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Benson v. State
640 P.2d 83
Wyo.
1982
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*1 “ * * * nationality The law —what how it, acquired, it is how constitutes internal, rather than part of

lost —is Thus, a state or na-

international, law. own law to determine may apply its

tion its nation- are or are not individuals

what genuine link

als, there exists a provided individual state and the

between ** Law, International *.” 48 C.J.S. 11.

p. have not enrolled Indians Shoshoni tribe, they not in their do enrolled. eligible him to be so

consider basis for af- proper this to be the

believe

firmance.

Terry BENSON, Appellant Curtis

(Defendant), Wyoming, Appellee

The STATE

(Plaintiff).

No. 5538.

Supreme Wyoming. Court

Feb. Counsel, Schilling, Appellate

Michael H. Program, Lara- Wyoming Public Defender Hackl, mie, Public Sylvia Lee Asst. Defender, Pro- Public Defender Wyoming (de- gram (argued), Cheyenne, fendant). Freudenthal, Gen., Atty. Ger- F. Steven Stack, Gen., Atty. Criminal Deputy

ald A. Johnson, Division, Asst. Allen C. Senior (plaintiff). appellee Atty. (argued), Gen. J., RAPER, ROSE, THOM- Before C. BROWN, AS, JJ. ROONEY *2 RAPER, plaint, police Justice. officer started his car and appellant. followed receiving After radio Appellant appeals judgment from the and confirmation of the existence of the war- following trial which by jury sentence at he rant, police pulled appellant officer over being posses- of a guilty found felon in and arrested him.2 Appellant was if firearm, asked in 6-11- sion of a violation of § possessed any W.S.1977, weapons, to which he Cum.Supp.1981.1 appeal His indi- ponder raises two for us to and de- cated he did issues not. The officer was First, cide. we must consider whether it at appellant’s aware time of trial error for the to allow into for taking conviction a shot with a testimony relating evidence to the nature of police at another officer and also that Second, appellant’s prior felony conviction. in complaint municipal court recited that we must whether decide the trial court appellant gun. Appellant a requested failing committed reversible error to in- permission to drive car to his his mother’s struct an element the of- being nearby house before taken in. How- operable. fense the firearm was that be ever, police explained officer this We will affirm. possible; was not the ear would either have was, police to be left where it or the would 8, 1980, police On December officer sat custody Appellant take and tow it. sudden- patrol in his monitoring car traffic Fifth ly car, for ostensibly hurried to it. lock Chey- and in Pebrican near Hebard School officer, police appellant unsure what approximately enne. At 10:15 a. m. he saw trying do, to by, began struggling vehicle pass appellant. driven with appellant in keep Aware of a warrant arrest order to him from reen- outstanding municipal on an com- tering court the car.3 finally The officer succeed- 2. The trial instruction with warrant, Section which he did a moment and looked at have a “A. open door of his car. there was a “Q. Okay. What occurred then? again replied sudden he Defendant rant, felony. that incident to arrest that I would have to assault in the first or second search punished by imprisonment “Q. for not more than five gravated assault, robbery, burglary or guilty manslaughter, in his “A. It was at that hem, “(b) I was “(a) Any person Upon Well, Would that I unless [*] advising or been asked him he had a possession any gun. and it is not an issue him, to the 6-11-115, W.S.1977,Cum.Supp.1981: replied the Defendant hurriedly remembered the conviction, [*] mention pardoned, I asked him if he had a this? you negative. convicted assault to commit pat gave respect who has part he did not. if [*] describe the manner in time, Defendant about the war- You him turned relating firearm is (5) years.” the offender and who uses or has down,, said me, appropriate limiting to the [*] just previously pleaded the Defendant did in the murder, and went second and then all of a ‘hurriedly’. before degree, may- stood complaint anyways, [*] I to the arrest: gun, advised penitentiary outstanding murder, guilty voluntary time us. gun shall [*] and he sexual him De- ag- be hands to see what he was war front occurred “Q. him trying pull him back out of the front-seat area in the of the vehicle. serve? seat area and floorboard area neath the driver’s seat. point reached back and locked the back door “Q. him and was “A. “Q. What did “A. He was bent over inside the He was still “A. he wasn’t open “A. “A. “Q. cle. “A. “Q. scribe for the Defendant what his out of the just hurriedly type kind of And what did (By Finally, Well, And I What did I He door, [*] observed his hands to immediately didn’t then Mr. prevent any manner, what, walking like to the front-seat area of his vehi- attempting car.” [*] trying actions were that after some over the driver’s seat. Jury, Smith) car, as to do? say anything. you you I if you stated, —he [*] back and forth in a anything, —went please, just do? followed him. do then? you accomplish? What else did were pull further movement to reach in and at one didn’t tried [*] time, I moving him out of attempted to his car to the doing He quite run, [*] what you reaching you was able directly observe that? just around the open observed. you you observe the car. [*] tug-of- turned I was What door pull saw for. ob- but be- his and, help supra endeavor with nies listed in fn. ed in his which arrived, which had hand- police backup lawfully possessing thus barred him from patted He then down cuffed However, firearm. the district court ruled car. and searched his Under that the officer be should allowed to side he found a .22 floor mat on the driver’s answer the because the fact that revolver. caliber had been convicted of *3 County of Court iden- firearm, The Laramie Clerk together assault with a with the in and there was received evidence tified arresting fact that the officer this case judgment and sentence entered copy of complaint upon knew that which the aggravated previous on the conviction alleged appellant warrant was based had a appel- There was no evidence assault. why gun, operated arresting to show pardoned. At trial another lant had been stopped when he officer acted as who testified con- police officer was called appellant’s positions One at felony 1973 conviction cerning appellant’s arresting the trial was that officer had weapon. The dangerous for assault with a made an unreasonable search and seizure. police officer testified the conviction fol- officer, An with such information in his appellant an incident in which lowed possession, would be ill-advised not to take him, appel- establish fired a appropriate protective measures. There by lant’s conviction of assault necessity was under all circumstances identifying appellant person as the so con- present protect the officer from assault Appellant tried to avoid the offi- victed. weapon. with a concealed Parkhurst v. testimony regard by stipulat- in that cer’s State, (1981); Wyo., 628 P.2d 1369 Neilson However, the ing felony conviction. State, Wyo., (1979); Terry v. 599 P.2d 1326 testimony trial ruled the admissible Ohio, 1, 1868, 20 v. 392 88 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. gave limiting instruction as anyway and States, (1968); 889 Preston v. 376 previous to that conviction. United 364, 367, 881, 883, 84 11 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. ap- the vehicle The firearm taken from (1964). 777 am- pellant driving was and the rounds of in evi- munition it contained were received said, As we have often a trial court’s No was introduced at trial dence. evidence questions concerning the ad- resolution of appellant to establish either the State missibility of is accorded consider- evidence handgun operable. whether the How- long legiti- there is a able deference. So as ever, appellant objected to the instructions it, mate and rational basis for we will not they given in this case on the basis that State, appeal. Apodaca Wyo., v. reverse on impose the burden failed to State (1981). 627 P.2d 1023 proving operable. that the firearm was Here, ruling that the the district court’s evaluating evidence would be relevant arresting officer’s with re- The first we shall address the search spect to the reasonableness of propriety admitting testi concerns Accordingly we and seizure is rational. relating appellant’s pri- mony the nature of reverse on this basis. felony conviction where cannot willing stipulate that he was in fact a stipulation was not

convicted felon. II was on the offered until the officer question we must ad The second for what stand and had been asked to state erred whether the trial court dress concerns The district act was convicted.4 neces that a by failing to instruct appel court allowed the that the the offense was that sary one of the felo- element of lant had been convicted of (1980) recognized Wyo., procedure were 604 P.2d 1341 and elements for State, here. and followed the trial court conviction set out in Chavez v. 86 operable.5 The merely

firearm be statute NRS 202.360. Cartwright, See State v. possession talks in terms of 120, firearm. 822, 246 Or. (Or.1966), 418 P.2d 830-831 operability No mention is made of an re- denied, 937, rt. 386 U.S. 87 S.Ct. ce quirement. This court has held that a fire- (1967).” Rusling L.Ed.2d 810 v. operable to arm need not be constitute a State, Nev., (1980). P.2d “dangerous deadly weapon” under 6-§ purposes us, For the of the case before 70B, (now W.S.1977). W.S.1957 we see no reason to deviate from the ap- State, Wyo., Evanson v. 546 P.2d 412 proach Here, followed Nevada. no evi- pistol jammed There a oper- and would not dence showing was introduced the firearm also, Shafsky Wyo., ate. See Further, to have inoperable. been (1974) cartridge clip P.2d 60 where the was evidence that the revolver was loaded pistol not inserted and the was therefore cartridges with at the time of inoperative; the conviction was affirmed. Thus, arrest. we conclude that it was not States with similar statutes have held error for the district reject court *4 that, appellant’s absent introduction of instruction requiring jury the specifically to some evidence inoper- that the firearm was find the operable.6 firearm able, it is not error to fail to instruct the Affirmed. jury operability that is an essential element. appellant’s

“As to second contention that the trial in failing court erred to instruct ROSE, Justice, Chief specially concurring. jury the that the operability of the hand- I am opinion of the judge the trial gun was an essential element of the erred when permitted the State’s wit- crime, we find Appellant no error. of- ness, Terwilleger, Officer testify to concern- indicating fered no evidence the ing appellant’s prior aggrava- conviction for handgun officers, inoperable. Both ted assault. I will therefore concur in the Scholl, gun Shelton and the ap- testified only. result peared operable it contained live case-in-chief, in its Further, called Offi- gun ammunition. the as well as Terwilleger cer of the clip Cheyenne the Police and ammunition were admitted De- partment into to the judg- evidence. It was within the witness stand testify to ment gun conviction, of the to the about prior conclude that a neces- was a firearm within the definition of sary charged element of the offense.1 This following “(a) weapon designed offered the refused Rifle. —A rede- purportedly signed, remade, instruction from 18 taken U.S.C. made or and intended to be 921(a)(3): designed fired from the shoulder and or rede- signed energy and made or any “The term remade to use the ‘firearm’ means includes explosive weapon expel cartridge of the projectile by a fixed which will metallic a the only single projectile explosive.” through to fire a action of an a rifled single pull misrepresents trigger. bore It for each actually of the that section which “(b) Shotgun. weapon designed reads: and re- —A designed, remade, “(3) (A) any made or weap- The term ‘firearm’ means intended to designed (including gun) be fired from the on shoulder and a starter which will or is redesigned designed may readily and made or to or remade to use the be converted to energy explosive expel shotgun projectile explo- in a fixed the action of an through sive; (B) shell to fire a smooth the frame or bore either a receiver of such weapon; (C) any single projectile number of ball shot or a firearm muffler or firearm silencer; single pull (D) any trigger.” each of the destructive device. Such judge apparently adopted antique The trial term does not include an sense of firearm.” handgun. this statute to include a 6. The trial instructed: any weapon “The term ‘firearm’ majority, appellant denotes de- 1. As noted was con- signed expel projectile by 6-11-115, W.S.1977, action an victed of a violation of § explosion, any handgun, Cumm.Supp., and includes According rifle or require- to the shotgun.” obliged ments of this statute the State was prove The firearm in evidence had these characteris- had been convicted of one tics. following murder, or more of the crimes: vol- untary manslaughter, Section W.S.1977: assault to commit mur- was the same officer at whom the transcript witness when the basis upholding appellant had fired a shot in 1973. When admission of the testimony was asserted. prosecutor question asked the witness a It is my therefore conclusion that the ma- concerning the nature of the of- jority opinion countenances the admission fense, but before the was answer- the testimony through imagined justi- ed, stipulate defense counsel offered to fication-one is not reflected in the appellant’s prior stipula- conviction. This record. accepted by

tion —which was the prosecutor my judgment, In prosecution, approved by agreed court — agreeing proposed to the stipulation, was appellant’s prior conviction was for a crime bound its terms and it was thereafter statute, which is included within the improper to offer concerning appel- that he was the one who committed it. prior lant’s Griffin, conviction. In re See: so, Even judge permitted pros- the trial Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d Ct.App. ecutor to continue to extract detailed testi- prosecution If the wanted to show mony having from the witness to do with previously defendant had fired a offense, prior including the fact that it shotgun Terwilleger, at Officer stipula- being involved fired at De- him. tion should not have been entered into. fense persistently objected counsel The case law is clear that the State is not relevance the testimony light of the required to enter into a offered stipulation that had been entered into and prove offense, an element charged approved by the court. The trial it present is entitled to prov- the facts admitted the testimony grounds: on three ing Szeto, People that element. See: *5 (1) identification; purposes (2) for 652, 20, Cal.Rptr. 29 Cal.3d 623 P.2d 213 purpose proving the the element of the (1981); Duran, Utah, State v. 522 P.2d 1374 charged; (3) crime for the reason that (1974); McClellan, People 31, v. Cal.Rptr. 80 testimony the was relevant probable (1969). 457 prosecutor P.2d 871 Here the testimony arresting of the officer. accept chose to stipulation. the At that Notwithstanding stipulation the and the point there necessity any was no further grounds upon which the trial admit- relevance for the officer’s con- evidence, ted the the majority opinion up- cerning the prior aggravated conviction for holds the admission of the officer’s testimo- stipulated assault. The State had to an ny theory on a that no one else had ever offense, charged element of the and the of, i.e., thought it was relevant to a trial court permitted allowing erred when it question concerning the reasonableness of any testimony. stipulation further The the officer’s arrest and seizure weap- of the not recite that prior conviction on. While justification urged this was firing resulted because of the court, the State in its brief before my this police at a officer and the fact that review of the record does not disclose that aggravated upon assault was committed the reasonableness of the search and seizure statute, police officer was irrelevant. The was an issue at trial. The record reflects 6-11-115, supra, does not delineate be- only time a search and seizure aggravated tween upon assault committed question up pretrial came in a was motion ordinary citizens and that committed suppress by appellant’s filed counsel. officers. Since the cover- This motion was denied necessary prove ed the facts element jurisdiction. lack of The issue was not crime, proof of the the need for further again trial, raised and the instructions do ended. not even intimate question was jury. explains though submitted to the Even I why opinion This am of the point the State did not to a reference in the admitting error was committed in Officer der, assault, aggravated robbery, burglary appellant’s previous conviction for degree, sexual assault in the first or second assault. mayhem. In this case the focused on 88 evidence, testimony into

Terwilleger’s prejudiced error

cannot conclude is in this case. burden defendant the com

on the show

plained-of prejudiced him to error such

degree required. that reversal is Belondon 238, City Wyo., P.2d cert. Casper,

v. 456

den., 398 90 26 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. State, (1969); Wyo., Drummer v. 366 (1961). Here present

P.2d was proving

ed with substantial evidence offense, which, charged

elements of the not

including testimony, suf erroneous

ficient to There no convict about the fact that cir possession firearm. Under the

cumstances, I cannot conclude that possibility,

was a in the reasonable absence error, the verdict in the case

would have been different. Nimmo v.

State, (1979); Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 Reeder Wyo., P.2d I there

fore concur result reached

majority.

James C. SHAFFER and Karin G.

Shaffer, Appellants (Defendants) Wyoming, Appellee

The STATE of

(Plaintiff).

No. 5496.

Supreme Wyoming. Court of

Feb.

Case Details

Case Name: Benson v. State
Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date Published: Feb 5, 1982
Citation: 640 P.2d 83
Docket Number: 5538
Court Abbreviation: Wyo.
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