163 Mo. 584 | Mo. | 1901
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Buchanan Circuit Court, in favor of the respondent against the appellants Kate M. Tootle, William, W. Wheeler, Joshua Mobter, and Frances M. Dameron, for the sum of $3,302.85, in an action on a judgment of the Decatur county district court in the State of Kansas.
There was no dispute about the facts, which are as follows:
On the eighth day of March, 1892, the plaintiff obtained judgment in the district court of Decatur county, Kansas (a court of general jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the parties
Pending these proceedings on the seventeenth of April, 1893, the said Hosea died at his domicile in Buchanan county, Missouri, and in that month letters of administration of his estate were duly granted by the probate court of said county, and during all the time of the pendency of these proceedings in the district court of Decatur county, and in the Supreme Court of Kansas, the appellants were residents of the. State of Missouri, as they now are and ever since have been; and have not been within the State of Kansas since the rendition of the judgment by the said Decatur county district court.
On the third day of December, 1897, on motion of the respondent, notice of which was given by publication, but of which appellants had no actual knowledge, an order was made by the judges of said district court reviving said judgment against the administrators of the said William E. Hosea, deceased, and against the other of said judgment defendants and each of them.
Afterwards, on the fifteenth of January, 1898, this suit was instituted by the respondent in the circuit court of Buch
The appellants answered, denying the allegations of the petition, pleading the statute of limitations, and certain statutes of the State of Kansas, setting up thereon the defense, upon which they rely, that at the time this suit was brought the said judgment under the laws of Kansas was dead, and no action could be maintained thereon.
Afterwards, on the twenty-fourth day of February, 1898, the appellants, with the said Moses Wells, Henry J. McFarland and E. P. Wells, partners as aforesaid, appearing specially for that purpose, filed their motion in the district court of Decatur county, Kansas, to set aside the order of the judge of said court, of the third of December, 1897, reviving said judgment, which motion was on the ninth day of March, 1898, sustained as to the said Hosea, deceased, and his administrators, and overruled as to the other defendants.
Thereupon, appellants, with the said Wells, McFarland & Wells, prosecuted a petition in error, with supersedeas, from the order of said district court overruling the motion to set aside the order reviving said judgment to the Supreme Court of Kansas, and on the third day of June, 1898, filed their motion in the circuit court of Buchanan county, Missouri, for a continuance of this suit until the petition in error of appellants and the said Wells, McFarland & Wells, should be heard and determined by the Supreme Court of Kansas, which motion was overruled, and on the same day the ease coming on for trial, was tried, and the judgment rendered, from which this appeal was taken on the fourteenth of June, 1898. No execution was ever issued and no payment was ever made on the Kansas judgment, nor was it ever exhibited as a demand against- the estate of Hosea in the probate court of Buchanan county.
(1) By the Laws of Kansas, a personal judgment against two parties is a joint and several obligation and an action upon it can be maintained against either of the judgment debtors separately. [2 Gen. Stat. Kan. 1897, ch. 114, p. 590; Read v. Jeffries, 16 Kan. 534; Stout v. Baker, 32 Kan. 113.] And in considering this case the judgment in question may be treated simply as a joint and several judgment against the appellants, and the other parties thereto may be disregarded. In that State, an action at law may be maintained on a domestic judgment. The right of action accrues at the date of the rendition of the judgment, and when no execution has been issued, is barred by the statute of limitations of that State by the lapse of five years, from its date, unless the case falls within some of the exceptions of that statute, one of which is absence from the State. [2 Gen. Stat. Kan. 1897, cap. 95, secs. 12 and 15; Burnes v. Simpson, 9 Kan. 658; Hummer v. Lamphear, 32 Kan. 439; Schuyler Co. Bank v. Bradbury, 56 Kan. 355.]
By the laws of this State, in force at the time this suit was brought, an action on the judgment of a court of' record of a sister State was not barred until after the lapse of twenty years from its date. [R. S. 1889, sec. 6796.]
If we had only the statutes of limitations eo nomine of these States, to deal with in this case, there would be no difficulty in sustaining the judgment of the circuit court, for it was well-settled law in this State, prior to the revision of 1899, when a new section (4280) was engrafted upon our statute of
“Sec. 455. If execution shall not be sued out within five years from the date of any judgment that now is or may hereafter be rendered in any court of record in this State, or if five years shall have intervened between the date of the last execution issued on such judgment and the time of suing out another writ of execution thereon, such judgment shall become dormant, and shall cease to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment-debtor.
“Sec. 439. If a judgment become dormant, it may be revived in the same manner as is prescribed for reviving actions before judgment.
“Sec. 425. The revivor shall be by an order of the court if made in term, or by a judge thereof if during vacation, that the action be revived in the name of the representatives or successor of the party who died, or whose powers ceased, and proceed in favor of or against them.
“Sec. 426. The order may be made on the motion of the adverse party, or of the representatives or successors of the party who died, or whose powers ceased, suggesting his death or
“Sec. 427. If the order is made by the consent of the parties, the action shall forthwith stand revived; and, if not made by consent, notice of the application for such an order shall be served in the same manner and returned within the same time as a summons, upon the party adverse to the one making the motion; and if sufficient cause he not shown against the revivor, the order shall be made.
“Sec. 428. When the plaintiff shall make an affidavit that the representatives of the defendant, or any of them in whose name it is desired to have the action revived, are nonresidents of the State, or have left the same to avoid the service of the notice, or so concealed themselves that the notice can not be served upon them, or that the names and residences of the heirs or devisees of the person against whom the action may be ordered to be revived, or some of them, are unknown to the affiant, a notice may be published for three consecutive weeks, notifying them to appear on a day therein named, not less than ten days after the publication is complete, and show cause why the action should not be revived against them; and if sufficient cause be not shown to the contrary, the order shall be made.
“Sec. 432. An order to revive an action against the representatives or successor of a defendant shall not be made without the consent of such representative or successor, unless in one year from the time it could have been first made.
“Sec. 433. An order to revive an action in the names of the representatives or successor of a plaintiff may be made forthwith, hut shall not be made without the consent of the defendant after the expiration of one year from the time the order might have been'first made; but where the defendant shall also have died, or his powers have ceased in the meantime, the order of revivor on both sides may be made in the period limited
Under this statute, as construed by the Supreme Court of Kansas, where a judgment has been permitted to become dormant by the neglect of the creditor to issue execution thereon for five years; has not been revived in the manner provided by the statute; and no suit upon the judgment has been brought within one year after the expiration of the five years, no suit can thereafter be maintained upon it. [Chapman v. Chapman, 48 Kan. 636; Mawhinney v. Doane, 40 Kan. 676, 681; Baker v. Hummer, 31 Kan. 325; Kothman v. Skaggs, 29 Kan. 5; Angell v. Martin, 24 Kan. 334; Gruble v. Wood, 27 Kan. 535; Burnes v. Simpson, 9 Kan. 658; State v. McArthur, 5 Kan. 280.]
In these circumstances, the judgment once dormant, becomes a dead judgment, incapable of supporting an action in that State or in this. [Dempsey v. Township of Oswego, 51 Fed. Rep. 97; St. Louis Type Foundry Co. v. Jackson, 128 Mo. 119.] The last case cited, was an action brought in this State on the twenty-fifth day of August, 1892, on a Kansas judgment rendered on the twelfth day of July, 1875, which had never been revived, or kept alive by the issuance of execution thereon; and came before this court in Division Two, at the April term, 1895. Burgess, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, after setting out the aforesaid Kansas statute, and reviewing some of the leading Kansas' cases, construing the same, said: “By the statute all remedy was taken away, which is never done without an intention to destroy the right (Moore v. Luce, 29 Pa. St. 262), and it would seem ‘illogical to hold that the remedy may be destroyed and the legal right remain.’ [McCracken Co. v. Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344.] Prom a legal standpoint the existence of one implies the existence of the other and it would seem impossible that one can exist without the other. In McMerty v. Morrison, 62 Mo. 140, it was said:
In that ease, at the time suit was brought in Missouri on the Kansas judgment, the defendant had always been a resident of Kansas, and an action against him in that State was barred by its statute of limitations. No execution had ever been issued on the judgment and after the lapse of five years from its date it had become dormant. Thereafter, within one year, it had not been revived as it might have been and no suit had ever been brought on it; all remedy on it in that State had been destroyed, and the judgment was dead. But the case in hand is quite different — leaving out of view entirely the attempt at revival, which finally proved futile but not for any lack of vitality in the judgment.
When the suit was brought in Missouri, on the Kansas judgment, in this case, the defendants being within the exceptions of the Kansas statute of limitations, an action against them in that' State was not barred by that statute, and although the judgment had become dormant by the failure to have execu
The judgment of the circuit Court ought, therefore, to be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
