Benson v. Otis Elevator Co.Benson v. Otis Elevator Co.
We generally review a denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011). Doe cannot demonstrate such abuse here because he never asserted in the district court that he stood ready to amend the complaint to name the designating employee as a defendant. See Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[N]o court can be said to have erred in failing to grant a request [for leave to amend] that was not made.“). Insofar as Doe submitted in the district court that he would substitute the designating employee for Whidden, whatever further consideration that might warrant with respect to the timeliness of any action against the designating official, it does not support maintaining this action against Whidden. See generally Ansam Assocs., Inc. v. Cola Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d 442, 446 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of leave to amend given “that discovery had already been completed and [defendant] had already filed a motion for summary judgment“); accord AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 727 (2d Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, we identify no error in the award of summary judgment to Whidden without affording leave to amend.
3. Denial of Oral Argument
As for Doe‘s complaint that the district court granted summary judgment without affording him oral argument, a “district court acts well within its discretion in deciding dispositive motions on the parties’ written submissions without oral argument.” Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2005). Thus, “[a] party seeking to reverse a summary judgment order must demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the court‘s refusal to hear argument.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 203 n. 9 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Although Doe maintains that issues related to the statute of limitations and unidentified material facts “could have been reviewed and amplified at oral argument,” Appellant‘s Br. 19, he fails to show that these arguments would have altered the outcome so as to demonstrate prejudice.
4. Conclusion
We have considered all of Doe‘s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
Kristin G. McGurn (Mary E. Ahrens, on the brief), Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, RALPH K. WINTER and GUIDO CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Kelley Staples Benson appeals from a September 14, 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Engelmayer, J.), granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Otis Elevator Company (“Otis“), United Technologies Corporation (“UTC“), and Jack Hager on Benson‘s employment discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL“),
We review a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate only where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit employers from, among other things, discriminating on the basis of race or color.
In this case, the defendants contend that Benson‘s employment was terminated as part of a company-wide “reduction-in-force” program because her position was no longer suited to Otis‘s business needs and because her performance was subpar. Benson argues that these rationales were pretextual, pointing to a few comments made by two superiors, the fact that other non-African American LRP participants were not fired as part of the downsizing program, and a series of workplace grievances. But while two of the comments Benson cites certainly had racial undertones, there is no evidence that they were malicious. In any event, the two comments occurred more than a year before Benson‘s termination, and were not made by Defendant Hager, the manager with sole responsibility for Benson‘s termination. Additionally, the record is devoid of evidence that the other LRP participants to whom Benson refers, who worked under different managers in other branches and regions, were similarly situated to Benson. There is likewise no evidence that any of the actions underlying Benson‘s
Turning to Benson‘s aiding and abetting claims, because Benson failed to raise a genuine factual dispute with respect to the defendants’ discriminatory intent, the district court properly dismissed these claims for failure to adduce evidence sufficient to establish a primary violation. See, e.g., Strauss v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Educ., 26 A.D.3d 67, 805 N.Y.S.2d 704, 709 (N.Y.App.Div.2005).
As to Benson‘s discovery challenges, we review a district court‘s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.2005). Benson first argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request to extend the deadline for fact discovery. But when opposing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Benson failed to submit an affidavit or declaration under
Benson also argues that the district court abused its discretion in issuing a protective order governing the treatment of confidential discovery materials. We find no merit in Benson‘s contention that this order somehow relieved the producing party of its burden to show that confidential treatment was necessary and shifted the burden to the nonproducing party to show that protection was unnecessary. In any event, Benson identifies no discovery material that was inappropriately designated as confidential, nor does she explain how her inability to disclose such material to third parties harmed her in any way.
We have considered all of the plaintiff‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.