56 Pa. Super. 226 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1914
Opinion by
The plaintiff alleged in his statement of claim in this action of assumpsit that he was a resident of the borough of Palo Alto; that no high school was maintained in that school district; that a high school was maintained in the adjoining borough of Pottsville, near his home, by the school district of the latter borough; that he obtained the consent of the directors of the Pottsville district to have his daughter, who was of proper age and qualified to attend a high school, to attend the high school of that district; that the rate fixed by the Pottsville district for tuition and school books was 15.00 per month; that the amount paid by him, at this rate, to the Pottsville district for his daughter, between the beginning of the fall term in 1907 and the end of the school year in June, 1909, was $100; and that the school district of Palo Alto, the defendant, had refused to pay to him the money he had thus paid to the Pottsville district. This action was brought to recover the amount with interest. On the trial of the case, all of the facts alleged as above were agreed to or were established by the evidence, and there was no dispute as to the reasonableness of the charges collected by and paid to the Pottsville district. The plaintiff claimed that an obliga
One of the defendant’s contentions is that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the benefits of the act of 1907 because his daughter was originally admitted to the Pottsville high school prior to the passage of the act in accordance with the regular rules of the board adopted under the authority given by clause 2, sec. 1, of the Act of May 26, 1893, P. L. 146, which rules allowed nonresident pupils to enter “upon the voluntary payment of the amount fixed for their tuition,” provided the schools were not overcrowded and the applicants were prepared by scholarship to enter. The only evidence of the facts upon which this contention is based is contained in a letter of a deceased superintendent, which was admitted in evidence without objection. Waiving all question as to the mode of proof, it is plain that the facts stated in the letter do not warrant the
Another contention is that the defendant was not a party to the admission of the plaintiff’s daughter into the Pottsville high school, which was conceded on the trial, and it was under no duty to pay the charges of that district for tuition and school books. This would be true if its liability depended on compliance with the provisions of the Act of April 3, 1903, P. L. 153, for that act declared that the attendance of children at the schools of a district other than that of their residence should not begin until after “provision for the same, and its duration, and for the expense of tuition .... has been made by the boards of directors of the districts interested, by security as required by existing laws.” The decision in Cascade School Dist. v. Lewis School Dist., 43 Pa. 318, which was based on a construction of the general school law of 1849, and the amended school law of 1854 would apply with equal force. But this condition as to prior arrangement between the two school districts was omitted from the act of 1907, and that it was designedly omitted is shown by the substitution of a provision that the consent of the directors of the district in which the high school is located be first obtained. It is to be noticed that the two acts do not relate to identically the same subject-matter. The act of 1903 related to attendance at “public schools of higher grades or courses of study, including high schools, in other districts,” while the act of 1907 related exclusively to a smaller, class of subjects, namely, to children residing in school districts in which no public high school is maintained attending a high school in some other district. The evident pur
The defendant’s third contention is that the action was barred by the express repeal of the act of 1907 by the Act of May 18, 1911, P. L. 309, 454. To state the proposition in the language of the learned trial judge: “the repeal of the act of 1907 by the school code wiped out the right of this plaintiff to recover. That right was purely statutory and the statute had been repealed before the plaintiff sought to exercise his right.” Before adopting this conclusion it will be well to consider the nature of the plaintiff’s demand. It has no cast of a penalty, and, therefore, those cases which, out of regard for personal liberty, hold that no judgment can be rendered in a suit for a penalty after the repeal of the act by which it is imposed, do not control the decision of this case. The demand arose out of the payment by the plaintiff of a sum of money which the defendant was under the primary obligation to pay to the Potts-ville district, and which, having been paid by the plaintiff, the defendant was under legal obligation to repay to him: It has the distinguishing feature of a debt, technically so called, namely, that it is for a sum certain: Baum v. Tonkin, 110 Pa. 569. And the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff to discharge it was not only perfect at the time of the passage of the act of 1911, but was as meritorious in law and morals as if the money had been paid to the Pottsville district pursuant to the express request of the defendant, and the
The judgment is reversed and the record is remitted with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict.