Rеna M. Bentley appeals from a $95,000 judgment in her favor against B.M.W., Inc. and Chemical Enterprises, Inc. Bentley contends she was rendered totally and permanently disabled from injuries sustained after a tire and wheel came off a tractor trailer for which *527 B.M.W. and Chemical Enterprises were responsible, and struck a van driven by Bentley. At trial, appellees admitted liability, but denied causation and damages because they asserted Bentley did not sustain any injuries in this accident and her medical treatment was unnecessary.
Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict for $100,000 in Bentley’s favor which was reduced to $95,000 because of the PIP set-off. Bentley now contends the trial court erred by denying her motion for new trial because appellees injected insurance and their financial status in the case. She also claims the trial court erred by allowing expert medical testimony based on medical records which were not admitted in evidence, by allowing appellees to impeach оne of her witnesses with a nolo contendere plea for which he was given first offender status, and by allowing two attorneys to argue on behаlf of appellees in closing. Held:
1. Bentley’s first and second enumerations of error contend the trial court erred by denying her motion for а new trial because appellees’ counsel in closing argument violated the trial court’s ruling on appellees’ motion in limine that еxcluded references to a party’s financial status or the availability of insurance. The comments Bentley complains of occurred when appellees’ counsel, in effect, argued that Bentley was involved in two collisions, one with someone with only minimum liability insurance and in which she suffered her injuries and the other with appellees, two out-of-state corporations with greater financial resources, and that even though she was not injured in the collision with appellees, she brought the action against them because of their greater finanсial resources.
As Bentley did not object to the comments of which she now complains, she relies upon the trial court’s rulings on appеllees’ motion in limine to preserve the issues on appeal. See
Reno v.
Reno,
The trial court stated: “You know where you are at with the insurance proposition. PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL: I know. THE COURT: If insurance gets too much involved in this case, you are out. PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL: I understand that. THE COURT: I think everybody knows that. That is why — PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL: No *528 problem. THE COURT: It kind of bothers me a little bit you want to come in here and try a case for three days and have it go out the window. [COUNSEL FOR BOTH PARTIES]: No sir.” Thus, it cannot be said that this colloquy clearly prohibited the remarks about which Bentley now complains. Additionally, although counsel for both parties agreed thеy would not make improper comments about the other’s financial conditions, we find no ruling by the trial court which would prevent appellеes from commenting upon their own financial conditions.
Moreover, not all references to insurance or financial conditions of the parties are prohibited. In most instances, evidence of the availability of insurance coverage or financial circumstances is not admissible because neither subject is relevant to any issue in the case. See
Northwestern Univ. v. Crisp,
Further, the authority cited by Bentley in support of her position is inapposite to the case at bаr. This is not a case in which either party introduced evidence of defendants’ liability insurance or collateral sources available to plaintiff. Accordingly, these enumerations of error are without merit.
2. Bentley’s third enumeration of error contends the trial court erred by аllowing appellees to introduce expert medical testimony which was based on medical reports and records not admitted in еvidence. The transcript shows, however, that this expert witness, a physician, personally examined Bentley and reached certain conclusions based upon this examination. Further, although some of the medical records and reports were not introduced, it is not apрarent that the witness based any of his opinions solely on reports which were not in evidence. Indeed, the physicians’ depositions had been read in evidence before this witness testified. Therefore, the witness’ testimony was not objectionable on this basis. See
Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Franklin,
3. Bentley also contends that the trial court erred by allowing appellees to impeach one of her physicians through the use of a nolo contendere plea which was given first offender treatment. We find no errоr. The record shows that before this conviction was introduced the physician had testified that “the only flaw” he had on his 50-year medical career was an occasion in the early 1970s when his hospital privileges were suspended. Therefore, appellees were entitled to disprove or contradict the doctor’s testimony regarding the “only flaw” in his 50-year career.
Hightower v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
4. Bentley’s final enumeration of error contends that the trial court erred by allowing two attorneys to argue for appellees in closing and by rеfusing to allow her counsel to state his objection and the grounds. See OCGA § 9-10-182;
City of Monroe v. Jordan,
Judgment affirmed.