George G. Bernzen, Amy Brown, Diane Schechter, and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. The City of Boulder, a municipal corporation organized under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Colorado; Penfield W. Tate, II, Timothy Fuller, Ruth Correll, Janet Roberts, Karen Paget, Kenneth Wright, Walter Slack, Frank Buchanan, Robert Trenka, constituting the duly elected and acting Council of the City of Boulder; Carl Chapel, City Clerk v. Chester V. Wells, Zenon J. Raczkowski and B. J. Perrin
No. 26505
Supreme Court of Colorado
August 12, 1974
525 P.2d 416
Christopher R. Brauchli, for defendants-appellants Tate and Fuller, on the issue of succession only.
Walter L. Wagenhals, City Attorney, Ronald B. Porter, Deрuty, for defendants-appellants City of Boulder, Colorado, and Carl Chapel, City Clerk.
Dosh, DeMoulin, Anderson and Campbell, Edward H. Haffey, for intervenors-appellants.
Jeremy Shamos, for amici curiae The Center for Law and Research and American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado.
En Banc.
MR. JUSTICE KELLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal challenges the judgment of the Boulder County District Court which permanently enjoined an election for the recall of two city councilmen, Penfield Tate and Timothy Fuller, because of the insufficiency of the petitions for recall certified by the City Clerk of Boulder on May 2, 1974. The judgment also held, in the event an election werе to be held, that both councilmen could run as candidates to succeed themselves in the same election in the event they were recalled.
Thus, two issues arise out of the controversy: 1. Whether the petitions for recall are sufficient under the Boulder Charter and the constitution of the State of Colorado to require the holding of a recall election; and 2. In the event an election is held, whether Tate‘s and Fuller‘s names should be allowed on the ballot as candidates for election and be permitted to succeed themselves in the event they (or either of them) should be recalled. We answеr the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.
The plaintiff Bernzen is a duly registered voter in the city of Boulder and is a member of a class of persons who voted for the election of Councilmen Tate and Fuller in the November, 1971, municipal election.
The plaintiffs Brown and Schechter аre also registered electors of the city of Boulder and are students at the University of Colorado, who alleged that they planned to be gone from Boulder for the proposed recall election. They claimed to be members of a large class of persons similarly situated. Because оf the delay resulting from this appeal, the issue raised by Brown and Schechter appears to have become moot insofar as the present recall election is concerned.
The defendants Correll, Roberts, Paget, Wright, Slack, Buchanan and Trenka, at all times pertinent to the litigation, were duly elected city council members, serving with Tate and Fuller, and were responsible for implementing the charter provisions in reference to the recall. Additionally, Chester V. Wells, Zenon J. Raczkowski, and B. J. Perrin appear here as intervenors-appellants and argue that the petitions are sufficient and that the recall election be held forthwith.
The action was filed on May 3, 1974, the day after the city clerk certified to the city council that the two petitions for recall met the charter requirements in all respects. Boulder is a home rule city under
I.
The first issue -- the sufficiency of the petitions -- involves the applicability to home rule cities of the limitation on judicial review contained in
“... such petition shall contain a general statement, in not more than two hundred words, of the ground or grounds on which such recall is sought, which statement is intended for the information of the electors, and the electors shall be thе sole and exclusive judges of the legality, reasonableness and sufficiency of such ground or grounds assigned for such recall, and said ground or grounds shall not be open to review.” (Emphasis added.)
“The finding as to the sufficiency of any petition may be reviewed by any state court of general jurisdiction in the county in which such petition is filеd, ... The sufficiency, or the determination of the sufficiency, of the petition referred to in this section shall not be held, or construed, to refer to the ground or grounds assigned in such petition for the recall of the incumbent sought to be recalled from office thereby.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 56 of the Boulder City Charter provides thаt a petition for recall shall contain “a substantial statement of grounds upon which the removal is sought.” However, the charter is silent as to whether one may obtain judicial review of the sufficiency of the grounds set out in the petition.
The limitation on judicial review of the grounds for recall set out above mаkes it clear that the recall intended by the framers of the Colorado Constitution is purely political in nature. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court said in Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okla. 619, 143 P. 331 (1914):
“We understand that the principle underlying the recall of public officers means that the people may have an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving satisfaction -- one who they do not want to continue in office, regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates.
If the policies pursued do not meet the approval of a majority of the people, it is the underlying рrinciple of the recall doctrine to permit them to expeditiously recall the official, without form or ceremony, except as provided for in the charter.” 143 P. 331, 333.
Thus, Colorado is not a state in which official misconduct is necessarily required as a ground for recall. Rather, the dissatisfaction, whatеver the reason, of the electorate is sufficient to set the recall procedures in motion. See Batchelor v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 81 Nev. 629, 408 P.2d 239 (1965); Wallace v. Tripp, 358 Mich. 668, 101 N.W.2d 312 (1960); State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 143 N.W. 796 (1913); but see Taines v. Galvin, 279 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1973); Richard v. Tomlinson, 49 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1951). The framers, by requiring that a recall petition contain the signatures of at least 25% of all votes cast in the last election for all candidates for the position which the person sought to be rеcalled occupies, assured that a recall election will not be held in response to the wishes of a small and unrepresentative minority. However, once at least 25% of the electorate have expressed their dissatisfaction, the constitution reserves the recall power to the will of the electorate. Courts of law are not to intercede into the reasons expressed by the majority.
Our disagreement with the trial court stems from a basic difference in concept and interpretation of the constitu-tional provisions relating to recall. We view recall, as well as the initiative and referendum, as fundamental rights of a republican form of government which the people have reserved unto themselves. As stated in Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 450 P.2d 653 (1969) at 268:
“Such a reservation of power in the people must be liberally construed in favor of the right of the people to exercise it. Conversely, limitations on the рower of referendum must be strictly construed.”
See Burks v. City of Lafayette, 142 Colo. 61, 349 P.2d 692 (1960); Brownlow v. Wunsch, 103 Colo. 120, 83 P.2d 775 (1938). We have also held that where the constitution protects certain fundamental values, neither the legislature nor a home rule city has the power to act to infringe upon such values. Burks v. City of Lafayette, supra; In re Kindergarten Schools, 18 Colo. 234, 32 P. 422 (1893).
We are not unaware that
“The recall may also be exercised by the electors of each ... city and town of the state, with reference to the elective officers thereof, under such procedure as shall be provided by law.
“Until otherwise provided by law, the legislative body of any such county, city and county, city and town may provide for the manner of exercising such recall powers in such counties, cities and counties, cities and towns, but shall not require any such recall to be signed by electors more in number than twenty-five per centum of the entire vote cast at the last preceding election, as in section 1 hereof more particularly
set forth, for аll the candidates for office which the incumbent sought to be recalled occupies, as hereinabove defined.
“Every person having authority to exercise or exercising any public or governmental
duty, power or function, shall be an elective officer, or one appointed, drawn or designated in accordance with law by an elective officer or officers, or by some board, commission, person or persons legally appointed by an elective officer or officers, each of which said elective officers shall be subject to the recall provision of this cоnstitution; ... ....
“This article is self-executing, but legislation may be enacted to facilitate its operations, but in no way limiting or restricting the provisions of this article, or the powers herein reserved.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we must look to the substantive provisions of
First, as to the sufficiency of the statement of the grounds for recall, the trial court erred in holding that the following statement was not sufficient:
“Councilman [Fuller‘s and Tate‘s names mentioned respectively] does not properly reflect the wishes of the majority of the citizenry of the city of Boulder, he is unresponsive to those wishes and therefore, does not represent his constituency.”
As set out above,
II.
Similarly, as to whether Fuller and Tate may be candidates to succeed themselves in the event that they are recalled, we hold that the substantive provisions of the state constitution must control.
“... The name of the person against whom the petition is filed shall not appear on the bаllot as a candidate for the office.”
We view this as a substantive element of the recall process. To allow one who has been recalled to run in an election to succeed himself, where it would be possible to be elected by a plurality of the vote cast, would frustrate the will of the mаjority who had successfully invoked the recall election. See Recall Bennett Committee v. Bennett, 196 Ore. 299, 249 P.2d 479 (1952). Home rule cities may provide for an election system in which candidates may be elected by a plurality vote. They may not, however, make it possible to frustrate the will of the majority by allowing a recalled officer to succeеd himself.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions for the city council to schedule the recall election in accordance with the provisions of the Boulder City Charter.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE DAY concur in result only as to Part I and dissent as to Part II.
MR. JUSTICE GROVES does not participate.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE concurring in the result of Part I of the opinion аnd dissenting on Part 2 of the opinion:
I concur in the result of Part 1 of this opinion and would order the election held because it is my view that the Boulder Charter and the Constitution of the State of Colorado, with respect to the issues raised on this point, in no way conflict with each other.
Insofar as the majority opinion forbids the present incumbents from having their names placed on the ballot to succeed themselves in the event they are recalled, I respectfully dissent. It is clear that the framers of the Boulder Charter followed the provisions оf the Colorado Constitution dealing with recall word for word until they came to that portion of
“... The name of the person against whom the petition is filed shall not appear on the ballot as a candidate for the office.”
They deliberately excluded that phrase in their recall provisions. Latеr in the Charter when they were dealing with the question of what should happen to one who was recalled from office, they provided only that he may not be “appointed” to any office within one year of his removal.
It is clear to me that the framers of the Boulder Charter specifically meant to permit the incumbent to run for election to succeed himself. Where there is a difference between the provisions of
I think the opinion of Chief Justice Weintraub in Grubb v. Wyckoff, 52 N.J. 599, 247 A.2d 481 (1968) and the reasoning therein contained is cogent and I would adopt it here.
MR. JUSTICE DAY authorizes me to say that he joins in these views.