47 N.Y.S. 569 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1897
. We agree with the learned judge at Trial Term that the Statute of Limitations did not run against the plaintiffs? claim during the period of Mr. Watspn’s absence in Florida and Europe. It is quite clear that during this period Mr. W atson was not a resident of this State, but resided first in Florida and later in Europe. The appeh lant’s contention is based upon an erroneous view of the meaning of the word “ -residence,” as applied to the Statute of Limitations. The appellant treats it as equivalent to “ domicile.” Section 401 of the Code, however, does not require a change of domicile to prevent the running of the statute. It may be that Mr. Watson’s domicile, remained unchanged during the -three years of his absence in Florida and Europe. But his residence was undoubtedly without this State; He was not a mere traveler as was .the case in Hart v. Kip (148 N. Y. 306). He went abroad for a special purpose, namely, the recovery of his son’s health/and his intention was to-remain abroad
There is a class of cases in which domicile and residence are treated as synonymous, as where a statute prescribes residence as k qualification of the enjoyment of a privilege or the exercise of a franchise. There, as was said in People v. Platt (117 N. Y. 167), the word residence is equivalent to the place of domicile of the person who claims this benefit. (See, also, Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556, and de Meli v. de Meli, 120 id. 485.) Non-residence, however, is not the equivalent of non domicile when the word non-resident is used in statutes affording creditors a remedy hy attachment, or where residence without the State is required to limit the effect of a debtor’s absence upon the creditor’s ordinary remedies against him. In such cases it is sufficient to constitute. non-residence that the person absenting himself should have a settled abode without the State, with the intention of remaining there permanently, at least for a time (that is, not transiently), for business or other purposes. (Frost v. Brisbin, 19 Wend. 11.) Were an actual foreign domicile required, such statutes could easily be evaded. Indeed, the case would be a rare one when the creditor could make proof sufficient to secure the benefit of the statute.
There is another point in this case which is fatal to the defend
It is true that a promise by one partner after dissolution will not . revive the debt as to his former copartner; nor will even payment upon account by such partner have that effect. This rule, however, proceeds upon the cessation of any presumed agency, and simply denies the power of a joint debtor. after dissolution to bind his co-debtor by any affirmative act of his. Here, however, the defendant who was served did nothing actively or affirmatively. He simply received the summons and the statute provided the effect.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Yak Bbunt, P. J., Rumsey, Williams and Patteksok, JJ., concurred. "
Judgment affirmed, with costs.