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Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Company Crum & Forster Managers Corporation, (Ill)
38 F.3d 1303
3rd Cir.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 is af- Judgment affirmed, the Amended

firmed. TOWNSHIP, Appellant,

BENSALEM IN- LINES SURPLUS

INTERNATIONAL COMPANY; & For- Crum

SURANCE (Ill). Corporation, Managers ster and 93-1072.

Nos. 93-1071 Appeals, Court

United States

Third Circuit. Aug.

Argued on 7, 1994.

Decided Oct. Rehearing Petition

Sur 1, 1994. Banc Nov.

OPINION THE OF COURT ROTH, Judge: Circuit action, plaintiff this Township Bensalem (Township) appeals the district court order dismissing its complaint against defendants, Surplus International Lines Insurance Co. (Insur- & Managers Corp. Crum Forster ers), for failure to pursuant state a claim 12(b)(6). Fed.R.Civ.P. Township had con- tracted with professional Insurers for liabili- ty covering insurance all civil claims first against made the town or its during officials policy period. agreement The included a typical exclusion clause that coverage barred any arising claims pre-policy litiga- tion. Township When renewed its 1989,Insurers language added expanding the scope of what Township had expect come as the standard prior litigation exclusion clause. The new exclusion limited to claims completely unrelated matter, regardless of whether the matter litigation money involved damages. Thereafter, (Blanche Corp. Blanche Road Road), a real developer, estate filed federal rights civil complaint naming Town- several ship officials as defendants. The lawsuit was years result of of friction between Blanche Road regarding the development parcels of certain of land locat- ed in Township. After attempts several obtain under the insurance for the cost of defending the Blanche Road litigation, Township filed the instant com- plaint. The district court subsequently granted dismiss, Insurers’ motion to conclud- ing that the Road Blanche lawsuit fell within express terms policy’s exclusion It clause. held provision barred coverage because the federal cause action involved the same underlying and cir- facts Neil A. (Argued), Morris Neil A. Morris cumstances as several pre-policy state dis- Associates, P.C., PA, Philadelphia, appel- putes. Township challenges decision, ar- lant. guing that the new added Thompson Peter (Argued), G. I. exclusion clause is Charles par- inconsistent with the Hadden, Douglas Nazarian, R.M. Ross, ties’ expectations. Moreover, Dix- reasonable on Masback, & Washington, DC, Frank Mi- maintains that the district court D’Amore,.Saul, chael Ewing, Saul, Remiek erred & not giving it the opportunity to PA, Philadelphia, prove for appellees. through contention develop- further

ment of the record. STAPLETON, Before: HUTCHINSON also appeals the district court ROTH, Circuit Judges. imposing sanction to Fed. of said and written notice period 'policy imposed $2000 R.Civ.P. during Company by the claim is received finding that Township after sanction period. inquiry conduct failed to had the Rule to determine a motion it filed when Company will reimburse B. *3 a while court the district motion in which the Entity all Loss for for Public appeal. on pending rehearing was petition for by law to required entity shall be Public was rea- motion Township contends any claim civil Insureds for indemnify the a circumstances under the sonable against them because made claims first or district divest the not appeal does premature Act, that the claim provided Wrongful of a pending to consider jurisdiction court of policy period and during the made is first 59(e) motion. Rule received claim is of said written notice policy period. during the Company below, we will forth set the reasons For complaint and of the dismissal reverse added). (emphasis consistent proceedings for further remand poli- portion of made the claims While reverse will also opinion. We with agreement, prior that of the cy is identical to against Rule sanction imposing a policy’s in the difference significant there is Township. parties past, the In the provision. exclusion litigation exclu- typical prior agreed to had I. relating to all claims bars sion clause that County, Pennsylvania, Township, a Bucks policy was When the lawsuits. pre-policy state municipality, however, filed renewed, expanded Insurers subsequently re- July Insurers 1991. exclusion provision. The new scope of that Dis- the United States moved the action states: Penn- of Eastern District trict Court the insur- agreed that It is understood following accept as true sylvania. We making any responsible for not er shall be Township’s com- allegations, contained any in connection payment for loss to dismiss. motion light of Insurers’ plaint, based any against insured made claim Allentown, F.2d City Holder See of of, consequence or in upon, arising out Cir.1993). (3d 188, 194 involving: way any or in litigation as (1) pending any prior and/or Policy Insurance A. The including period] [pre-policy 2/1/89 its Public Township renewed April In local, before to matters but not limited Liability Insurance Employees’ Officials’ commissions, boards, or state, or federal year, commenc- for one Policy with Insurers agencies, or administrative Although aware ing April 1989. circumstance, (2) or situation any fact, or litigation exclusion to the addition litigation alleged in such underlying or it was clause, Township apparently believed matter. or type insur- essentially same receiving added). In- always received policy it Insurers added (emphasis had ance only exclu- surers, usual subject effectively essence restricts any pre- completely unrelated sions. those claims the dis- of whether dispute, regardless monetary loss any agreement covers by the legal claim covered pute involved during $1,000,000 claims made for civil up to acts wrongful arising from period states: us and insured. argued both before Township has expect not court that did district before the pay on behalf company will A. The exclusionary language would the new the Insureds all Loss the Insureds pre- been previously had not bar claims pay for obligated to legally shall claims, petitions e.g., to it as insurable against sented first made claim or claims civil before proceedings or injunctive relief Act, provided Wrongful aof them because agencies. administrative during the made the claim first Dispute B. The Blanche Road wages. interest and The suit was settled parties when stipulated both that the build- In December Blanche Road named ing permits would be reinstated.1 many of its current and for- mer employees officials and ain federal civil subsequently Blanche Road filed its feder- rights § suit to 42 U.S.C. rights al civil complaint alleging that certain Corp. See Blanche v. Township, Road No. Township officials had violated the Due Pro- (E.D.Pa. 1989). 89-9040 filed December cess by attempting Clause pay- to coerce The suit years was the culmination of several required ments by impeding law and arising development contention from the development Blanche Road’s of the Industri- the Blanche Road Industrial Park located in addition, al Park. Blanche Road claimed *4 Township. that Township Equal had violated the Protec- In Blanche Road commenced devel- by tion Clause applying different standards opment parcels of certain securing of land from those used for developers. other This necessary building permits town and en- was the first time that Blanche Road filed a tering agreements into of with sale several against federal action Township seeking buyers. Subsequently, Township made some money damages. It was also the first time financial demands which Blanche Road al- that Blanche Road raised constitutional leged required by any were not town ordi- claims and the first many time that nance. then stop issued a work town officials were named as defendants. A order and cited Blanche Road with certain held, trial was jury and a a entered verdict in town ordinance violations. On December favor of Blanche Road in amount appealed Blanche Road the order to $2,000,000plus interest, costs, attorneys’ and Appeals Town Code Board. While the fees. The subsequently district court grant- appeal pending, Township revoked Township’s ed motion for a new trial. That Blanche building permits Road’s and issued a apparently trial is pending. still stop second work order. Thereafter, 20, 1988, January on Blanche Township’s Declaratory C. complaint Road a quo filed warranto in the Judgment Action Court of Common County, Pleas Bucks Once the litigation Blanche Road federal Pennsylvania. sought It declaring order commenced, Township filed a claim with In- Appeals Town Code Board mem- surers under the terms of poli- the insurance appointments bers’ were null and void. cy. Township believed it was entitled to Blanche Road wanted the members excluded rights because the civil complaint from serving on the Board. was filed during policy period and it was Blanche Road also equity filed an action in the first time Blanche Road had filed a feder- state court on February 1988. In that al seeking money suit damages. Township suit, sought Road injunctive Blanche and de- had not filed claim Insurers for claratory relief as well as ancillary some prior Blanche state Road proceedings damages. Blanche Road asked the court to they because equitable involved relief not enjoin Township enforcing from stop work covered under provisions levying penalties. and fines or More- over, it wanted the court to stop declare the work order null and void. only damages dispute After a arose between Insurers Blanche sought Road delay were for the Township regarding coverage under the some construction work and certain policy, related Township filed the complaint instant 1. We note that there were two other state improvements they certain proper- made their to proceedings that ty related to the Blanche Road and to release owners their obli- dispute. proceedings gations Neither of the were under initi- a letter of credit. case, ated Blanche Road. In one certain case, another related official individual owners of lots within the Industrial private swore out a complaint criminal in Dis- complaint Park filed a naming in mandamus against trict Justice one Court of Blanche Road’s Supervisors Town Board as defendants. The principals. dispute to a related sought compel owners approve to the Board to over one of the lots in the Industrial Park. concerning the insurance discussions Bucks Pleas of Common in the Court as policy in as well Endorsement issue seeking both declara- Pennsylvania, County, believe, This, we will also devel- No. 1. removed monetary relief. Insurers tory and generally do op proof Court District States to United the action Defendants’ attempt apply Pennsylvania. or even District the Eastern enforce they in this policy No. as Endorsement alleged that case, i.e., claims. and that uninsurable litigation Road the Blanche covered duty pay de- contractual what Insurers had does not define d.The instant cer- alleged that Township also except by negative costs. fense claim is an insurable ambiguous i.e., ¶4^), were aspects of Definitions, tain in III inference coverage. in favor of construed only. should money be Plaintiff needs damages discovery oral take written and Town- to dismiss a motion Insurers filed discovery believes issue. Plaintiff a claim failing to state complaint for ship’s ‘prior claims reveal that had will granted could upon which relief timely been related thereto’ 12(b)(6). argued that facts They Fed.R.Civ.P. policy, under Defen- Defendants’ filed barred exclusion rejected the claims would have dants involved *5 litigation Road federal Blanche Thus, able to anyway. Plaintiff will be prior state as the issues five facts and similar “prior claim” ex- prove that Defendants’ un- While equitable relief. for proceedings (but is), clusion, ambiguous real- if it not claims provision exclusion the former der “prior claims.” ly meant insurable prior they if related only barred would be deposi- to take g. will need that the lan- maintained litigation, Insurers Plaintiff Township Bensalem tions barred policy specifically in the new offi- guage offormer cials, employees, representatives and/or prior relating administrative claims Township, longer work who no matter. proceeding or for knowledge, under- respect to their motion and opposed Insurers’ Township standing discussions with and Defen- requested opposition this connection with concerning the agents dants and their discovery to permitted to conduct that it be in issue and exclusions policy, claims expectation that its reasonable demonstrate case, Road as the Blanche litigation, such omitted). (footnote In- Brief at 9 Appellant’s Township by the would covered stay discovery pending reso- moved surers areas following explanation of the gave the The dis- to dismiss. motion lution of their discovery and the to take it needed stay March 27. on granted trict court discovery: this underlying for reasons discovery then was issue of further relied, Mo- in their have b. Defendants when, by entered June order mooted dismiss, No. 1 Endorsement tion to mo- granted Insurers’ the district clause, concerning exclusionary as to dismiss. tion litigation. prior claims Plaintiff’s memorandum, dismissing the com- In its what, any, discus- need to discover if that the court held plaint, the district sions, or other explanations information coverage be- precluded expressly exclusion representa- agents or Defendants’, their litigation Road federal the Blanche cause explaining gave to the tives Plaintiff underlying circumstances involved the same exclusion, impact on how would It con- proceedings. state pre-policy as the con- relate to other Township and unambiguous was that the cluded exclusion policy, said flicting exclusions plain according be enforced and should lUd), excluding ie., Definition, § language. “non-money” damages. all claims for depositions discovery and Written Proceedings Post-Judgment D. employees agents

Defendants’ necessary. 23,- Township a letter sent would be On June un- court, was stating that the order to the prior discover needs to c. drafts Plaintiff not indicate whether it did clear memos internal and Defendants’ prejudice and it was with or without did II. specify both defendants. also stat- diversity jurisdiction The district court had that, preju- if ed the dismissal was without pursuant § of this action to 28 U.S.C. dice, it an amended would move to file com- jurisdiction pursuant We to 28 U.S.C.

plaint. appears It intended § 1291. the letter as a motion to amend the district plenary We exercise review of the 59(e). pursuant court order to Fed.R.Civ.P. district court’s dismissal of a under 7,1992, July receiving response On 12(b)(6). Fed.R.Civ.P. Ditri v. Coldwell court, Township from the filed its amended Inc., Affiliates, Banker Residential 954 F.2d 8,1992, complaint. July On filed a (3d Cir.1992). 869, 871 We review the dis 9,1992, July appeal. notice of On the district imposing trict court Rule sanctions Township’s court denied motion to file an for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. complaint. amended The order did not ad- 384, 385, 110 Corp., Hartmarx 496 U.S. S.Ct. 59(e) dress the motion. Rule 2447, 2450, (1990). 110 L.Ed.2d 359 13, 1992, By order entered October we III. 8,1992, Township’s July dismissed appeal for first address the issue of whether jurisdiction. Township lack of subsequently Township’s complaint properly dismissed petition rehearing filed a in this Court 12(b)(6). to Fed.R.Civ.P. We ac and a motion to determine the Rule cept well-pleaded all allegations in Town motion in the district court. Insurers filed ship’s complaint as true and construe all motion, response to the district court indicat- inferences the avowed facts ing petition rehearing divested *6 in Township. may favor of affirm the jurisdiction. the district court of Insurers only dismissal if appears certain that no also filed a motion for sanctions granted relief could be provable under stating Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 legal incurred set of facts. Blaw Knox Retirement Income $8,800 responding fees to the “unneces- Indus., Inc., Plan v. White Consol. 998 F.2d sary” district court motion. The district — (3d 1185, Cir.1993), denied, 1188 cert. Township’s court dismissed motion to deter- —, 687, U.S. 114 S.Ct. 126 L.Ed.2d 655 59(e) juris- mine the Rule motion for lack of (1994). diction. diversity juris- district court exercised 30, 1992, granted On November we Town- obliged apply diction and was the substan- ship’s request panel rehearing tive and issued law of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co., 487, v. opinion affirming Mfg. an Co. Stentor Elec. clarifying our 313 U.S. 61 earli- (1941). 1020, S.Ct. 85 L.Ed. 1477 par- er dismissing Township’s appeal decision agree Pennsylvania governs ties law jurisdiction. lack of appeal We held case. premature 23, Township’s June 1992, letter to the district court was a Rule Expectations A. Reasonable 59(e) motion appeal that tolled the time for thirty days until after We find that the the district court dis- district court should 4(a)(4). posed not have dismissed of the without Fed.R.App.P. motion. allowing discovery on the issue of whether 2, 1992, On December renewed language the new added to the insurance its motion to determine the Rule motion policy’s prior litigation exclusion clause is By the district court. order entered Janu- Township’s inconsistent with reasonable ex 14, 1993, ary the district court denied Town- pectation type coverage provided ship’s day, motion. On the same the court agreement. under Township may While order, separate granting entered Insurers’ change language have known of the in the motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The court the exclusion clause when it renewed the awarded Township’s timely Insurers policy, $2000. it should oppor nevertheless have the appeals followed. tunity to discover and submit evidence that

1309 France Co. v. Allstate Ins. ex- J.H. in it a reasonable had created Insurers Refractories 468, Co., 185, 472 Pa.Super. 396 578 A.2d claims policy would cover pectation (1990) added), (emphasis part by the federal presented as that such aff'd (1993). 29, part, Pa. 626 A.2d 502 rev’d in 534 litigation. Blanche Road Farm Mut. Auto. See also Tonkovic State that we should dispute the notion Insurers (1987) Co., 920, 445, A.2d 926 Ins. 513 Pa. 521 expec- parties’ reasonable what the consider (“Courts assuring should be concerned with been, arguing that such might tations have purchasing public’s rea Pennsylvania precluded under inquiry is fulfilled.”) (quoting expectations are sonable of a are clear the terms law where Co., Ins. 479 Pa. Collister v. Nationwide Life Indeed, correctly Insurers unambiguous. denied, 579, 1346, (1978), cert. 388 A.2d 1353 appears to be the rule what state 871, 1089, L.Ed.2d 55 439 U.S. 99 S.Ct. 59 eases, Thus, run of in the Pennsylvania. Co., (1979)); Keystone 433 Frain v. Ins. the contract is ... “[w]here (1994) 1352, 462, Pa.Super. A.2d 1354 640 required unambiguous, a court is clear and (“While expectations of the in reasonable language.” Standard Ve- to that give effect points interpreting sured are the focal Empire Ins. Blind v. American netian Co. policies, an language of insurance contract (1983). 563, Co., A.2d 566 Pa. complain that his or her insured language added to point to the new Insurers expectations were frustrated reasonable which, they argue, ex- clause the exclusion are clear and unam policy limitations which Blanche Road pressly (citations omitted); bars biguous.”) Everett Cash dispute Krawitz, arises litigation because Pa.Super. federal Mut. Ins. Co. v. (1993) (“[C]ourts and circumstances as from the same facts must 633 A.2d proceedings. expectation local pre-policy state and focus on the reasonable transaction.”) (cita insured in an insurance law, Pennsylvania case As read the we omitted); Security Ameri Dibble v. tions part justified this rule based courts Pa.Super. Ins. can Life in most cases the supposition (1991) (“[T]he proper focus A.2d provide will language of an insurance regarding under insurance issues of the content of the indication the best expectation of the contracts is the courts expectations. The parties’ reasonable totality of must examine the insured. Courts *7 parties’ reason- have made it clear involved to ascer the insurance transaction the touchstone of expectations are to be able in expectation of the reasonable tain the meaning of an insurance any inquiry into the sured.”) (citations omitted); Mut. Harford Yet policy. Moorhead, 234, 578 Pa.Super. Ins. Co. (1990) (“[Ojverly-subtle or A.2d [a]ny expectation which would reasonable used to interpretations not be technical parties by this or imputed to the be insureds.”), expectations of defeat reasonable necessarily rely upon, and be court must denied, 617, 590 A.2d 757 527 Pa. appeal with, reasonably the written consistent (1991). Accordingly, in certain situations the simply because phraseology, document al expectations insured’s will be contrary to any interpretation advanced language of an express the lowed to defeat could document the contents written insurance assert; hardly as “reasonable” to be viewed Pennsylvania Supreme Court first be- good reason in law is advanced The unless exceptions to the clearly contrary gan to carve out disregarding the analy- began The court its rule Collister.2 phraseology. rely on for consumers actually fore not unreasonable process started with Justice Man- 2. expert representations rather than opinion Rempel v. Nationwide derino’s Life Co., (1977), insurance itself." the contents of the 471 Pa. 370 A.2d 366 Ins. noted, Moreover, opinion A.2d at 368. justices the remain- which two concurred while allowing response assertion that judgment to Nationwide's ing without three concurred in the theory misrepresentation to suc- plaintiff's opinion. opinion "Consumers ... stated: an increase in fraudulent possessing would lead to agent ceed claims, ... as one view insurance sympathy "very had little subject. that the court expertise complicated It is there- ain by observing premium paid. sis that transactions between rabie value in return for the fundamentally keep insurers and insureds are dif- Courts should also alert to the fact parties expectations ferent from those between to con- of the insured are large by by measure created tracts as envisioned the common law. insurance industry Through itself. the use of approach contractual The traditional fails lengthy, complex cumbersomely writ- to consider the true nature of relation- applications, receipts, ten conditional rid- ship the insurer and between its insureds. ers, few, policies, just to name a Only through recognition insur- industry insurance forces the insurance freely negotiated ance contracts are not rely upon representa- consumer the oral agreements by parties entered into agent. repre- tions of the insurance Such status; equal only by acknowledging that may may accurately sentations or re- the conditions of an insurance contract are flect the contents of the written document part by for the most dictated the insurance and therefore the insurer in a often companies and that the insured cannot position reap the benefit of the insured’s “bargain” anything over more than the understanding lack of of the transaction. monetary coverage purchased, amount of analysis approach does our the realities of Id. an insurance transaction. Collister, Pennsylvania With seemed to Collister, 388 A.2d at 1358. Because of the significant step have taken a adopting toward unique dynamics relationship of this between expectations principle the reasonable as stat- insureds, principles insurers and certain ed then-Professor Keeton his landmark guide interpretation must of insurance Henderson, Roger article.3 See C. The Doc-

policies. trine Expectations Reasonable in Insur- Decades, assuring Courts should be concerned with ance Law Two 51 Ohio St.L.J. After (1990).4 later, purchasing public’s years however, rea- Five Thus, expectations sonable are appeared pull fulfilled. the court back from its regardless ambiguity, or lack there- enthusiastic endorsement of the doctrine. of, Indeed, given inherent in a set insurance in Standard Venetian Blind v.Co. (whether they applications, documents Empire American Ins. 503 Pa. riders, receipts, (1983), policies, conditional or A.2d 563 the court failed even to whatever), public right expect acknowledge opinion has a in Collister while they something eompa- holding will receive ... “where limitation alleged for Nationwide's Reading concerns in view of the Should an Insured Be Rewarded Not procedures Policy?, (1992); fact that its necessitate reliance Roger 41 Drake L.Rev. 705 Henderson, representations consumer on the Expec- of an insurance C. The Doctrine Reasonable agent." Decades, Id. at 370. This notion that insurers tations in Insurance Law Two After bring upon (1990); Ware, through these Stephen lawsuits themselves Ohio St.L.J. 823 J. A *8 practices Doctrine, something Critique their arcane is of a theme Expectations the Reasonable of Pennsylvania Supreme (1989); Rahdert, subsequent the Court's 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1461 Mark C. subject. Reconsidered, cases on the Expectations Reasonable 18 Conn. (1986); Abraham, Judge- L.Rev. 323 S. Kenneth Keeton, Rights 3. Judge-Made Robert E. Insurance Honoring Law at Made and Law Insurance: Provisions, Insured, Policy Variance with 961, Expectations 83 Harv.L.Rev. the Reasonable the of (1970) (providing (1981). following Among the formu- Va.L.Rev. 1151 the courts that doctrine, expectations principle: lation of the clearly adopted reasonable have not the the state- objectively expectations ap- Pennsylvania Supreme "The reasonable ments of the Court are plicants Henderson, regarding perhaps and intended conflicting. E.g., beneficiaries the the most terms of insurance contracts will be honored 51 Ohio St.L.J. at 829-31. though painstaking study policy pro- even of the negated out, expecta- visions would have tions.”). points those 4. As Professor Henderson Professor article, Keeton, by Since Professor Keeton's Judge con- who that time had become Keeton, siderable number of have adopting trees been sacrificed in read Collister as the doctrine of expectations the name expectations explicitly go of reasonable the aca- as reasonable "in a form community ing beyond merely demic has resolving ambiguities against debated what reasonable means, expectations adopted Davenport Royal courts have insurers.” Peters Co. v. Globe doctrine, Co., (D.Mass. the F.Supp. and whether it is desirable for them Ins. 291 & n. 5 1980) (Keeton, J.). generally Ingram, to have done so. See John D.

13H Pennsylvania signifi- This is coverage law. Id. deny stated insurer to upon the relied charge: given content of the dis- cant the conspicuously and clearly is worded may the conse- not avoid the insured played, the cases have said: the This is what by proof that he limitation of that quences ... upon burden is the insurer establish not limitation or he did the that failed to read ... and the awareness under- insured’s so, at 567. Even it.” 469 A.2d understand So, even standing the exclusions. light “in of the manifest that the noted court in this is though the initial burden case an power between bargaining inequality stays plaintiff and it with the with the purchaser of insur- company and a insurance indeed, plaintiff, upon there is a burden justified in ance, may on occasion be a court company in this case to of a con- plain language deviating from prove you by preponderance of the Id. insurance.” tract of evidence, and insured] that was aware [the that understood the exclusion existed Pennsylvania Supreme Finally, in here.... Mut. Farm decided Tonkovic State Court court). the trial (quoting Id. at 922 A.2d 920 Pa. Ins. Auto point consequence is that the second insurer, (1987). followingits In Tonkovic the holding was in ac- expressly noted application and acceptance of the insured’s Collister, proceeded at cord with id. and scope unilaterally limited the payment, provisions of quote the core the Collister by inserting coverage provided opinion, including the second block lan- informed about which never an exclusion quoted at guage that above. Id. we Despite unambiguity of the the insured. exclusion, Vene- the court felt Standard distinguishable. Standard In tian Blind Collister, with Standard Faced Vene Blind, reasoned, poli- the court Venetian Tonkovic, Blind, we are tian unable be, and what cy purported what “was any categorical distinction draw between liability pol- purchased, the insured Pennsylvania types of cases in which courts all the usual icy,” 521 A.2d at expectations of the will allow the reasonable and exclusions. incidents unambiguous language insured to defeat the of an those which insurance between cases find a crucial distinction adhering general rule of courts will follow the type of applies specific for a one where policy. precise to the terms One unilaterally limits coverage and the insurer cases, emerges from all the how theme coverage, resulting policy quite in a ever, chary that courts are to be about requested, from what the insured different companies allowing to abuse their insurance pre- where the insured and cases received Thus we position their customers. vis-a-vis cisely coverage requested that he but insurer or its that where the are confident clauses to read the to discover failed agent in the insured creates usual incident of that are the supported that is not expectation of applied for. expectation policy that by the terms Accordingly, court held that “where Id. prevail will over applies prepays ... individual cases, simply way of many this is another coverage, the insurer specific insurance made supreme court clear saying what the change coverage provid- unilaterally Tonkovic, may not make an insurer *9 showing that the without an affirmative ed un changes policy an insurance unilateral understood, of, the notified and insured was the policyholder the of it both less notifies the insured regardless of whether change, policyholder that the changes and ensures (emphasis at 925 add- policy.” the Id. read significance. In other understands their ed). straightforward more requires a cases equitable es application principles the of Tonko- of couple points about the A of other recognized, which, court has toppel as this mentioning. first of opinion vic bear Park, v. 933 F.2d American Ins. Co. found that West specifically that the court these (3d Cir.1991), 1236, the underlie eases correctly 1239 jury court’s instruction the trial 1312 Township change discussed and are manifest in informed of the and

that we have its repeated significance, prevail then supreme the court’s observations Insurers must be- cause, view, industry policy unambiguously in our the that insurance and its recondite coverage excludes for claims such as practices responsible are for deviations from the one types In of at issue here. rule. both cases the insured, as a result of insurer’s either persuaded by Township’s We are thus ar- actively providing misinformation about the gument that dismissal to Rule by scope coverage provided or of 12(b)(6) inappropriate. Before the dis- notify passively failing to the insured of trict court denied the motion to amend and changes policy, something in the receives Township’s complaint dismissed for failure to thought purchased.5 it In other than what it claim, state a it should have allowed discov- consequence, supreme court as the was care- ery it to enable to review the circumstances Collister, point at ful to out both 388 A.2d surrounding agreement in or- 1353, Tonkovic, 926, 521 A.2d at “the Township might der to determine whether position reap insurer is often expectation have had a reasonable of cover- understanding lack of benefit of the insured’s age in despite language this situation of of the transaction.” will We therefore reverse and remand so that the district court can take In this case had the district court steps. these additional permitted Township to amend its proceed discovery, Township might with Unconscionability B. types have been able to assert one of these of remand, Township might claims. On be able Township argues also that the new change to demonstrate that Insurers did not exclusion clause was unconscionable because language of the exclusion until after most, all, effectively abrogated if not Insurers, agreed had its renew with coverage agreement under the and because notify and that Insurers either did not Town only a handful of type carriers offered this ship change the exclusion or did not coverage. “Unconscionability requires significance explain change. two-fold determination: that the contractual unreasonably terms are Alternatively, Township might favorable to the be able to drafter meaningful there is no demonstrate Insurers somehow misled it that, part party regard choice on the of the other indicating despite ing acceptance provisions.” policy, World claims such as the one at issue wide Brady, Underwriters Ins. Co. v. here would be covered. (3d Cir.1992) (citing F.2d Koval v. sum, In we believe that could Liberty Pa.Super. Mut. Ins. conceivably prove that it had (1987)). A.2d Bishop See also expectation coverage despite policy lan- Washington, Pa.Super. 480 A.2d guage appears to those not familiar with (1984); Robert E. Keeton Alan& relationship unambiguously with Insurers Widiss, 6.3(b)(2) (1988) § I. Insurance Law preclude coverage, and that it therefore (“In ... unambiguous some cases lan might stress, coverage. be able to obtain guage policy provides of an insurance so little however, holding that our must not be over- coverage that it would be unconscionable to If stated. was aware of the it.”). permit the insurer to enforce change provision in the exclusion before it elected to renew its Township argues application Insurers and Here representation Insurers made no arising the exclusion to claims scope reduced, equitable, non-monetary would not be or if disputes, unreason- agreed ably after to renew Insurers favors Insurers. Under the terms of contrast, not, cases like Standard Venetian Blind certain events when its terms it does nor change concern situations where the has no rea- insured made a in the terms of after the *10 believing policy agreed purchase sonable basis for that a covers insured has to insurance with- is, informing change events that it does not. That the insurer has out the insured of the and its policy consequences. neither told the insurer that a would cover Township any party that it is the intention such agreed pay to policy, Insurers the money damages. party responsible the Insureds for for to hold civil claims for all seeking strictly any specified Wrongful suits Act did not cover results of policy if it Township argues that equitable alleged relief.6 to have done done or been commencement of the a claim at the had filed acting capacity in afore- Insureds while dispute, Insurers would Blanche Road state mentioned; or express coverage under have denied (b) Entity or the Insureds The Public Township that it asserts terms any aware of occurrence shall become apply the exclusion for Insurers is unfair may subsequently give rise to a deny coverage of the broadly so as to being against made the Insureds claim § it relat- 1983 action because Blanche Road Act; respect any Wrongful such disputes prior disputes, when these ed Entity Then the Public or the Insureds would not have been of a nature which were give practicable as written shall as soon agreement and thus covered Company receipt of notice to the the basis of a claim not have been would notice under Clause such written or oral prior policy. any similar it or under under 4(a) Clause or of such occurrence under unconscionable, Township The exclusion 4(b). Upon receipt the Insurer’s of such litiga- contends, majority of its because may subsequently any claim which notice originates state administrative tion arising against the Insureds out be made first Generally, a claimant will proceedings. shall, alleged Wrongful Act for the of such Township agency.7 Such relief from a seek Policy, be treated as a purposes of this money rarely ripen into lawsuits for disputes period hr during claim made he cannot damages plaintiff finds unless given given or if which such notice was through agen- local adequate relief obtain discovery during period as the extended this, Township cy proceedings. Because discovery period. during such claim made interpreted by as that the exclusion believes Township can provision As a result of virtually coverage, no Insurers leaves it with coverage long all its claims so as obtain for non-monetary relief that claims for since during potential claims notifies Insurers during policy period are not cov- arise only policy period. effects ered, monetary al- for relief will and claims then, exclusionary language, are to additional inevitably pre-poli- somehow tied most gap in aforementioned create the cy litigation and therefore excluded. of notifica- place and to the additional burden drastically the extent overstates Township. of these effects tion on Neither coverage. exclusion reduces its to which the in our view. unconscionable render gap in reality, only creates a the exclusion those claims that Township’s IV. prior to the effec- arisen in some form policy. This is because of tive date of the contention Lastly, Township’s we address policy, which states as 4 of the Condition abused its discretion that the district court follows: for sanc- by granting cross motion Insurers’ hearing during policy period

If or extended Rule 11. After tions under discovery period: motion, imposed a sanction the district Township had

(a) Entity the sum of $20008 or the Insureds The Public court to deter- a motion with the district oral notice from filed receive written or shall Board, Board, Zoning Hearing Appeals payments Code excludes 6. The Committee, Advisory Budget claims, relief, Environmental seeking or re- 4. a. dress, demands Board, Corp. Development money damages; Economic any than and the form other claims, expenses relating de- b. fees or redress, seeking relief or mands or actions costs 8.Although that their Insurers first claimed damages. money than form other answering the Rule motion associated $8,800, and then lowered amounted to adminis- at least seventeen maintains $5,535, a rea- the court determined Among amount them and Boards. trative Commissions Council, Auditors, $2000. to be sonable sanction Board of are the *11 1314 59(e) Inc., (3d 277, Rule timely Cir.1991), mine the motion while a 930 F.2d 289 cert. — denied,

petition —, rehearing pending 373, for was before U.S. 112 S.Ct. (1991) L.Ed.2d 324 Finding dupli- (quoting this Court. the motion to be Jones v. Pitts cative, (3d burgh Corp., 1350, the district Nat’l 899 F.2d court held that Cir.1990)). inquiry had failed to conduct a reasonable prior filing. It concluded that Insurers Township’s We original appeal dismissed expense having incurred needless to re- jurisdiction for lack of specifying without spond Township’s jurisdictionally defective basis for our speculat- decision. Instead of motion. ing dismissal, about our rationale Township sought by clarification of the order have held may that Rule 11 sanctions filing petition for rehearing. Apparently exceptional be awarded in circumstances in believing may that the dismissal have been “discourage plaintiffs order to bringing 59(e) motion, pending due to the Rule Town- making baseless actions or frivolous mo- ship also filed a motion in district court to Doering County tions.” v. Union Bd. of determine that motion. (3d Freeholders, 191, Chosen 857 F.2d Cir.1988). Daily also See Morristown Rec- correctly The district court noted ord, Union, Graphic Inc. v. Communications that, the well principle settled once a notice 8N, (3d 31, Cir.1987) Local 832 F.2d 32 n. 1 filed, appeal jurisdiction longer is no (noting that “Rule 11 is not to be used rou- vested the district court. Griggs v. Provi tinely parties disagree when the about the 56, 58, dent Consumer Discount 459 U.S. correct resolution in litigation”). of matter 400, 401-02, (1982). 103 S.Ct. 74 L.Ed.2d 225 provides part The Rule in relevant prevents This rule “the confusion and ineffi signature attorney party or con- ciency necessity which would of result were signer stitutes a certificate two considering courts to be the same issue signer motion, pleading, has read the or simultaneously.” Sweet, or issues Venen v. paper; other to the sig- best of the (3d 117, Cir.1985). are, 758 F.2d There knowledge, ner’s information and belief however, exceptions to this rule.9 inquiry formed after reasonable it is well Specifically, premature “a appeal notice of grounded in fact and is warranted exist- does not jurisdic divest the court district ing good law or a argument faith for the House, tion.” Mondrow v. Fountain extension, modification, or reversal of (3d ex- Cir.1989) added). F.2d (emphasis law, isting interposed it is not for We have held that delay avoid at any improper purpose, such as to harass or the trial level “district courts should continue unnecessary delay to cause or needless jurisdiction to exercise their when faced with litigation....

increase in the cost of clearly premature appeal.” notices Id. Township’s Because appeal pre notice of was imposes The Rule duty an affirmative mature, Township’s filing of the motion to parties inquiry conduct determine the Rule motion was not applicable into the law and facts objective outside the bounds of reasonable Guides, filing. Business Inc. v. Chromatic ness. Enters., Inc., Communications 498 U.S. 922, 933, 111 S.Ct. 112 L.Ed.2d 1140 Insurers maintain that Mondrow does (1991). Healthcare, See also apply Garr U.S. to the instant facts because was not Inc., (3d Cir.1994). 22 F.3d 1274 An inquiry Township’s appeal clear that premature. is considered reasonable under the circum- argument We find this to be without merit. if provides party stances “an Township’s There is no doubt that June ‘objective knowledge or belief at the time of letter could be considered to be a mo- filing challenged paper’ 59(e). tion to amend to Rule well-grounded claim was in law and fact.” expressly requested letter that the district Prods., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit clarify Motor applied whether its order to all example, during relief, pendency For ap- regarding of an ap- issue orders the record on peal, applications peal, district court review and vacate a bond and order bail arrest. fees, Venen, attorney's grant modify injunctive or 758 F.2d at n. 2.

1315 V. the case it dismissed and whether parties requested The letter also prejudice. without dismissing reverse the order We will complaint. While an amended to file leave 12(b)(6) to Fed.R.Civ.P. denying the re- entered an order the court court for and remand the case to the district complaint, the order an amended quest to file opin- with this proceedings further consistent 59(e) As a Rule motion. as to the was silent addition, ion. In we will reverse the order dispose to the court’s failure result of imposing a Rule 11 sanction the district motion, Township’s appeal could well against Township. so, If it premature. would to be deemed of reason for within the bounds then be to determine the HUTCHINSON, to file the motion Judge, Circuit on its conclusion motion based

Rule Concurring. continue to exer- district court would join opinion I I write Court. jurisdiction. cise only emphasize separately to the distinction Furthermore, support for can find no we between this case and Standard Venetian Township’s motion was any allegation that Co., Empire Blind Co. v. American Ins. 503 or cause unneces- attempt to harass Insurers 300, (1983), embodies Pa. 469 A.2d 563 judicial proceedings. To sary delay of the Pennsylvania’s general practice applying Township appeared to be en- contrary, language” construe exclu- “plain rule to in jurisdictional defect deavoring to cure the sionary liability insurance con- clauses Indeed, appellate to facilitate review. tracts, considering “reasonable instead of argue support of the sanction Insurers Stan- expectations” of the insured. Since have chosen one of two Township should that decided, appears Blind was dard Venetian 1) procedural options: seek rehear- realistic Pennsylvania excep- that has created to me 2) persuade the ing in or seek to this Court plain language rule which make tions to yet its court that it had not resolved district inapplicable to the facts now before that rule If Insurers can advocate Rule 59 motion. us. have taken action should apparent It that Standard Ve now seems court, we do not find unreasonable either rejec signal Blind did not wholesale netian Township, of the choice it should unsure principle expectations tion of the reasonable make, on the mer- sought protect to its case Rempel Nationwide v. foreshadowed by taking in both courts. its actions Life Inc., 404, Pa. 370 A.2d 366 Ins. Co. surrounding the is- grey areas There are (1977), v. Nationwide expressed in Collister appeals, appealability, prematurity of sues of Co., A.2d 1346 479 Pa. Ins. Life jurisdiction during period and the situs of denied, (1978), 439 U.S. 99 S.Ct. cert. attempting clarify rulings party when (1979), reiterated in L.Ed.2d 55 district court and the by either or both the Co., Ins. Farm Mut. Auto. Tonkovic State ripe- appellate court. the issue of the When (1987). Instead, I 513 Pa. 521 A.2d clear, party should appeal of an is not ness no more Blind did think Standard Venetian taking 11 for sanctioned under Rule not be v. North reject attempt of Hionis than steps perfect appeal or Pa.Super. ern Mut. Ins. stringent clarify A more rule its status. (1974), wholly divorce the con A.2d 363 liti- penalize the confused but cautious would exclusionary from their clauses struction of aim of Rule 11. gant. That is not the (insurer duty affirmative id. has text. See reasons, find we do not For all of these of all exclusions explain the effect the bounds of so exceeded regard to the without precise, concrete terms imposed. should be Rule 11 that sanctions policy or the clarity language of the contrary that the district find to the expectations). the insured’s reasonableness of appropri- court abused its discretion Blind, all Thus, in Standard Venetian justify imposition circumstances to ate Pennsylvania Supreme Court not members of the against Township did a Rule 11 sanction apply agreed that Hionis’s failure exist. gener- support theory clear of the exclusions of the would liability policy was inconsistent with the al it received did not cover risks it was reason- objective theory of contracts. The Hionis ably led to believe would be covered. rationale would covered insureds *13 subject This case is to much the same they against risks as to which had no reason- analysis that in Justice Manderino used his Indeed, coverage. expectation able of the plurality opinion announcing judgment the majority recog- in Standard Venetian Blind Rempel. analysis my the court in That inequality bargaining nized the “manifest unobjectionable mind an that embodies rule power company an insurance between an insurer should not be allowed to disclaim insurance,” purchaser reasoning that a coverage after a loss occurred of a risk that plain on occasion deviate from the company its insured advised the it wanted language of a contract of insurance. Stan- 410-12, Rempel, covered. 471 Pa. at 370 Blind, Co., 307, dard Venetian 503 Pa. at A.2d at 371. Accordingly, A.2d at 567. under Erie R. Co. 817, Although Pennsylvania Supreme the Tompkins, Court v. 304 U.S. 58 S.Ct. (1938), correctly adopt I think in Standard Venetian Blind did not L.Ed. 1188 the Court form, Rempel principle decides insured should be the its broad the given opportunity pursue discovery an antipathy Rempel plurality expressed, purpose uncovering evidence companies failure of insurance to alert would tend to show Bensalem was not sold likely their customers to exclusions are policy Surplus it asked International occurs, to remain until hidden a loss provide, Lines to was not advised that this reiterated, by majority, this time in Collis- policy coverage “claims-made” left it without out, points ter. As the Court took Collister covered, prom- for risks it wanted or that the important step an towards the reasonable given largely illusory ises were made expectation Pennsylvania standard when the way in- restrictive exclusions the “[cjourts stated, Supreme Court should be surer relies on interact with the claims-made assuring concerned with that the insurance policy. public’s expectations purchasing Collister, ease, Collister, are fulfilled.” 479 Pa. at present

In the inas Furthermore, A.2d at 1353. as the Court policy claims that the it received demonstrates, cogently and, policy this theme was con- buy was not the it wanted to most Tonkovic, Pennsylvania tinued in significantly, was led Su- the insurer to be- preme purchasing. pronouncement Court’s most recent discovery lieve it was matter, designed support insured seeks is on this and thereafter in the deci- Therefore, allegation. Pennsylvania I sions of Superior believe the Court Court correctly decides that the opinion. Major- should also cited this Court’s See given opportunity ity Op. to discover evidence at 1308-09.1 Tonkovic, however, analyzed policy, which can be in terms of an In a claims-made limitation of coverage illusory promise, policy to claims filed within the term is relevant here because Bensa- can sometimes interact with broad exclusions Township's policy lem is a “claims-made" present like those here to defeat the "reasonable such, As it limits to claims filed within expectations” cases, Tonkovic, perhaps, of the insured or in some policy's term. Standard Venetian Blind in- promised coverage illusory. make the See pro- volved an "occurrence-made" 920; 513 Pa. A.2d Worldwide vided covered event that oc- (3d Brady, Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 973 F.2d 192 term, during regard curred without Cir.1992). Pennsylvania’s exceptions to the when claim was made. See American Cas. plain language rule of Standard Venetian Blind Continisio, Reading, Pennsylvania Co. advantages seek to balance the relative an insur- (3d Cir.1994) (discussing F.3d differences company underwriting ance has in claims-made policies). between claims- occurrence-made policies expecta- with the insured's reasonable policies Claims-made allow the insurer to make a coverage. tions of See Zuckerman v. National precise premiums more calculation of based Union Fire Ins. 100 N.J. 495 A.2d 395 assumed, upon the costs of the risks a calculation (1985) (for an excellent discussion of the discrete difficult, impossible, that is if not in an occur- presented by issues policies). claims and occurrence made Still, rence-made where the insurer is faced if insurance is to serve its basic potential liability with tin unlimited "tail” of purpose splitting ex- economic loss that would be tending beyond policy period. catastrophic single among group to a insured agree with the Court Accordingly, I not, the circum- under STATES of America v.

Pennsylvania would UNITED Venetian here, apply Standard stances to exclude Bensa- language rule

Blind’s plain 93-1377, QUINTERO, Appellant Melba if it coverage it seeks Township from the lem reasonably expected such can show Rodriguez, 93-1386, Appellant Maria Instead, Pennsylvania I think coverage. lan- technical beyond the strict would look 93-1389, Gonzalez, Appellant Santiago exclusion to determine guage policy’s of this told the insurer coverage the insured what Jose Gonzalez-Rivera a/k/a *14 rea- buy the insurer and whether Otero, wanted “Tosti”, Aberto sonably expect it to such led Gonzalez-Rivera, Appellant Jose it tendered. terms 93-1415, opinion of the Accordingly, join I Cruz, Appellant 93-1416, Jose Court. SLOVITER, Judge, Chief Before: Joaquin Morgado, Appellant in 93-1572. MANSMANN, BECKER, STAPLETON 93-1377, 93-1386, 93-1389, Nos. 93- SCIRICA, HUTCHINSON, GREENBERG, and 93-1572. 93-1416 ALITO, ROTH, COWEN, NYGAARD, McKEE, LEWIS, Judges. Circuit Appeals, States Court of United

Third Circuit. FOR REHEARING SUR PETITION Argued March 1994. IN BANC Decided Oct. 1, 1994]

[Nov. by appel- rehearing filed petition for having ease been

lees the above-entitled participated in judges who

submitted to the other of this and to all the

the decision Court regu- judges of the circuit in

available circuit service, judge con- and no who

lar active having for re- in the decision asked

curred majority judges circuit

hearing, and a active service

of the circuit regular court rehearing by

having voted for

banc, petition rehearing is denied. risks, exchange? exclusions in facing of cov- continue such persons similar exclusion question to do no more than here be meant erage particular insured is more for losses that a who, they problem of moral risk. Whether necessary. For solve or less certain to suffer said, go deprive insured of the cover- give up pepper- far as to so it was once would not as who, reasonably expected remains to age to receive exchange pound mat- no corn in long pounds, seen. could ter how well endowed

Case Details

Case Name: Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Company Crum & Forster Managers Corporation, (Ill)
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Nov 1, 1994
Citation: 38 F.3d 1303
Docket Number: 93-1071 and 93-1072
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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