Beresheim v. ArndBeresheim v. Arnd
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Waterman
*85
It is further argued that the Code of 1897 revised the scheme of taxation and imposed new duties on the taxpay*86er. It is true that section 803, Code 1873, provides that the taxpayer “shall assist the assessor in listing all property,”- etc., while section 1312 of the present Code makes it the duty of such person “to list for the assessor all property,” etc. But we regard this change as rather one of phraseology than of principle. In each case the duty was imposed on the taxpayer to make -known his property. One who permitted the assessor to list his property at much less than its real assessable value, through an omission to divulge-moneys and credits, certainly did not “ assist the assessor” in making up the tax roll. We cannot see that the authorities cited by plaintiff on this point in any way aid his case. Washington County v. Miller, 14 Iowa, 584; Marion County v. Kruidenier, 72 Iowa, 92.
We know that making an assessment is held to be a’ quasi judicial function. Clark v. Norton, 49 N. Y. 243; Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62 (54 N. W. Rep. 938, 39 A. M. St. Rep. 575); Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 238; Baker v. Allen, 21 Pick. 382; Cooley, Taxation, 786. And that *88it is a general principle of law that a judge may not be tbe arbiter of his own controversy, nor pass upon matters in which he is interested. Oooley, Constitutional Limitations, 174. But how far are those principles to be extended? May an assessor not value and assess his own property? Or may not a property owner act as assessor? If we carry the theory of plaintiff to its logical conclusion, only non-property owners are eligible to that office. This precise question was before the supreme court of Ohio, arising under statutes in many respects similar to those under consideration. That court held that the auditor, who performed the duties with us imposed on the treasurer, was not disqualified from acting because he received a per cent, upon the tax collected, and that the assessment was not. invalid on that account. The court in substance says the objection made that a man cannot be a judge in his own case is not applicable. The auditor is not a judge, and he has no case. Besides, almost every officer in the state, judicial and ministerial, is interested directly or indirectly in the result of the duties he performs. Probasco v. Raine, 50 Ohio, 378 (34 N. E. Rep. 536). It is true, when a federal question was raised under that act, and its validity denied on the ground that the provisions violated the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in depriving citizens of their property without due process of law, it was held by the federal courts in that state that, the auditor being an interested party and the assessment a judicial act, it was void for those reasons, and could not be enforced. Meyers v. Shields (C. C.) (61 Fed. Rep. 713); Brinkerhoff v. Brumfield (C. C.) (94 Fed. Rep. 422). While some of the arguments used by the state court are perhaps not apt, we are inclined to agree with its conclusions; but, were we disposed to adopt the reasoning of the federal tribunals, we should still have to say that our statute is to be distinguished from the Ohio law in two important partic*89ulars. In the latter, the auditor had a power of distraint to enforce the collection of the tax he imposed. With us the treasurer must go into court, and in the action all rights of the taxpayer will be protected. Second. The fee there was certain. Here it does not go now to the treasurer, and in all human probability never will do so. On the whole, we are of opinion this point is not well taken.
But it is said a part of the subject-matter viz, the assessment, is not embraced in the title, which speaks of “listing” the property, and that listing and assessing are two very different matters. It is true, the words “list” and “assess” are used in the chapter relating to taxation in a somewhat different sense, but always as a part of the same process of getting the property upon the tax roll. In section 1374, to which this act is additional, the words listing and assessment are used in the sense mentioned. The objection is purely technical, for the title of the act says, “to list and collect taxes thereon” and surely this phrase■ includes an assessment. Titles of legislative acts are to be liberally construed. Shooting Club v. Lamoreaux,— Wis. — (89 N. W. Rep. 880). In that case the court says: “It has been repeatedly held that the title of an act should be liberally construed; that it should not be condemned as insufficient to constitutionally suggest those things found in the body of the act, unless, giving thereto the largest scope which reason will permit, something is found therein which is neither within its literal meaning, or its spirit, nor germane thereto. Courts cannot sit in judgment upon the work of the legislature, and decide one of its acts unconstitutional, merely because the title thereto is not as comprehensive as it might have been made. * * * Any number of provisions, all relating to a single object, includ*91ing all the necessary or reasonable details thereof, may be covered by a title in such general terms as to fairly indicate such subject; the unity of the subject being taken as including within its scope all the details provided to effect the single legislative purpose.” See, also, to the same effect, In re Mayer, 50 N. Y. 504; Connor v. Railroad Co., 23 S. C. 427; Town of Mahomet v. Quackenbusch, 117 U. S. 508 (6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 858, 29 L. Ed. 982).
Our conclusion is that the trial court erred in not confirming the assessments for the years 1896 and 1897, and awarding judgment therefore Modified in that way, the judgment entered will be aeeirmed.