139 So. 629 | La. | 1932
Lead Opinion
The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company issued a policy for $2,000.00 on the life *1080 of Ferdinand H. Bernier on the 25th of January, 1929; his wife being the beneficiary. He was killed by the falling of an airplane in which he was riding, on the 5th of April, 1930. The policy contained the following stipulation: "It is hereby understood and agreed, in the event of the death of the insured arising, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, from engaging in aerial navigation, except while riding as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed commercial air craft provided by an incorporated common carrier for passenger service, and while such air craft is operated by a licensed transport pilot and is flying in a regular civil airway between definitely established air ports, the only liability under this policy shall be for a sum equal to the premiums paid thereon, and the policy shall thereupon be terminated."
The airplane in which the insured met his death was not a licensed commercial air craft; it was not provided by an incorporated common carrier for passenger service, was not operated by a licensed transport pilot, and was not flying in a civil airway between definitely established airports.
The insurance company therefore refused to pay the widow the $2,000 but offered her $94, being the amount of the premiums that had been paid on the policy. She sued for the $2,000, basing her claim upon the fact that the death of her husband occurred after the policy had become incontestable by the following clause in the policy, viz.: "This Policy and the application therefor constitute the entire contract between the parties, and the contract shall be incontestable after it shall have been in force, during the lifetime of the Insured, for one year from the date of the Policy, except for non-payment of premium or for violation of the conditions of the Policy relating to military or naval service in time of war." *1081
The civil district court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and it was affirmed by the court of appeal.
The insurance company cites and relies upon the case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway, Superintendent of Insurance,
We regard the decision cited, therefore, as authority for the proposition merely that a life insurance company may, without doing violence to a provision making the policy incontestable after a stated period, except from the so-called coverage, or risk assumed, any cause of death that the company sees fit to except, provided, of course, that the exception shall be expressed so plainly in the policy as to leave no reasonable doubt that the exception is to remain after the policy shall have become otherwise incontestable. No better illustration of such anexception could be given than the exception "for violation of the conditions of the policy relating to military or naval service in time of war." Other exceptions that were made in years gone by, and approved by the courts, were death by suicide, if plainly stipulated; death resulting from a violation of law by the insured; death while engaged in a specified hazardous occupation or undertaking; death occurring while the insured is beyond certain prescribed limits of residence or travel; or death resulting from a quarrel or duel. All of these exceptions from the risk assumed are, like the exception of death from engaging in military or naval service, or death from engaging in aerial navigation, exceptions relating to a hazardous occupation, undertaking, or situation, of the insured at the time of his death.
By the terms of the policy on which this suit is founded, the insurance company would have been bound to pay to the beneficiary the amount stated on the face of the policy if the death of the insured, arising "from engaging in aerial navigation," had occurred before the policy became incontestable; except that, on proof of death by that *1083
means, the company would have been free from liability (except for a return of the premiums paid) if the insured was not a farepaying passenger at the time he was killed, or if the air craft was not provided by an incorporated common carrier, or was not used for passenger service, or not operated by a licensed transport pilot, or not flying in a regular civil airway, or between definitely established air ports, on the fatal occasion. But after the policy had been in force for a year, the premiums having been paid, the obligation to pay the amount stated on the face of the policy on due proof of the death of the insured was incontestable, except for violation of the conditions relating to military or naval service in time of war. These conditions were not warranties or mere conditions the violation of which would render the policy void. The conditions relating to military or naval service in time of war, stated substantially, were that if within five years from the date of the policy the insured should engage in military or naval service in time of war the liability of the company, in the event of the death of the insured while so engaged, or as a result thereof within six months thereafter but within the period of the war, would be limited to any outstanding dividend additions, etc. These conditions, relating to military or naval service in time of war, constituted a limitation of the so-called coverage or risk assumed, as plainly as did the conditions on which alone the insured could engage in aerial navigation, without affecting the obligation of the insurer, constitute a limitation of the coverage or risk assumed by the insurer; and yet it was deemed necessary to except the conditions relating to military or naval service in time of war from the provision making the policy incontestable after one year, in order that the obligation of the insurer to pay the amount stated on the face of the policy might remain contestable after *1084
the expiration of the year, on the ground of violation of the conditions relating to military or naval service in time of war. Our opinion therefore is that, inasmuch as only the one exception was made in the provision making the policy incontestable after having been in force for a year, the intention, at least of the insured, was that there should be no other exception. If the insurance company intended to except also, from the incontestability clause, a violation of the conditions relating to aerial navigation, that exception, like the exception of violation of the conditions relating to military or naval service in time of war, should have been expressed. Article
Our conclusion therefore is that the civil district court and the Court of Appeal were right in maintaining that the policy on which this suit is founded, having been in force over a year during the lifetime of the insured, was not contestable on the ground of violation of the conditions relating to aerial navigation.
We could not decide otherwise without going against the ruling in Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson (National Life Insurance Co. v. Miller),
"When a clause makes a policy indisputable after one or two years, the mere evocation of a possible motive for self-slaughter is at least not more objectionable than the creation of a possible motive for murder. The object of the clause is plain and laudable — to create an absolute assurance of the benefit, as free as may be from any dispute of fact except the fact of death, and as soon as it reasonably can be done. * * *
"We are of opinion that the provision in the first mentioned document avoiding the policy if the insured should die by his own hand within two years from the date is an inverted expression of the same general intent as that of the clause in the second making the policy incontestable after one year, and that both equally mean that suicide of the insured, insane or sane, after the specified time shall not be a defense. It seems to us that that would be the natural interpretation of the words by the people to whom they are addressed, and that the language of each policy makes the company issuing it liable in the event that happened. We answer the first question in each certificate, yes. The other questions are disposed of by our answer to the first."
A denial of liability for the amount stated on the face of a life insurance policy, on the ground of suicide, is a denial of coverage, a denial that the company insured against the risk of death by that means; but that defense is barred by the provision making the contract incontestable after a stated period, unless that defense is plainly excepted from the provision making the policy incontestable after the period stated. The provision in a life insurance policy, making the *1087 contract incontestable after a stated period, means something more than that the insurer cannot then contest the validity of the policy on the ground of breach of a condition; it means that the company cannot then contest its obligation to pay, on due proof of the death of the insured, the amount stated on the face of the policy, except for a cause of defense that is plainly excepted from the provision making the policy incontestable.
The decisions that were cited in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway, Superintendent, are not at all appropriate to the case before us. They are Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. (C.C.A.)
Counsel for the insurance company refer us to two decisions in which the Conway Case is cited with approval, viz.: Jolley v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co.,
In a suit on a life insurance policy, the question whether the defense set up by the insurance company is barred by the incontestability clause in the policy does not depend upon whether the company pleads a breach of a condition or pleads that the cause of death was excepted from the risk insured against; but it depends upon whether all that is said in the policy leaves no reasonable doubt that the defense set up by the company is not barred by the incontestability clause. In the case before us, considering that the incontestability clause makes but one exception, of a cause or circumstance of death for which the policy should remain contestable after one year, the natural and plausible inference is that the policy became incontestable for any other cause or circumstance of death at the end of the year. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Vice versa, the exclusion from the effect of the incontestability clause of only the one cause or circumstance of death, death while engaged in military or naval service or within six months thereafter but during the period of the war, was the inclusion of death "from engaging in aerial navigation" under any or all conditions.
The decision rendered in the present case is said to be supported by Brady v. Fidelity *1093 Mutual Life Association, 13 Orl. App. 35, where it was held that the incontestability clause in the policy forbade the insurance company to plead that the insured had violated the condition that he should not reside or travel south of the Tropic of Cancer. In that case, however, the death of the insured occurred long after his return north of the tropic, and was not even remotely caused by his violation of the condition of the policy.
The defense urged by the insurance company in the present case is not any more a denial of coverage than it is a plea of breach of the conditions of the policy relating to aerial navigation. In that respect, our decision is in accord with the ruling made by the Court of Appeals of New York in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway, Superintendent.
The judgment is affirmed.
OVERTON, J., dissents, and indicates reasons.
ODOM, J., dissents.
Dissenting Opinion
There was no coverage by the policy for the amount sued for, but only for an amount equal to the premiums paid, and, by no process of reasoning, should the incontestability clause be given the effect of increasing that amount to the full amount of the policy, payable where death occurs, say, in the ordinary course of things. It would be otherwise if the limitation were only for a fixed period, which had elapsed when death occurred, but this, I think, is not the case. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway,
*1094ST. PAUL, J., concurs in the above.