Case Information
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*2 | 1 | claim. The rule requires the court to assume the truth of the complaint's factual | | :--: | :--: | | 2 | allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders . | | 3 | Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court "need not accept as true conclusory | | 4 | allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint." Manzarek . | | 5 | St. Paul Fire &; Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must | | 6 | point to factual allegations that "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell | | 7 | Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint | | 8 | avoids dismissal if there is "any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the | | 9 | complaint" that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. | | 10 | . | | 11 | A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the | | 12 | complaint, although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the | | 13 | document is central to the party's claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder . | | 14 | Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to | | 15 | judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). |
| 16 | A. Defamation | | 17 | The elements of a cause of action for defamation in Washington are (1) a false | | 18 | statement; (2) lack of privilege; (3) fault; and (4) damages. Herron v. KING Broadcasting | | 19 | Co., 112 Wash.2d 762, 768, 776 P.2d 98 (1989). Here, the allegations of defamation are | | 20 | largely conclusory, namely that Plaintiff made false statements that the Defendant abused | | 21 | and assaulted her to police. Dkt. # 22 at 7. | | 22 | Under RCW 4.24.510, a person who communicates a complaint or information to | | 23 | any branch of government is immune from civil liability for claims based on the | | 24 | communication. Washington state and federal courts have affirmed that the statute | | 25 | provides immunity when persons report information to the police. DiBiasi v. Starbucks | | 26 | Corp., No. 10-35213, 414 Fed. Appx. 948 (Mem) (9th Cir. 2011) (employee complaint to | | 27 | police regarding customer behavior was a matter of concern to the police); Cornu-Labat |
*3 | 1 | v. Merred, No. 13-35158, 580 Fed. Appx. 557 (Mem) (9th Cir. 2014) (call to law | | :--: | :--: | | 2 | enforcement was protected from liability). | | 3 | Further, even if Defendant had shown a defamation claim, he alleges only | | 4 | conclusory allegations related to his damages. He fails to provide any specific facts to | | 5 | show that any entity took adverse action against him because of the alleged false | | 6 | statement. As such, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to meet the damages element | | 7 | of a defamation claim. As requested, the Court permits leave to file a counterclaim for | | 8 | abuse of process. Dkt. # 25 at 5. | | 9 | B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress | | 10 | To prove outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress, a complainant | | 11 | must establish the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) | | 12 | intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) the actual result of severe | | 13 | emotional distress to the plaintiff. Kloepfel v. Bokor, 149 Wn.2d 192, 195, 66 P.3d 630 | | 14 | (2003). | | 15 | The Court will also dismiss this claim. Washington courts have stated that seeking | | 16 | legal process, even with malicious intent, was not "so outrageous in character, [and] so | | 17 | extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency," and thus fails to | | 18 | claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Saldviar v. Momah, 145 Wash.App. | | 19 | 365, 390 (2008) (filing suit alleging sexual abuse by a physician, even under false | | 20 | pretenses, did not state claim for outrage). Accordingly, Defendant fails to state a claim | | 21 | for intentional infliction of emotional distress. | | 22 | III. CONCLUSION | | 23 | For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. | | 24 | Defendant may file a First Amended Counterclaim within fourteen (14) days of the entry | | 25 | of this Order. |
*4 Dated this 1day of June, 2023.
The Honorable Richard Jones United States District Judge