239 S.W. 951 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1922
Lead Opinion
Appellant was convicted in the Criminal District Court of Bowie County of the offense of keeping a house of prostitution, and her punishment fixed at a fine of $200 and twenty days in the county jail.
The State moves to dismiss the appeal for two reasons, one because of a defective caption, and the other because of a defective recognizance. The ground upon which the State bases its contention that the recognizance herein is defective is that in reciting the court before which the appellant should make her appearance from day to day and term to term, the recognizance uses the language "this court." It is contended that the recognizance should name the court before which appellant was bound to appear. This was the rule prior to the adoption of Articles 903 and 919, Vernon's C.C.P. In each of said named articles, however, the Legislature has seen fit to lay down the exact form for a recognizance upon appeal in felony and misdemeanor cases respectively. An examination of the form of recognizance required by Article 919 in cases of misdemeanor, reveals the fact that it is in the exact language of the recognizance appearing in the record in the instant case. An examination of the authorities cited by the State in its motion discloses that they are cases in which the punishment affixed by the judgment, is not named in the recognizance. We would not feel ourselves justified in adding to the requirements of a recognizance which is expressly made sufficient by legislative enactment.
The other ground of the State's motion to dismiss appears to be well taken. We are not informed by the caption of the transcript herein as to the length of the trial term of the court below, nor of the ending of said term, and hence it is impossible to decide whether the statement of facts and bills of exception appearing in the record, are filed within the time required by law. Because of the lack of definiteness of said caption same is insufficient, and motion of the State as based on this ground will be granted and the appeal will be dismissed.
Dismissed.
Addendum
This case was dismissed at a former day of this term because of a defective caption to the transcript, but appellant now presents a certified and corrected caption, and the dismissal will be set aside and the case considered and decided upon its merits. We find no brief on file for appellant. *424
The refusal of three special charges is presented as erroneous in the first three bills of exception. Neither exhibits any error. One of said charges asked a peremptory instruction of not guilty, which was properly refused. Another asked that the jury be told that a reasonable doubt is such doubt as would govern one in deciding a matter in the more serious affairs of life. We do not think it necessary to change the well recognized rules of law relating to instructions upon the question of reasonable doubt. Branch Ann. P.C., pp.
4-5. The other of said charge sought to have the jury told that there could be no conviction unless other women resorted to or resided in the house charged as a disorderly house, and that evidence of guilt based solely on the general reputation of said house was not sufficient. Neither of said propositions was appropriate to the evidence in the instant case. This court has held that a conviction may be sustained where but one prostitute resided in the alleged disorderly house. Ramey v. State,
Several bills of exception were reserved to the testimony of different people to the fact that said house in question bore the reputation of a bawdy house. Such testimony was competent. Vernon's C.C.P., p. 245; Branch's Ann. P.C., Sec. 1069 for authorities.
That appellant made no denial of such fact when informed by the health officer of the city of Texarkana that he had a report showing her house to be a bawdy house, would seem to be provable against her. Moore v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App. 18; Holden v. State, 18 Texas Crim. App. 106; Farris v. State,
Complaint is made by several bills of exception of questions asked appellant when on the witness stand testifying in her own behalf. We find nothing in any of said bills presenting error. When one accused of crime becomes a witness in his own behalf he occupies the same attitude as any other witness and may be cross-examined, and may be asked questions calling for evidence of his guilt in the case on trial, and we think it perfectly legitimate to ask appellant on such cross-examination if she did not know that men came to her house for the purpose of staying with women, and if she had not seen such men go into rooms with girls, and if she did not know their purpose in such action was carnal intercourse.
There is nothing in the record which would make a recital of its *425 facts either enlightening or interesting because of the statements of the witness or the facts set forth and we forego any narration of the testimony.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
