195 Pa. Super. 524 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1961
Opinion by
The Liquor Control Board revoked the license of the appellees upon the grounds: (1) that they were not the only persons pecuniarily interested in the business; (2) one of the licensees and his employees aided and abetted prostitution, assignation on the premises and permitted rooms to be used for immoral purposes, etc.; (3) the licensee permitted minors to frequent the premises and they and their employees sold intoxicating liquors to them. The board in imposing the penalty of revocation took into consideration two previous suspensions of the license of appellee for occurrences in 1955 and 1956.
Upon appeal, the common pleas court reversed the finding that the appellees were not the only persons pecuniarily interested in the operation of the licensed business. John Gentile, the third person involved, had entered into a contract for the purchase of Edward Berarducci’s interest in the licensed business. He was on the premises in December 1959 and January 1960 and helped out in various capacities and also was given the right to draw checks on the business account. The board drew from this the inference that he was pecuniarily interested in the business during this period. There is no conclusive evidence, however, that he had anything more than the prospective interest which his contract of purchase gave him. He got no salary. He received one payment of $50 just before Christmas,
Since the court below had sufficient ground for changing the finding as to pecuniary interest, it had the right to modify the penalty: East End Social Club Liquor License Case, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 583, 165 A. 2d 253 (1960). The appellant argues that this modification from revocation to sixty days suspension was too great in view of the seriousness of the other of-fences and the prior suspensions as to Edward Berarducci. However, this matter is for the court below when it reverses the board’s finding on a substantial matter (Barbato Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 548, 149 A. 2d 539 (1959)), and so long as the penalty is warranted by law, we have no right to reverse because we think it is either too severe or too light.
However, we do think that this penalty was not warranted by law in another respect. The court did
Order reversed and record remanded for the imposition of a proper penalty in accordance with this opinion.