122 Mo. 332 | Mo. | 1894
This is a bill in equity to cancel a negotiable promissory note and to recover interest paid thereon, against the holder, charging that the note is without consideration, and was procured by fraudulent misrepresentations, of which the defendant had notice.
On the sixth of July, 1889, W. E. Wyman was defendant’s cashier, and also secretary and treasurer
At maturity, on the seventh of October, 1889, this note was taken up and a new note given, signed by the ■same parties with the same recitals as to collaterals, payable to W. F. Sargent, cashier of said bank, at ninety days, for the same amount with interest added. Up to this time, the certificate of stock to Benton had not been issued, and the deposit of that stock consisted merely of the recital in the note: “Certificates No.’s -fifty shares of stock of the Kansas City Glue and Fertilizer Company, being ten shares each.”
On the twentieth of December, 1889, certificate number 65 for fifty shares of the capital stock of the •company was issued to Benton by the company, by whom it was thereafter indorsed and delivered to the hank, and held as collateral. At the maturity of the last mentioned note, on the eighth of January, 1890,
This note, at maturity, was renewed by a like note signed by the same parties for thirty days, dated May 11, 1890, which at its maturity was again renewed by a like note dated June 13, 1890, signed by the same parties, payable ninety days after date, and 'this seems to be the note which the plaintiffs seek to have cancelled in this action, commenced at some time after its maturity — but when, this record does not show — in which a final hearing on the merits was had in the Jackson circuit court, on the fifth day of December, 1891, and the plaintiff’s bill dismissed, and judgment rendered against them for costs, from which they appeal.
There is nothing in the contention that the bank did not give value for the note. In support of the other contention the plaintiffs introduced the articles of incorporation showing that the company was incorporated in July, 1888, “with a capital stock of $50,000, divided into five hundred shares of $100 each, the whole amount of said stock having been subscribed for, and one-half thereof actually paid up;” and then introduced in evidence the stubs of the stock book of the company showing that prior to the sixth day of July, 1889, there had been issued to divers persons certificates of stock for four hundred and fifty-eight shares of the capital stock of the company, which had not been canceled or recalled, and that on the twentieth day of December, 1889, the same day on which the certificate of fifty shares of stock was issued to Benton, certificates of stock were issued, including his, for three hundred more shares, making, in all, seven hundred and fifty-eight shares issued, as appears by the book, and contend that, although on the twenty-eighth of October, 1889, at a meeting of the stockholders, held in pursuance of law, an increase of the capital stock to $75,000, was authorized by the votes of a majority of the stockholders, yet their' action not having been certified to the secretary of state as required by law, and his certificate evidencing such increase not
To meet this argument the bank introduced evidence tending to prove that, although the stub book shows that, at the time of the agreement, certificates for four hundred and fifty-eight shares of the original stock had been issued, there were in fact only then two hundred and eight shares outstanding, one hundred of the shares evidenced by the stub book having been written, but held by the company to be delivered to the parties who had subscribed and given their notes therefor, only on condition that the notes were paid at maturity, and those notes, long past due, not having been paid, these shares were at the disposal of the company and could be applied to the discharge of the agreement. That the other one hundred and fifty shares had been written and delivered to the persons therein narhed, officers and stockholders of the company, to be sold for the company, but had not been placed, so that, in fact,
"What the equities might be by reason of that fact between the plaintiffs and the company in respect of the note given for that stock, if that note were in the hands of the company, we find it unnecessary to determine in this case. All the evidence tends to prove that the agreement between Wyman and Benton was a fair, frank and open contract, entered into in the utmost good faith by both parties, both believing at
It seems to be well settled law in this state that knowledge which comes to an officer of a corporation, through his private transactions, and beyond the range of his official duties, is not notice to the corporation. State Sav. Ass’n v. Printing Co., 25 Mo. App. 643; Bank v. Schaumburg, 38 Mo. 228; Manhattan Brass Co. v. Co., 37 Mo. App. 145; Hyde v. Larkin, 35 Mo. App. 366; Johnston v. Shortridge, 93 Mo. 227; Bank v. Lovitt, 114 Mo. 519.
In this last case, which is quite analogous to the case in hand, we held that “an officer of a banking corporation has a perfect right to transact his own business at the bank of which he is an officer, and in such a transaction his interest is adverse to the bank, and he represents himself and not the bank. The law is well settled that, when an officer of a corporation is dealing with it in his individual interest, the corporation is not chargeable with his uncommunicated knowl
It appears affirmatively from the evidence that no loans were made by the bank without the sanction of the discount board. Of whom that board was composed, the evidence does not show. But there was no evidence tending to show that Wyman communicated to the board or any other officer of the bank any knowledge he may have had in regard to the company, its stock account or its affairs, or of this transaction with Benton, or that, in the matter of discounting the note, he occupied, any other relation than that of the repsentative of the company for whose benefit the discount was obtained. His own interest as an officer and a stockholder in the company placed him in an antagonistic position to the bank in this matter, and its rights as a purchaser for value in the regular course of business, of the security in question, can not be affected by his acts or dealings with the plaintiffs as secretary and treasurer of the company. See other authorities cited by defendant’s counsel in their brief. Also Bank v. Christopher, 40 N. J. Law, 435; Innerarity v. Bank, 139 Mass. 332, cited by counsel for the plaintiffs. The court committed no error in dismissing the bill, and the judgment is affirmed.