Bennett v. WhitleyBennett v. Whitley
A state refusing to listen to a habeas claim because it was decided оn direct appeal does not impose a procedural bar to federal review of the constitutional issue. We reverse the district court‘s contrary holding and remand.
I.
On December 12, 1981, Dedrick Bennеtt and his accomplice, Shug Bell, entered a convenience store intending to rob the clerk. A shеriff‘s deputy interrupted the robbery, and Shug Bell killed both the deputy and the clerk. Bennett claims that he fled the scene before Shug Bell killed the deputy and the clerk.
The state district court denied Bennett‘s first three claims on the grounds that they were barred by procedural default pursuant to
Bennett‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court asserted the samе four grounds for relief. A magistrate judge found that Bennett‘s insufficient evidence and jury charge claims were procedurally barred pursuant to
The district court judge adopted the magistrate judge‘s repоrt and denied relief. Bennett filed a notice of appeal, and we granted a CPC. Bennett raises аs error only the district court‘s procedural default holdings; he does not challenge the district court‘s dеnial of relief on the double jeopardy and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
II.
The district court erroneously held that Bennett‘s claims were barred by procedural default. There are three primer rules and a presumption behind today‘s ruling. First, “[w]hen a state-law default prevents the state сourt from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2593 (1991). Second, if the last state court to reach the issue looks to its merits, then the federal courts are also free to review the issue on its merits. Id. Third, in determining whether to reach the merits of a pеtitioner‘s claim, the district court must look to the last state court decision. Id. To assist courts in deciding upоn what grounds the last state court decision rests, the Supreme Court fashioned the following presumption: “whеre there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Id. at 2594. The Court held
The only common circumstance in which the presumption is unrealistic is that in which the later state decision rests upon a prohibition against further state review -- for example, an unexplained denial of state habeas resting in fact upon a rule . . . preventing the relitigation on state habeas of clаims raised on direct appeal. In that circumstance, even though the presumption does not рosit the real reason for the later denial, it does produce a result . . . that is the correct one for federal habeas courts. Since a later state decision based upon ineligibility for further state review neither rests upon procedural default nor lifts a pre-existing procedural default, its effect upon the availability of federal habeas is nil -- which is precisely the effect accorded by the “look-through” presumption.
Id. at 2595 n.3. This is Bennett‘s case.
III.
The judgment dismissing as procedurally barred Bennett‘s claims of insufficient evidence and flawed jury charge is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.