Berger v. HaleBerger v. Hale
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The defendant Theodore Hale established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by adducing expert opinion evidence that he did not deviate from the relevant standards of practice (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In opposition, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of an expert which was sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to whether Hale departed from good and accepted medical practice (see Adjetey v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 63 AD3d 865 [2009]; Boutin v Bay Shore Family Health Ctr., 59 AD3d 368 [2009]). Summary judgment may not be awarded in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting opinions of medical experts, which present a credibility question requiring a jury‘s resolution (see Espinal v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 71 AD3d 723 [2010]; Dandrea v Hertz, 23 AD3d 332 [2005]). Moreover, the opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert were based upon facts in evidence, and were not conclusory or unsubstantiated (see Keevan v Rifkin, 41 AD3d 661 [2007]; Shields v Baktidy, 11 AD3d 671 [2004]). Accordingly, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Hale was properly denied.
Skelos, J.P., Covello, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.