Matthew Benton was convicted by a Fulton County jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Christopher “Black Magic” Ramsay and the wounding of several others.
1. Construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, the evidence shows that, on the night of July 17, 2008, while Ramsay and the other victims were drinking, smoking, and socializing outside of an apartment building in the Trafalgar Square Apartments, Benton and his accomplices began shooting at the group, killing Ramsay and wounding four others. Some of the victims returned fire, and the shooting stopped only after law enforcement and emergency response personnel arrived on the scene. Despite the large number of people in the area, investigators had difficulty obtaining statements from eyewitnesses. Eventually, one eyewitness came forward and identified Benton as one of the shooters. The eyewitness had been at Trafalgar Square on the day of the shooting, observed the events leading up to the shooting, and was present throughout the shooting itself.
Around noon on the day of the shooting, the eyewitness saw Benton’s younger brother, Drique, riding a four-wheeler. About this time, the eyewitness overheard a confrontation between Drique and Ramsay concerning the four-wheeler.
Around 11:45 that same night, the eyewitness heard some rustling noise (like a “stray dog or a stray cat”) coming from a cut-through that connected the Trafalgar Square Apartments with a neighboring apartment complex. At midnight, he heard gunfire coming from the same direction as the noise and saw people running and screaming. The eyewitness identified Benton and Maurice Badie as two of the shooters, and he saw Ramsay get shot in the head and other people get struck while they were taking cover and returning fire. Later, the eyewitness identified Benton as one of the shooters from a photographic lineup.
Benton was arrested on September 9, 2008, and he was interviewed by an officer about Ramsay’s murder. During the videotaped interview, Benton dеnied any involvement in the shooting that killed Ramsay, but he admitted to shooting at Ramsay on two previous occasions. Benton also expressed knowledge about the four-wheeler dispute and about Ramsay pointing a gun at his brother Drique. Benton moved to suppress the statements, and the trial court held a Jackson-Denno
Benton does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Nevertheless, as is our customary practice in murder cases, we independently have reviewed the record with an eye toward the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Benton was guilty of malice murder and the other offenses of which he ultimately was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia,
2. As his first enumeration of error, Benton argues that his incriminating statements to police should have been suppressed because they were elicited without his full understanding of the Miranda warnings and made under threat of physical violence.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that Benton did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights under Miranda, and the trial court erred whеn it concluded otherwise. The videotape shows that, prior to beginning the interview, the interrogating officer read Benton the Miranda warnings from a card, as follows:
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say will be used against you in the court of law. You’re entitled to have a lawyer present now or at any time during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost, and he may be present at all times during your questioning. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements.
After reading these warnings, the officer asked, “do you understand what I just explained to you?,” and Benton nоdded. The officer then asked Benton how far he went in school and whether he could read, to which Benton replied that he was “kicked out” of school in ninth grade and that he could read, but “not that much.” The officer then asked Benton to explain what the officer just read to him, “so we’re on the same рage,” and Benton responded something like this: “I go to court, and I can’t answer no questions or ask no questions.”
Specifically, the officer told Benton, “right now we’re here to talk, on why you’re here... you don’t have to talk to me right now, if you don’t want to, or you can explain your side of what we’re talking about.” The officer again repeated that “you don’t have to [talk] if you don’t want to,” and said “it ain’t like the TV where I’m slamming you all around and trying to get you to talk . .. nah, it ain’t like that... or where I hit you with telephone books...This last comment elicited a smile from Benton. The officer then told Benton that he just wanted to have a conversation “man to man,” that he wanted to know the truth about what Benton knew, and that Benton had the option of refusing to talk. The officer concluded, “so you understand what I’m talking about now?,” to which Benton responded, “yeah.” At this point, the оfficer proceeded to question Benton about the events surrounding Ramsay’s killing.
The above colloquy shows that Benton did not understand the Miranda warnings as read to him initially. Although Benton at first indicated by nodding that he understood them, when the officer asked him to characterize those warnings, Benton’s response was patently inaccurate. Indeed, the interrogating officer tеstified at trial that “it was obvious [Benton] didn’t understand his rights at that time.”
Needless to say, a person must understand his rights in order to knowingly and intelligently waive them. Seе Berghuis v. Thompkins,
3. Because we reverse the judgment of conviction, we do not address Benton’s remaining claims, as those claims are either moot or unlikely to arise again upon retrial. See Willingham v. State,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
The crimes occurred on or around July 17, 2008. On October 28, 2008, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Benton along with Maurice Badie and Domonique Hodo. Benton was charged with malice murder (Count 1); felоny murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); aggravated assault on Ramsay (Count 4); aggravated assault on Quionez Mabry, Demoroe Paggett, Tyrone Freckleton, and Larry Feggins (Counts 5-8); aggravated battery on Larry Feggins (Count 9); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 10). Benton was tried аlong with Badie from June 14 through June 22, 2010, and a jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The trial court sentenced Benton to life imprisonment for malice murder, a twenty-year consecutive term for the aggravated assault of Mabry, two twenty-year concurrent terms for the aggravated assaults of Paggett and Freckletоn, a twenty-year concurrent term for the aggravated battery of Feggins, and a five-year consecutive term for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The aggravated assault on Feggins merged with the aggravated battery on Feggins. The aggravated assault on Ramsay merged into the mаlice murder, and the felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State,
The eyewitness mentioned that Ramsay allegedly pointed a gun at Drique during this confrontation, but then the eyewitness testified that he never actually saw Ramsay with a gun.
See Jackson v. Denno,
See Miranda,
See State v. Chulpayev,
It is difficult to discern from the video the precise words Benton spoke, but it seems clear that he did not initially understand the rights read to him.
“[W]hen a question is raised on appeal about the voluntariness of a statement, the appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, and it instead may look to all the evidence of record in determining the admissibility of a confession.” Butler v. State,
We acknowledge that an error based on a violation of Miranda is not reversible if it was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Spears v. State,
Benton’s other enumerations of errоr raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding Benton’s statement to police as a self-serving declaration; (2) whether the prosecutor improperly vouched for the veracity of the State’s key witness (the eye witness) during closing argument; (3) whether the State violated the “ultimate issue rule” whеn it questioned the interrogating officer about Benton’s custodial statements; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed the eyewitness’s statement to detectives to be read to the jury, as that statement, Benton asserts, contained inadmissible hearsay; (5) whether the trial court erred when it ruled that part of the eyewitness’s testimony fell within the “res gestae” exception to the hearsay rule (the new Evidence Code, effective January 1, 2013, which would apply in the event of Benton’s retrial, does not use the term “res gestae”); and (6) whether this case should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on Benton’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.