
Id. at 37. See also id. at 36 (“[T]he Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.”). Appellant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See McGuyton,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Under Alford, “[a]n individual accused of [a] crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understanding^ consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”
We have held that “the grant of an out-of-time appeal is the functional equivalent of the entry of a judgment,” Fairclough v. State,
According to Culp, Appellant’s final version just before trial was that he was with Cornett and Williams before the shooting and gave them the gun without knowing what they were planning to do with it; they dropped him off somewhere with no witnesses; and they came back and picked him up after the shooting and returned the gun to him, which he then gave to his father.