37 Ga. App. 20 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1927
The accusation in this case, as amended, alleges “that the said Julius Bennett on or about the 1st day of December in the year 1926, in the county aforesaid, then and there unlawfully, having contracted with T. H. Bennett to perform for him certain services, necessary in the conduct of a turpentine farm, to wit, chip certain pine trees, dip gum, or any other kind of ■ labor usually performed in the conduct of a turpentine farm for the usual wages paid for said class of labor to wit, $1.50 per 1000 for chipping and from $2.00 to $2.50 per thousand when rented, with intent to procure from him money and other things of value, and not to perform the services so contracted for, did without good and sufficient cause fail and refuse either to perform said services or to return the money so advanced, to the
In Sheffield v. State, 13 Ga. App. 78 (78 S. E. 828), the first paragraph of the decisioar is as follows: “To authorize a conviction uaider the ‘labor-coaatract act5 of 1903 (Penal Code, § 715), the evidence must show a coartract of service, distinct aard definite as to all essential terms, such as the time whear the contract is to commence and termiarate, the amount of wages to be paid, how the laborer is to work, whether by the dajr, week, month, or year, where he is to work, and the character of the work to be performed. Starling v. State, 5 Ga. App. 171 (62 S. E. 993); Mosely v. State, 2 Ga. App. 189 (58 S. E. 298); Glenn v. State, 123 Ga. 585 (51 S. E. 605); McCoy v. State, 124 Ga. 218 (52 S. E. 434); Presley v. State, 124 Ga. 446 (52 S. E. 750); Thorn v. State, ante, 10 (78 S. E. 853).” The coaatract iaa the instaaat case is aaot “distinct and definite as to all its esseaatial terms.” It is not distinct as to the time when the term of service was to- begiaa. The contract was made “oaa or about the 1st day of December,” 1926, and the accused was to begiaa work “aaot later than the 8th day of January, 1927.” The work could have commenced immediately after the contract was made. The contract is indefinite
Judgment reversed.