— This is an appeal by plaintiff wife from that portion of a decree of divorce pertaining to the division of the community property of the parties. We are not concerned with the provisions of the decree granting her a divorce, placing the younger daughter of the parties, who was eight years of age at the time of trial, in her mother’s custody, and providing for certain support and visitation by the husband.
The parties were married September 12, 1931. They had two children, both girls. The older one was eighteen years of age at the time of trial and was not mentioned in the decree.
Mrs. Bernier contends that it was error to award the home of the parties to them as tenants in common, as the court did in the following language in its decree:
“That the plaintiff and the defendant be, and they hereby are, awardеd, as tenants in common, the real property more particularly described as follows: [description]; together with the home situatе thereon, with the proviso, however, that the plaintiff is hereby awarded the sole and exclusive right of possession of said real prоperty during the lifetime of the minor child of the parties hereto, Michele Bernier, or until said child shall reach the age of 16 years, or until said child shall become emancipated or self-supporting, or until the plaintiff, Dorothy Bernier, shall remarry, whichever shall occur the earliest, at which time plaintiff’s sole and exclusive right of possession shall automatically cease and terminate without further actiоn of this court and both parties shall at the time of the occurrence of the earliest contingency hereinbefore referrеd to, have the full rights granted to a tenant in common under the laws of the State of Washington. ...”
The decree also contained provisiоns to insure the right of possession to the wife, and provided that she might rent the property, with consent of the husband, and account for the rentals, and also specified that expenses for taxes, assess *449 ments, and insurance upon the property be equally divided betweеn the parties.
Decision of this issue is governed by the rule found in
Shaffer v. Shaffer,
43 Wn. (2d) 629, 630,
The decree in the case at bar does not meet this requirement. It does not determine definitely and finally the respеctive interests of these parties in the real estate in question. They are left, as were the parties in the Shaffer case, with a prosрect of future litigation, including a partition action, upon the ultimate occurrence of certain events mentioned in the questioned paragraph of the decree.
The husband contends that there have been cases in which this court has approved аn award of property to the parties to a divorce action as tenants in common, of which
High v. High,
41 Wn. (2d) 811,
• • In addition to their home, the parties owned a meat market and grocery- store, household goods and furnishings, an automobile, and certain cash and insurance policies, all of which was community property. Some of it was subject -to heavy indebtedness. Shortly before the complaint was filed in this action, the parties entered into a property sеttlement agreement purporting to establish their future rights and obligations. The husband raised the issue of the fairness of the agreement by his answer, in which he prayed that it not be confirmed. The trial court did not divide the property upon the agreed terms. The wife now contends that •the аgreement was binding upon the court, in the absence of fraud, duress, or other equitable considerations, and that its failure to approve and confirm the agreement was error.
While a property settlement agreement, fairly reached, should have great weight with the court in determining the property rights of the parties to a divorce action, it is not binding upon the court. The rule is well stated in
Lee v. Lee,
27 Wn. (2d) 389, 400,
“As a general rule, voluntary settlements of property rights are binding on the parties and will be upheld if they are fair and equitable, untainted with fraud, collusion, сoercion, undue influence, or the like, although, in subsequent actions for divorce, such settlements or agreements are not binding on the court and may be disregarded if the court is satisfied that they are unfair, unjust, or do not constitute a proper division of the property. Tausick v. Tausick,52 Wash. 301 ,100 Pac. 757 ; Malan v. Malan,148 Wash. 537 ,269 Pac. 836 ; State ex rel. Atkins v. Superior Court, 1 Wn. (2d) 677,97 P. (2d) 139 ; 27 C. J. S. 1157, Divorce, § 301.”
The trial court did not find the value of any of the items of property. It ordered that the businesses could be sold by defendant, in which event the proceeds after payment of debts were to be divided equally between the parties. *451 Counsel stated in oral argument that one of the stоres had been sold since the decree was entered, upon terms which apparently were agreeable to both partiеs.
Considering the evidence and circumstances in this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to аpprove and confirm the property settlement agreement as a fair disposition of the rights of the parties.
In the absence of findings of the value of any of the property, we cannot make a fair and equitable division of the home. The portions of the decree affecting property other than the home will not be disturbed, but may be considered by the court, together with the other factоrs specified in the cited statute, in its determination of the proper ultimate division of the home property.
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court for a new trial upon this issue.
Grady, C. J., Mallery, Hamley, and Finley, JJ., concur.