31 Barb. 9 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1858
The right to pond and to fish, which was conveyed to the defendant Bergen by Cornelia J. Udall, was cer
This, then, is a voluntary conveyance obtained from a child by her parent within a few days after her arrival at age. She became of age on the 10th and she executed this deed on the 20th of April, 1857.
The protection of persons who are either in a condition of tutelage or dependence, or just emancipated from it, and the rigorous scrutiny of deeds and agreements obtained from such parties by those who occupy such relations of confidence or control towards them, have long formed a recognized head of equity jurisprudence. Without going back through the long series of cases in which the doctrines of courts of equity on these subjects have been illustrated and enforced, it will be sufficient to recite the language of a few recent adjudications and text books of authority in which the rules by which the court acts are clearly laid down.
Judge Story remarks, (Eq. Juris. § 307,) “In this class of cases there is often found some intermixture of deceit, imposition, overreaching, unconscionable advantage or other mark of direct and positive fraud." But the principle upon which courts of equity act in regard thereto, stands, independent of any such ingredients, upon a motive of public policy. These courts will therefore often interfere in such cases, where, but for such peculiar relations, they would wholly abstain from
In Dent v. Bennett, (4 M. & C. 269,) Lord Chancellor Cottenham quotes with approbation the argument of Sir Samuel Bomilly in Huguenin v. Baseley, where that accomplished lawyer said that the relief stands upon a general principle applying to all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another.
In Hoghton v. Hoghton, (11 Eng. L. and Eq. Rep. 134,) Sir John Bomilly, M. B. first clearly states the rule, on the authority of Lord Eldon in Gibson v. Jeyes, (6 Ves. 266,) that whenever a man takes a voluntary donation he must assume the. burden of proving the transaction righteous, that is, of showing that the donor understood what he was doing; and. in the next place, upon the same authority in the noted case of Huguenin v. Baseley, (14 Ves. 273,) that where the donor and donee were so situated towards each other that undue influence might have been exercised, the question is not merely what was the intention of the donor, but how that intention
The same learned judge, in Casborne v. Barham, (2 Beav. 75,) said, that in certain cases there is so great an inequality between the contracting parties, so much of habitual exercise of power on the one side, and habitual submission on the other, that without any proof of the exercise of power beyond that which may be inferred from the transaction itself, a court of equity will impute an exercise of undue influence.
This case, with others, is cited by Judge Ghidley, in giving the opinion in the recent case of Sears v. Shafer in the court of appeals, which contains a similar doctrine asserted and applied. There was,.in that case, no direct proof of the manner in which the instrument in question was procured. But there was an intimate and confidential relation between the grantor and grantee, and a temper and disposition to yield by the latter to the former. There was evidence of intercourse between them in which the paper might have been procured. The grantor was sick and enfeebled as well as ignorant, and there was no proof that what she was doing was explained to her. The conveyance was without consideration, and was of a character inconsistent with her natural feelings and affections, as well as her interests. The learned judge who delivered the judgment of the court of appeals says that there are cases in which undue influence will be inferred from the nature of the transaction, together with the exercise of occasional or habitual
From the authorities thus collected and the numerous older cases to which they refer, I deduce these principles. A transaction like the present, in which a daughter immediately upon her arrival at lawful age makes a Voluntary conveyance for the benefit of her father, will be examined by the court with the most jealous scrutiny and suspicion. The person relying upon it must show affirmatively not only that the person who made it understood its nature and effect, and executed it voluntarily, but that such will and intention was not in any degree the result of misrepresentation or mistake, and was not induced by the exertion, for selfish purposes, and for his own exclusive benefit, of the influence or control which he possessed as a father, over his daughter. There is no law against a child bestowing upon a parent any property of which she may be the owner because she loves him and desires to promote his interests. But there is an inflexible principle, both of public policy and private justice, which forbids a parent making use of his influence or his child’s affection, to impose upon her mind a purpose of bounty to him. If the design to make the gift originated in the mind of the child, or was at least unsuggested by any agency of the parent, the act is as unimpeachable in law as it may be laudable in morals. But if the mind of the donor was brought to a purpose preconceived by the parent for his own sole advantage by an influence which she could not escape, in the. circumstances in which she was placed, and which is deliberately used to effect such a purpose, then that influence or its exercise was undue and improper. And in all dealings between parent and child, under such circumstances, the most scrupulous good faith—uberrima fides—must be observed, and the weaker party must be put upon an equal footing with the stronger by a complete disclosure of all material facts, and the abnegation as far as possible of any con
Miss TJdall was about 18 years of age when Mr. Bergen purchased her father’s farm. She then sighed a conveyance to him of the right to pond the stream which runs between her lands and his. This was done with the advice of Judge Strong, in whom she evidehtly and justly reposed great confidence. He testifies that he explained the matter td her as to the effect of the pond upon her property, giving it as his opinion that the property would be more valuable with it than without it, and telling her she would be able to see, before she came to an age to ratify her deed, whether this opinion was correct. Judge Strong says that she expressed herself willing to do whatever he should advise, and that he supposed, and still thinks, she understood that she could ratify or recant the act when she reached the age of twenty-one.
From this time until she attained her majority we hear no more of the matter. When she reached that period it is quite evident that she had not made up her mind as to her action, or at least that she had Hot determined to make the gift or conveyence.
And the first and a very material observation upon the deed - now in question is, that it is plainly not an act of unsolicited bounty, or the tree gift of her affection for her father. She made the first deed while under age, upon the advice of Judge Strong, and as he says, aWare no doubt of the locus 'pcenitentice which she possessed, and of the ineffectual character of her act, so far. When she became twenty-one years of age, she made no attempt, and gave no indication of a purpose, to complete the gift. We cannot avoid seeing, without adverting to the particulars of the transaction, that this deed was obtained from the young lady, not proffered by her. It was not the result of the deliberate, unaided and uncontrolled action of her own mind, but was produced by the agency of means and motives and the suggestions of others. The deed is not to be regarded and cannot therefore be maintained as
Miss Udall is by no means deficient in intellect, as far as I can judge from the proofs in this case, and there is no evidence of extreme or overweening fondness on her part for her father. She is not shown and cannot be supposed to have possessed at this time more than a very imperfect acquaintance with business, or with the ultimate effect upon her property of the conveyance she was desired to make. She seems to have relied in the first instance upon the advice of Judge Strong ; but when the question was presented to her for final action, there was no one about her to whom she could resort for disinterested and competent advice. She did indeed ask advice of her uncle Joshua Willetts, and her guardian Samuel J. Underhill, but neither of them felt qualified to direct her; and the latter, who did undertake to negotiate at one time for her interest, was not at hand when her father and his wife’s mother finally procured the conveyance. She was living in her father’s house up to the time of her coming of age, and left there to go to her uncle’s of whom I have spoken, the same evening that she became twenty-one, partly, it is probable, to accomplish her marriage, to which her father was averse, and partly, it would seem, in consequence of a somewhat rude effort which was made by her stepmother to procure her signature to this deed. On the 10th of April, the day that Cornelia J. Udall became of age, Dr. Mowbray was sent to Mr. Udall’s house, and Mrs. Udall bringing him into the room, told her stepdaughter that he had come to take her acknowledgment to a conveyance of this interest. She refused to execute the paper. Mrs. Udall told her she must do it. She started to get up from her chair, and Mrs. Udall pushed her back and told her she should sign it. She did not, however, and shortly left the apartment and went to her room, in considerable agitation. She had not,
After this a week elapsed, during which the plaintiff was at her uncle Joshua Willetts. She had been approached by Mr. Bergen with the deed, though whether he did so with any real intention or desire that she should execute it, is perhaps doubtful. Still the plaintiff had again the opportunity to make the conveyance, but again declined to do so. About a week from the day she left her father’s house she was thrown from a wagon, somewhat hurt and a good deal frightened. She seems to have been unwell and hysterical for several days afterwards. The next day but one after the accident befell her, her father came to see her, bringing with him Mrs. Carll, the mother of her father’s second wife, who was selected by Mr. TJdall on account of her supposed influence over this young lady. Her uncle, who was an old man apparently of no great force of character, and a woman named Powell, were present during a part, and a younger sister of the plaintiff during the whole, of the interview that followed. The plaintiff was lying in or on the bed when they entered, and Mrs. Carll very soon began to speak of the difficulties upon this subject between her and her father, and the plaintiff turned away at first with a gesture of impatience. Mrs. Carll, however, persevered in urging the matter upon her, and told her it was her duty to her father to make this deed, appealing also, as one witness says, although Mrs. Carll does not remember it, to her father’s necessities. During the previous week the plaintiff, as I have stated, was presented with the deed for signature or acknowledgment, by Cornelius J. Bergen. At
But a still greater objection to the transaction I find in the manner in which the consequences of her determination to make or not to make the conveyance were presented to her. Mrs. Carll impressed upon her that if she refused to sign the deed, no one would be benefited but Mr. Bergen, and that the question for her to determine was whether she would benefit her father or Mr. Bergen; whether her father or Mr. Bergen should have the money. Her own rights and interests were carefully ignored. She was not told that if she declined to confirm her first conveyance, she instead of her father would hold a claim upon Mr. Bergen, and could exact compensation for the privilege of ponding, and control or dispose of the right of fishing, If no one were interested in her decision but her father and Bergen, if the result of her refusal to do what she was urged to do would be that Bergen would keep what he had and her fatherwould lose four thousand dollars, the young lady might well assent to what was asked of her. But if she had understood, ás we see now, and these parties knew then, that she
This case differs from most of the cases of a similar character which are presented to the courts, because the entire history of the transaction is disclosed in evidence, and we learn all that was said and done by the parties, so that the means used and the motives urged to obtain the plaintiff’s consent are matter of proof and not of conjecture. It is quite true that we cannot, upon this evidence, impute to the defendant either gross intentional misrepresentation and fraud, or threats and violent coercion. It is also plain that the plaintiff understood that she was signing a deed confirmatory of her former act, and which would confer upon Bergen the right to maintain the pond which he had constructed, and would put four thousand dollars in her father’s pocket. But this is not all which the defendant must establish to sustain such a conveyance. His daughter was young and inexperienced, not yet emancipated from the natural influence and control of her father, and surrounded mainly if not entirely by those who were either under the like control and influence, or who were actively assisting his purpose and laboring for his interests. She was also at the moment suffering under the effects of an
The defendant relies upon the testimony of Dr. Mowbray as to what took place the next day after this deed was signed, and upon the two letters of the plaintiff written on that day, to sustain his view of the case, or to show a deliberate confirmation of her acts by the plaintiff. Dr. Mowbray went on Tuesday to take the plaintiff’s acknowledgment of the original agreement, which he says was produced by the Bergens. She acknowledged the execution of that paper, and expressed her willingness to make the conveyance. She inquired if the paper which she had signed the day before contained any thing more than the original agreement, stating that she had read it, hut was not sure if she recollected it. One of the papers had been left with the Bergens, and the other with Mr. Udall. Alexander Bergen, the defendant’s brother, offered to deliver the one held by him if Udall would surrender the one procured by him. On the same day she wrote to her father, stating that she had acknowledged the old deed, and insisting earnestly that the one which he had should be returned according to his promise, as she alleges. To this letter he seems to have written an answer, and then she wrote him again, saying that the original deed was acknowledged and ready to be delivered, if he would give up the other. She manifests great anxiety, for her own safety as she says, that the latter instrument should be destroyed. She then goes on to tell him of her instantly approaching marriage, to which he was opposed. She deprecates his anger and his interference, and pleads very earnestly for his acquiescence, and she asks him to send her a dress which she had prepared for the occasion, but which she had left at his house.
Uow if the question were whether the plaintiff knew and intended what she was doing when she signed the deed, this testimony and these letters would be conclusive. But in the language of Lord Eldon, in Huguenin v. Baseley, cited by the
I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to relief against this deed. In ordinary eases that relief would consist in absolutely annulling the instrument. But there are some peculiarities about this case. The plaintiff seems to have been willing to make this deed for a consideration, if that consideration could be secured to her brother and sister. In her complaint, she claims the price for which this privilege was sold by her father, or the $4000 mortgage which was made contingent upon her confirming it; and she asks either to have her deed declared void as to her, or for such other re-* lief as may be just. It is also to be observed that this is not a conveyance of a parcel of land which will revert at once to the grantor, and be in her possession and at her disposal, if her deed is set aside. It is a grant of an easement-—of a right to erect a dam and flow back the waters of a stream upon the plaintiff’s lands, and to fish in those waters. The privilege thus obtained has been executed, and a pond made which overflows in part the plaintiff’s lands, but in part also the lands of Bergen. If the plaintiff’s deed were absolutely set aside, this pond and its privileges could not fall into the possession
Emott, Justice.]